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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Utah R. App. 
P. 4(a). Third District Court Judge Leon Dever denied mentally disabled pro se plaintiff-
appellant Lowery's motion to amend complaint on March 18, 2002, and issued a 
memorandum and order granting defendant-appellee BYU's motion to dismiss on 
December 12, 2002. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on December 31, 2002. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Didthe trial court err or abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff Lowery's 
"Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Motion to Amend Complaint" because 
Lowery's motion to amend was "not very timely"? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether to grant or deny a motion to amend is *a matter 
within the broad discretion of the trial court and we [will not] disturb its ruling unless 
the [[appellant]] establishes an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice/ Chadwick v. 
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)." "Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure directs that leave to amend pleadings 'shall be freely given when justice 
so requires.' Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Moreover, "'rule 15 should be interpreted liberally so 
as to allow parties to have their claims fully adjudicated.'99 Sulzen v. Wiliams, 1999 UT 
App 76, 513, 977 P.2d 497 (quoting Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 
1993)). This is especially true when the motion to amend is made well in advance of trial. 
See Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981) ("The rule in this state has always 
been to allow amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is this true before 
trial/" (Quoting Gilliman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971)))." 
Nunez v. Albo. 2002 UT App 247,519. 
"The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion.' Kasco 
Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). Because they present questions of 
law, in reviewing summary judgments and rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, 4we accord no 
deference to the trial court's determinations and review the issues under a correctness 
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standard/ Harmon Citv, Inc. v. Nielson & Senior. 907 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1995)." 
Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, 512; 977 R2d 497. 
2. Didthe trial court err or abuse its discretion by denying Lowery's motion to 
amend complaint because the trial court didn't believe that the motion to amend (the 
amended complaint) did not address "any new issues in this matter"? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In deciding on a motion to amend, the trial court should 
primarily consider whether granting the motion would subject the opposing party to 
unavoidable prejudice 'by having an issue adjudicated for which he had not had time to 
prepare.' Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983). In this case, 
Aurora seeks to amend its complaint to state an alternative theory of recovery. Where 
the amendment would advance a new theory of recovery based almost entirely on facts 
already in evidence, the court should liberally allow amendment because the opposing 
party is then generally prepared to address such a claim. See Foman [v.Davis], 371 U.S. 
[178] at 182 [(1962)] (allowing amendment where 'the amendment would have done no 
more than state an alternative theory for recovery')." Aurora v. Liberty West 
Development, Utah Supreme Court, Na 970154, p. 7. 
"In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to amend, we consider 
the timeliness of the motion, the justification for delay, and the resulting prejudice to the 
responding party. See Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight 845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)." Nielsen v. Hefferon, 1999UTApp317.1 
"The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion. Kasco 
Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). Because they present questions of 
law, in reviewing summary judgments and rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, "we accord no 
deference to the trial court's determinations and review the issues under a correctness 
standard." Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, J12, 977 P.2d 497. 
3. Did the trial court commit error, abuse its discretion, fail correctness, or deny 
Lowery access to due process by repeatedly dismissing the case before allowing 
4 
mentally disabled Lowery's scheduled oral argument, thereby triggering depressive-
manic cycling in Lowery's brain chemistry immediately before Lowery was 
subsequently allowed to make oral argument, especially when the court knew of and 
had acknowledged Lowery's severe and persistent mental illness and disability by 
granting Lowery's Motion for Reasonable Modificiation of Rules at the beginning of 
the case — thereby violating the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 United States Code, 
Chapter 126, Title II, Public Services, SEC. 202, DISCRIMINATION. 42 USC 12132 and 
SEC 203 ENFORCEMENT. 42 USC 12132? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Review for error, prejudice, abuse of discretion, and 
correctness. Bonham v Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989) and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
"...a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies^ practices, or procedures, when 
such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can 
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of 
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations." (PGA Tour 
Inc. v. Casey Martin, No. 00-24, May 29, 2001, p. 20; 532 U.S. 661 (2001); underlined 
emphasis added; italicized emphasis by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
"SEC. 202. DISCRIMINATION. 42 USC 12132 [Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990]. 
"Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 
by any such entity." 
"SEC. 502. STATE IMMUNITY. 42 USC 12202. 
'"A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a 
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violation of this Act. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of 
this Act, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a 
violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an 
action against any public or private entity other than a State." See University of 
Alabama, et. al. v. Garrett, et. «/., No. 99-1240, p. 1, footnote 1; p. 13, footnote 7; and p. 
14). 
4. Did the trial court err or abuse discretion by excluding "outside materials" in 
deciding defendant's motion to dismiss? Citation to Record to Preserve Issue on Appeal: 
Memorandum Decision and Order, December 12, 2002, p. 1. 
5. Did the trial court err or abuse discretion by granting defendant's motion to 
dismiss in the face of evidence supporting the contrary? 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW: "The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings is 
abuse of discretion. Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). 
Because they present questions of law, in reviewing summary judgments and rule 
12(b)(6) dismissals, "we accord no deference to the trial court's determinations and 
review the issues under a correctness standard," Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, 
512, 977 P.2d 497. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 10(f). 
Nunez v. Albo. 2002 UT App 247 
Sulzen v. Williams. 1999 UT App 76, JJ12; 977 P.2d 497 
42 USC Chapter 126 (Americans with Disabilities Act) 
PGA Tour Inc. v. Casey Martin. No. 00-24, May 29, 2001; 532 U.S. 661 
(2001) 







STATEMENT OF THE CASH 
( 
("BYU") solicited a Marriott School of Management confidential letter oi 
recommendation from mentally ill plaintiff-appellant Lower) in behalf of a B \ U 
applicant l 111*" tpiiliuuil I 
On or about March 12, 1995, Lowery provided the confidential letter of 
recommendation to BYE according to the BYE instructions on the official BYU form for 
t -lit ;-. ' .111 Il iiejMliu' statemen. .*:«nil Ih 
Applicant. Lower) included in the confidential letter substantial negative statements 
about the Applicant in response to BY1 ( explicit request for negative statements. 
1 cm ei } i elied oi l B V I I to 1 . , , .nm^^. ;—.. ^ ^uiiaeiu:aj iettei aboi it tl ie Applicant, 
given the obvious danger to Lowery if the letter fell into the hands o\ the Applicant. 
Between March 12. 1905 and \nril l f ' M:* , ?x 1 received I i n v e n t 
confidential letter for the Appncan:. iK;v\eu, „u. :n\w ti\ ^cei\eu Lower s 
confidential letter and March 12. 1995. BYU gave copies of Lowery's confidential letter 
to Applicant, who later anpri'\ confronted •• .; •'i. : *w -:- • wi1-, - / o n 
April _ .. i <U)5. ' 1 1 i»e Xp) ,i^ an; aho made public Lo\\er\ s naving made negat . e 
statements about the Applicant in the confidential letter for the Applicant. 
Lowery immediately contacted BYU Marriott School of Management to ask how 
the Applicant had gained possession of Lowery' s confidential letter. Af ter a i lumber of 
phone calls to BYU during the following three days, BYU employees admitted to 
Lowery that they had gi\en copies of Lowerv's letter to the Applicant, The\ :\<o 
directed Lowtri . . -i:-jeior m «.; . i . . , ; IJU .?I 
Management, and Dr. Hed Skousen. the dean of the Marriott School of Management, 
both of whom apologized in behalf of BYU 1 " -i v I « ^ cr\"- confidential Setter to 
the Applicant. Lowery requested from Aiorecnt acoj \ oi :-, \ \ on_,nai i ,owcr\"s 
confidential letter for the Applicant, The coin ot tlie (original was delivered n. Lo\* 
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When Lowery learned that the Applicant had made public in Lowery's 
community that Lowery had written substantially negative statements about the 
Applicant, Lowery feared that the Applicant would release copies of the letter to others 
in the community. Lowery contacted BYU Director Albrecht and requested that 
Albrecht retrieve the copies BYU had given to the Applicant. Albrecht told Lowery to 
contact BYU chief legal counsel Eugene Bramhall to request retrieval of the letter. On or 
about June 5, 1995, Bramhall told Lowery that BYU had done nothing illegal, that only 
the Applicant had acted illegally. Lowery asked Bramhall to retrieve all copies of 
Lowery's confidential letter from the Applicant. Bramhall told Lowery to go to the 
Applicant's church bishop and discover who the Applicant's psychological therapist 
was, and to report the therapist's name to Bramhall, who would retrieve the letter 
through the therapist. Lowery did so. Lowery attempted to contact Bramhall numerous 
times to discover if Bramhall had retrieved the letter as promised by Bramhall. Bramhall 
never returned Lowery's phone calls. 
BYU's actions caused, in part, severe and lasting physical and emotional distress 
and mental disability discovered after November 21, 1998, during treatment by BYU 
psychotherapist Dr. Michael Lambert, who has treated Lowery continuously since 
Lowery's psychotic breakdown on May 20, 1997, which took place during Lowery's 
part-time BYU employment. Dr. Lambert on August 29, 2000, and the Utah Third 
District Court on December 14, 2001, declared Lowery mentally disabled. 
Lowery filed the complaint against BYU on March 11, 2002, along with a Motion 
for Reasonable Modification of Rules required by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Title II, asking the trial court to modify rules to provide Lowery equal access to due 
process. The trial court granted Lowery's motion for reasonable modification of rules, 
particularly 30 days to respond to each of defendant's responses, motions, and 
arguments. BYU moved the trial court to dismiss the action; Lowery's response to the 
motion to dismiss included a request for hearing and oral argument. 
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On September 9, 2002, the trial court granted BYU's motion to dismiss without a 
hearing and oral argument. On September 11, 2002, the trial court set aside its grant of 
the motion to dismiss and ordered a hearing on the motion to dismiss. At the beginning 
of the October 18, 2002 hearing before the trial court on the motion to dismiss, Lowery 
submitted a written motion for leave to amend the complaint; without reading the cases 
cited in the motion to amend, the trial court immediately denied Lowery's motion for 
leave to amend the complaint for lack of timeliness and because the amended complaint 
did not offer any new material facts. The court also granted BYU's motion to dismiss the 
case without allowing oral argument by Lowery on the motion to dismiss. The trial 
court's summary dismissal of the case without allowing scheduled oral argument by 
Lowery triggered severe depressive-manic cycling in Lowery's brain chemistry, which 
seriously exacerbated Lowery's disability to think and speak clearly during oral 
argument. Lowery then objected to the Court's summary dismissal of the case without 
oral argument, and the district court then attempted to "weasel" around its prejudicial 
dismissal of the case and allowed Lowery to argue against the motion to dismiss; during 
argument, Lowery was in a state of severe depression and cycled into hyper mania, 
which greatly exacerbated his disability to make his subsequent argument. 
After argument, the trial court took the case under advisement and promised 
Lowery that the court would read the cases cited in Lowery's pleadings. Under the trial 
court's previous grant of Lowery's motion for 30 days to respond to defendant's 
arguments, Lowery filed a reply to BYU's response to Lowery's motion for leave to 
amend the complaint. While briefing its decision on the motion to dismiss, the trial court 
excluded from consideration Lowery's motion to amend and his reply to BYU's 
response to the motion to amend. The trial court's December 12, 2002 memorandum 
decision and order granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The videotape record of the 
October 18, 2002 hearing reveals Lowery's depressive breakdown and cycling into 
mania caused by the trial court. 
9 
Lowery appeals the trial court's denial of Lowery's motion to amend, the trial 
court's deliberate triggering of Lowery's brain chemistry cycling immediately prior to 
making his oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the trial court's exclusion of "outside 
materials" in deciding defendant's motion to dismiss, and the trial court's dismissal of 
the case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff had not enough time to make summary, as Court of Appeals has not yet 
acted on plaintiff's Notice to Submit on Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules 
and Amendment to Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In early 1995, defendant BYU hired Lowery part-time to teach one class for the 
BYU Political Science Department during the winter semester, from early January 
through mid-April. BYU again hired Lowery part-time to teach one class during the 
Spring Term, from May through June 1995. Aplt. App., pp. 25-50. 
On or about March 10, 1995, defendant-appellee Brigham Young University 
("BYU") solicited a Marriott School of Management confidential letter of 
recommendation from Lowery in behalf of a BYU admissions applicant ("the 
Applicant"). Aplt. Add., p. 26. The official BYU confidential letter form stated: 
CONFIDENTIAL LETTER OF 
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE 
MARRIOTT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
GRADUATE PROGRAMS 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
Academic reference: Faculty member / Professional Reference if EMBA or EMPA 
Part 1. (To be completed by applicant) 
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Part 2. (To be completed by recommender) 
The above individual has applied for admission to Brigham Young University's 
Marriott School of Management and is requesting a recommendation from you. 
The MSM will select those students who show the greatest promise of success as 
leaders in the private and public sectors. May we have your assistance in 
evaluating this applicant's potential. Your frank and confidential evalution of his 
or her abilities and attitudes will be appreciated. 
I have known the applicant: thoroughly fairly well superficially 
State nature and length of contact: 
Instructions for checking items 1 to 11: Extraordinary should be used sparingly; 
Outstanding is a very strong rating; and Above Average is a positive 
recommendation. The others are self-explanatory. 
1. Intellectual ability 
2. Ability to work with others 
3. Leadership potential and 
administrative ability 
4. Emotional stability and maturity 
5. Esteem in which applicant is held 
by faculty or other supervisors [ Evaluation Scale Levels ] 
6. Ability to communicate: [ Extraordinary, Outstanding, Above 
Average,] 
a. Orally [ Average, Below Average, No Basis for ] 
b. In writing [ Judgment Aplt. Add., p. ] 
8. Creativity (including ability to 
see implications and to synthesize ideas) 
9. Industry, initiative, motivation 
10. Judgment 
11. Honesty 
In terms of overall competence and potential as a successful MSM student, this 
candidate ranks in the upper 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 
11 
How would you evaluate yourself in giving ratings of this kind to someone: 
Generous Average Very conservative 
The MSM assumes that in all likelihood the applicant is a competent person. It 
would be most appreciated if, instead of describing his or her general excellence, 
you could tell what makes this candidate especially promising when compared to 
other applicants who may appear equally well qualified. If for any reason you 
have substantial reservations about the candidate's potential for success in the 
field of management, please explain. (Write your comments either on this form or 
on a separate page.) 
Aplt. Add., pp. 47-48. 
On or about March 12, 1995. Lowery provided the confidential letter of 
recommendation to BYU according to the BYU instructions on the official BYU form for 
the confidential letter. Lowery included in the confidential letter positive and negative 
statements about the Applicant in response to BYU's explicit request for positive and 
negative statements, to wit (in bold): 
Part 2. (To be completed by recommender) 
The above individual has applied for admission to Brigham Young University's 
Marriott School of Management and is requesting a recommendation from you. 
The MSM will select those students who show the greatest promise of success as 
leaders in the private and public sectors. May we have your assistance in 
evaluating this applicant's potential. Your frank and confidential evalution of his 
or her abilities and attitudes will be appreciated. 
I have known the applicant: thoroughly 
State nature and length of contact: [The Applicant] was a member of the 
[church] ward scout committee when I served as a scoutmaster. I was also [the 
Applicant's] Elder's Quorum President — 4 years plus. I worked closely with 
[the Applicant] during his challenge of unemployment. 
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Instructions for checking items . ... : 1: Extraordinary should be used sparingly; 
Cli itstanding is a very strong rating; and Above Average is a positive 
recommendation. 1 he others are self-explanatory 
1. Intellectual ability Above Average 
2. Ability to work with others Average 
3. Leadership potential and Abo^e Average 
administrative ability 
Emotional stability and maturity ow Average 
5. Esteem in which applicant is held u Average 
by faculty or other supervisors w Average 
6. Ability to communicate: 
a. . ally ^ t Average 
b. In writing Mo Basis for Judgment 
8. Creativity (including ability to 
see implications and to synthesize ideas) Abo\e \ ti age 
9. Industry, initiative, motivation Belo\* \ \ e rage 
10. Judgment Average 
11. Honesty Average 
In terms of overall competence and potential as a successful MSM student, this 
candidate ranks in the uppw, 5 § % 
How would you evaluate yourself in giving ratings of this kind to someone: 
Very conservative 
The MSM assumes that in all likelihood the applicant is a competent person. It 
would be most appreciated if, instead of describing his or her general excellence, 
you could tell what makes this candidate especially promising when compared to 
other applicants who may appear equally well qualified. If for any reason you 
have substantial reservations about the candidate's potential for success in the 
field of management, please explain. (Write your comments either on this form or 
on a separate page.) 
I don't know whether or not [the Applicant] is a promising candidate. 
He seems to be professionally competent, that is, as a CPA and MBA. He is 
intelligent and able to manage financial business. But [the Applicant] has 
some significant social and emotional problems. During my acquaintance 
with [the Applicant], he has changed employment at least 3 times, usually 
because of social and professional indiscretion. I have counseled him in these 
challenges with some success, but the fundamental challenge he faces, which 
seem to underlie his social and professional difficulties, may still exist. [The 
Applicant] has expressed deep distress about his childhood and immediate 
family relations, something he can't seem to shake off. While I am not a 
psychologist or therapist of any kind, my extensive conversations with [the 
Applicant} suggest he may struggle in your graduate program and in the 
business world thereafter — unless he can improve his abilities in social, 
professional, and personal relations. 
I am sorry to have to make such a striking statement. [The Applicant] 
has the potential to do well in graduate school and business; but he will do so 
only if he can somehow put his past behind him and develop tactful and 
respectful skills in human relations. Maybe he deserves another chance, but 
that is your call. 
Aplt. Add., pp. 47-48. 
Lowery relied on BYU to keep confidential his confidential letter about the 
Applicant, given the obvious danger to Lowery if the letter fell into the hands of the 
Applicant. Aplt. Add., pp. 27. 
On or about March 15, 1995, Lowery's confidential letter of recommendation for 
the Applicant was received by BYU. The letter was stamped as received by BYU 
"Graduate Admissions." Aplt. Add., pp. 27. 
On or about April 21, 1995, the Applicant phoned Lowery and stated bluntly that 
he would arrive at Lowery's family home "in a few minutes to talk." The Applicant said 
no more. Aplt. Add., pp. 27. 
After searching his memory for a reasoafor the Applicant's blunt phone call 
Lowery associated the phone call with the negative comments and ratings he had 
written in his BYU letter of recommendation for the Applicant, and Lowery began to 
fear reprisal from the Applicant, even possible violence. Aplt. Add., pp. 27. 
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Lowery loaded a small family protection pistol and placed •• ..noor ;lu ci ishion of 
the sofii IIIIIII IIIIIII III IIIIIII lliliii in , IIIIIII , IM' flu \pp l iu in t heu imr |ihv< -. -! 
pp. 2~. 
When Lowery answered hiN ironi door a few minutes later, the .Applicant began 
t - . . • v i -
letter of recommendation. A pit. Add . pp. 27. 
Stepping toward the door Uu Applicant insisted that he enter \pM * id. pv 27. 
door wide, and the Applicant walked into the entr) and on into the adjoining library. 
Aplt. Add., pp. 27 
the negative comments in Lowery's BYU letter of recommendation in behalf of the 
Applicant. 
I OY en readi 2 ::l 1 lii i lse If f c i pi i) sical defense. 
During this time, Lowery repeatedly recalled the presence of the pistol under the 
sofa cushion below him and prepared himself to use it if the Applicant made any 
pin -iv\J a^ai; '?, 
Lowery spoke to the Applicant softly in efforts to calm him down. 
When the Applicant finished Lovver\ asked him to leave. 
The "l| | in ill en i ill iii1*! ii«,IM) ii p i^mjj r*ijic thai I n\vci\ iiliill sav iicgalive 
things about him instead of only posiiive things in the BYU letter of recommendation. 
Lowery listened quietly, then carefully and kindly apologized for writing the 
negative rnmmriil'i IIIIIII I  IIIIIII" IIYI'1 Idler of recommendation, win In plauiled lilt" \pplicant. 
Lowery then told the Applicant he would do anything possible to help the 
Applicant get into a master's degree program except lie. The Applicant became 
would emphasize only the positive aspects a bum hun 
Lowery again spoke softly to the Applicant, this time about the possibility of the 
Applicant's future success. 
The Applicant became less irritated, and Lowery was able to get him to leave 
Lowery's home. Aplt. Add., pp. 28. 
After the heated conversation in Lowery's library, Lowery phoned the BYU 
Marriott School of Management and asked to speak to someone in charge of graduate 
program applications and letters of recommendation. A receptionist said the person in 
charge had already left the office for the day. 
Lowery recounted to the receptionist the brief phone call and visit from the 
Applicant. 
The receptionist took the message and promised that someone would return 
Lowery's phone call the following business day. 
On or about April 24, 1995, Kathy Carter, the admissions manager for the BYU 
accounting master's degree program phoned Lowery and said that the circumstances of 
the release of Lowery's letter of recommendation to the Applicant had "snowballed." 
Kathy Carter said the Applicant had delivered his application and sealed 
envelopes containing confidential letters of recommendation in his behalf to her 
department at BYU. 
Kathy Carter also said that the Applicant later returned to her department and 
requested copies of the sealed letters of recommendation to deliver to the BYU law 
school in conjunction with his application there and to the Department of 
Organizational Behavior in conjunction with his application there. 
Kathy Carter also said that she instructed a "new secretary" in her BYU 
department named Shalene to make copies of Lowery's letter of recommendation for the 
Applicant and to give them to the Applicant to deliver to the law school and 
Organizational Behavior department Aplt. Add., pp. 29. 
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Kathy Carter also said that the Applicant did not deliver letters of 
rtvnmmHuliilion In I he < H'ttfiii/ational Kehav ior department hill hail kepi Ihem 
Lowery expressed distress that the Applicant had the letter of recommendation 
Lowery had written, and asked to speak with the person ultimately in charge of the 
confident: ^ <* • • : * viktaM** ; 
Kathy Carter gave Lower) inc name and j hone number of the director of the 
BYU Department of Accountancy and Information Systems, Dr. Steve Albre ht. and the 
i ic ini i anil pii 11 i in 11 in 111 M'i«ii mil! i i 111 ii tin iirrin 11 M a m o i t sehoui ni r. 
Fred Skousei i. 
Lowery phoned Albrecht. w ho was not in his office, and so Ix>wery left a 
message n* < it 2 j:: J i ::: in: i z • : a ill I : • ;" 2 1 ;; 11:1 i i e i i 1  pi 101 led I : r ed 
Skousen. 
After Lowery recounted to Skousen the release of Lowerv \ BYL letter of 
recoi i ii i lei idal M-.\\...:.- ; :L * .H-i.±.i. 
call and visit and conversation at Lowerv *s home, skousen apologized to Lowery for 
the breach of privacy and confidentiality and said Albrecht would phone Lowery. 
Albree * s . I . K M 
that one of the secretaries in lus department had given Lowerv "s BYL letter of 
recommendation i ualf of the Applicant to the Applicant after BYU had obtained 
custody ol (In ItiiiT. .|ill I.I |i|i 10. 
Albrecht also apologized to Lowerv for his department's release of the letter to 
the Applicant. 
1 o\\i--r\ ;Kked Albrer >p\ oi ^ > 
behalf of the Applicant to Lowery through BVl campus mail M) Lowerv couid rev iew 
the letter. Albrecht agreed to do so. 
On April 2 i 1995, "fc P :| * "- i ? e re r "< >f •' n E\ I J "Sch :: ol ;:if , ' uc count \ u ic> & 
I n f o r m a t i o n S y s t e m s " at " 5 6 0 TNi<i> | B ^ I " s T a n n e r b u i l d i n g ] " m a i l e d a " M e m o ... T o : 
Tom Lowery, 783 SWKT [BYU's Spencer W. Kimball Tower] ... re: Letter of 
Recommendation for [the Applicant]." 
The memo said: "Enclosed please find a copy of the Letter of Recommendation 
you wrote for [the Applicant], which you requested from Dr. Steve Albrecht." 
During May 1995, the Applicant revealed to Lowery's neighbor, Mark Poulsen, 
that Lowery had written negative comments in his letter of recommendation for the 
Applicant. Poulsen visited Lowery and discussed with Lowery the Applicant's anger at 
Lowery. 
Lowery's fears of harm from the Applicant increased in intensity and quantity. 
Because of his increases of intensity and fear, Lowery phoned Steve Albrecht 
again on or about June 2, 1995, and expressed to Albrecht his fear of damage to his 
reputation stemming from the Applicant's possession of Lowery's negative letter of 
recommendation in behalf of the Applicant, which the Applicant might copy and 
distribute to others. 
Lowery asked Albrecht to retrieve the letter from the Applicant. Aplt. Add.., pp. 
31. 
Albrecht told Lowery to contact BYU University Counsel Eugene Bramhall 
(hereafter "Bramhall") and to ask Bramhall to retrieve the letter. 
On or about June 5, 1995, Lowery reached Bramhall via phone, described to 
Bramhall the aforementioned events and circumstances surrounding his BYU 
confidential letter of recommendation in behalf of the Applicant and it's release by BYU 
to the Applicant, and asked Bramhall to retrieve the letter from the Applicant. 
Bramhall told Lowery that there were no legal problems for Lowery or for BYU 
because of the Applicant's access to and possession of the letter, that only the Applicant 
had violated the law. 
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Lowers told Bramhall that BYl I personnel had given the Applicant a copy of 
LowetVs " - * iiiiiiiriiiiiliuii iii I iiilfnl llllii '* |i|ilic .ml ind HI.II BYl I In nld 
retrieve the letter. 
Bramhall told Lowery to retrieve the letter himself. Lowery told Bramhall he 
Bramhall then told Lower) to retrieve the letter through the Applicant s mental 
health therapist. Lowery told Bramhall that he didn't know the name of the Applicant's 
tl terapist. 
Bramhall told Lowery to visit Lowery's and the Applicant's common church 
bishop. Lynn Bullock, and ask Bullock to find out who the Applicant^ therapist was 
the therapist's name, that Bramhali would retrieve the tetter and notifv Lowery of its 
retrieval. Aplt. Add., pp. 32. 
Because I ov ei 3 ; ••»• • ' : u r^h-- •" nlmiiii' Initio e 
authority over him as a B^ l employee, and because ot B ram hall's commanding exercise 
of authority upon him, Lowery follower ^ramhalTs instructions. 
During In 11 !; ? 199 * ll- i ' 1 
attempts to get the name ol the \pphtanf * therapist for Bramhall. In earl) jm) 1995, 
Bullock told Lowery that the Applicaiu was seeing a therapist at the Alpine Center for 
A lent; ill I Ie; iJtti 
In early July, Lowery phoned Bramhall to tell him the name of the Applicant's 
medical clinic. Bramhall could not take the call, so Lowery left a message, 
f i l l II 1 ill III11 HI II I II II II II 1 I 9 C ) S I ? l " i i l i l i i l l i i ' i i l i i i i ' i l I ( i i i r i i , \ p i l l n i l in i l l i o ' H t ' l ' i 111 ( I d 
Bramhall the name of the Applicant ^ mun^i! , 1.
 :.;*\ the Alpine Center for Mental 
Health. 
Brar n i u 
Lowery phoned Bramhall numerous times to discover the retrieval of his BYl J letter of 
recommendation from the Applicant, but Bramhall never returned Lowery's phone calls. 
Aplt. Add., pp. 33. 
On May 20, 1997, Lowery suffered a psychotic breakdown during his 
employment hours at BYU during a conversation with BYU Political Science 
Department Chairman David B. Magleby. 
After BYU replaced Lowery's health care providers with BYU psychotherapist 
Dr. Michael Lambert on November 21, 1998, Lowery discovered in psychotherapy that 
the actions of defendant BYU's employees in this case caused in part Lowery's major 
psychotic breakdown that took place on May 20, 1997. Aplt. Add., pp. 137. 
Lowery suffered and continues to suffer severe physical, mental, emotional, and 
psychological trauma, bewilderment, turmoil, distress, pain, discomfort, confusion, and 
loss of enjoyment of life, including numerous depressive and manic and mixed 
depressive-manic episodes in his brain, a psychotic breakdown resulting in severe 
damage to his brain chemistry, and a severe, life-threatening biochemical mental 
disability. Aplt. Add., pp. 66, 69-74. 
Lowery has incurred medical and medical related expenses to his and/or his 
collateral source provider's special damage and will incur yet future sums not yet fully 
ascertainable. 
Lowery sustained a loss of income and benefits which would have accrued to 
him since May 20, 1997. 
Lowery sustained a loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity in sums 
not yet ascertainable. Aplt. Add., pp. 34-36, 38-46, 150-157. 
Dr. Lambert on August 29, 2000 and the Utah Third District Court on December 
14, 2001 declared Lowery mentally disabled. Aplt Add^ pp. 117-121. In March 2002, 
Lowery brought this lawsuit against BYU, claiming torts of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress and requesting 
compensation for his injuries. Aplt. Add., pp. 25-50. With the complaint, Lowery also 
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filed a Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules based on Title II of the \ mericans 
svmptoms oi his illness and disabiliiv \;•••. \dd pp. 51-07: cf. 68-74 I he u al court 
granted the motion. A pit. Add,, pp. ^>^u 
\\ l u l l " | |H ' i , i ) i i i " i i i i i L , 1 t i n i 11 ' . - * * M M ; , V , - < >f. 
caused Lowery to forget to include n- me complaint facts about his discover) of the 
causal connection between BY I I's actions in this case and his psychotic break and 
numerous times in his pleadings in this case, to wit: 
In I.owery's Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules, which was submitted 
paragraph 67 that his "illness was triggered and exacerbated by the defendant BYU." 
Apit. Add., pp <*i 
Plaintiffs Notice io Submit for Decision on Motion for Reasonable Modification oi 
Rules, and Defendant's Objection ?'* the Same, and Memorandum." filed with the trial 
( *• - u i u -_i ^ r a f i u • >;: . .MIL 
2002, Lowery stated in JJf 6-8: 
6. The incidents described in my civil complaint against Brigham Young 
\ Ii li i e i sit) ai id otl it:,! In :lemlanl > .(Civ it No 020902112) exacei bated my 
mental illness and led to a total mental breakdown in May 1997, two years 
later. 
1. } II Il  '• Il • Il ! » - , > . , L , l , » u ii • I" I ""I"11"*'" ">• , Ji l l ' t l i i u J l ) c . l l l ' i C d l > ) . I I I 
employee of Brigham Young < ni\ersiiy. Dean David Magleby. 
8, I am currently and ha\ e bee?1 -.Mice Mav 1 *)co, under medical care for my 
illi tess, i- • ; • . . icl i egulai therap) I: ) 
psychiatrist Dr. Michael Goates and clinical psychologist Dr. Michael 
Lambert, who was provided to me by Brigham Young University Vice 
President Noel B. Reynolds. 
Aplt. Add., pp. 73; cf., 69-74. In 5 13. of the same affidavit, Lowery stated: 
13. The dangerous mental health condition 1 suffer from now is at least tn part 
a consequence of the incidents decribed in my complaint (Civil 
No. 020902112). 
Aplt. Add., pp. 74; cf., 69-74. Lowery also referred to the same affidavit on page 17 of 
his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss All Claims. Aplt. Add., 
pp. 93. 
Lowery also referred to the same affidavit on page 4 of his Reply to Defendant's 
Belated Written Response to Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Motion to 
Amend Complaint and Memorandum. Aplt Add. pp. 170. 
On October 18, 2002, immediately prior to the hearing on BYU's Motion to 
Dismiss All Claims, Lowery filed with the court a Motion to Amend the Complaint, 
which motion included an amended complaint that included the following two 
additional paragraphs of material facts: 
60. On or about May 20, 1997, Plaintiff suffered a psychotic breakdown 
during his employment hours at BYU during a conversation with BYU 
Political Science Department Chairman David B. Magleby. 
61. On or about November 21, 1998, Plaintiff discovered that Defendant's 
employees actions were direct and proximate causes of Plaintiff's major 
psychotic breakdown that took place on May 20, 1997. 
Aplt. Add., pp. 2, 137-157. 
The trial court summarily denied Lowery'JS motion to amend because it was not 
timely and because it addressed no ^new issues in this matter." Aplt. Add., pp. 4. The 
trial court also dismissed the case prior to allowing Lowery oral argument on the motion 
to dismiss, which prejudice triggered depressive-manic cycling in Lowery's brain 
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chemistry and exacerbated Lowery's disability to make argument and speak. Aplt. Add., 
pp. 8, 158-160. The district court attempted to "weasel" out of its prejudicial dismissal of 
the case and allowed plaintiff to attempt oral argument. Aplt. Add., pp. 8, 159-160. After 
oral argument, the trial court took the case under advisement and promised Lowery that 
the court would read all the cases cited in Lowery's pleadings. Aplt. Add., pp. 18-19, 
159-160. 
On December 12, 2002, the court issued a memorandum and order stating that the 
court had excluded "outside materials" from his consideration of the motion to dismiss 
and granting BYU's motion to dismiss. Aplt. Add. pp. 177-182. Lowery filed a notice of 
appeal on December 31, 2002. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED OR ABUSEI>ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S "MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT" BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND WAS "NOT VERY TIMELY" AND DID NOT ADDRESS "ANY NEW 
ISSUES IN THIS MATTER." 
A. The trial court erred or abused its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion 
to amend the complaint because the motion was not timely. 
Plaintiff's case was in the earliest stage of litigation, not even beyond the 
defendant's answer to the complaint. The defendant's motion to dismiss had not been 
orally argued before the court. Scheduling of the case, therefore, had not been done, 
neither had discovery begun. The trial had not been scheduled. The case had existed for 
only 7 months, a very short time given the court's grant of plaintiff's motion for 
reasonable modification of rules for 30 days to respond to each pleading. Aplt. App., pp. 
25-50, 137-140. Despite this, the district court summarily denied plaintiff's motion to 
amend because "It's not very timely" and not "timely being made," according to the 
district court. Aplt. Add., pp. 2,4. 
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The district court's ruling that the motion to amend the complaint was not timely 
was error or an abuse of discretion and denied justice to the plaintiff. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directs that leave to amend 
pleadings 'shall be freely given when justice so requires.' Utah R. Civ. P. 
15(a). Moreover, ""rule 15 should be interpreted liberally so as to allow 
parties to have their claims fully adjudicated/" Sulzen v. Wiliams, 1999 UT 
App 76, J13, 977 P.2d 497 (quoting Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 
1183 (Utah 1993)). This is especially true when the motion to amend is 
made well in advance of trial. See Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 
(Utah 1981) ("The rule in this state has always been to allow amendments 
freely where justice requires, and especially is this true before trial/" 
(Quoting Gilliman v. Hansen. 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 
(1971))). 
Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, J19. 
In Nunez, the district court disallowed the complaint amendment "because Ms. 
Nunez had unjustifiably delayed" the litigation and because "her motion came late in 
the litigation process, and granting the motion would result in prejudice to the 
[defendant]." Nunez, 5 20. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of Nunez's motion to 
amend, because 
the majority of cases where Utah's appellate courts have upheld a trial 
court's denial of leave to amend on the grounds of untimeliness have been 
when the motion to amend was made several years after the original 
pleadings were filed and just before trial or at trial. 
Nunez, J 32. In the case before the Court, discovery had not yet begun. 
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Ms. Nunez made her motion to amend a little over a year after she filed her 
complaint. At the time Ms. Nunez filed her motion, no scheduling order 
had been entered, no trial date had been set, no expert discovery had 
taken place, and discovery was still ongoing. 
Nunez, 5 33. In the case before this Court, the case had been in progress only 7 months. 
The Nunez Court of Appeals even considered Ms. Nunez "limited understanding 
of English" in their decision, akin to this plaintiff-appellant's disability, which the district 
court had recognized and acknowledged in its grant of plaintiffs motion for reasonable 
modification of rules. Id. 
In Carlise v. Wal-Mart, 2002 UT App 412, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a 
district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend complaint because the-district xx>urt 
exceeded its discreation in denying further discovery." The Court of Appeals did so 
even though the case had entered the discovery stage. Carlile, 5 18. In the case before 
this Court, not even the defendant's initial answer to the complaint had been completely 
litigated. Aplt. App., pp. 25-50, 2. 
In Nielsen v. Herreron, 1999 UT App 317, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a 
district court's denial of plaintiff s motion to amend, basing it's reversal on the elements 
of 
timeliness of the motion, the justification for delay, and the resulting 
prejudice to the responding party. See Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 
250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Although motions raised late during 
litigation are disfavored, a motion to amend raised in response to facts 
discovered after a prior pleading "should be allowed if there is a 
reasonable explanation for the delay in discovering the facts and the 
amendment is not unduly prejudicial to the opposing party." 
Nielsen, J 2. (See also Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West Development, 970 P.2d 
1273 (Utah 1998), 5 36). In the case before this Court, plaintiffs motion to amend was 
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timely, the plaintiffs disability and his obvious intent during the case to include the 
proposed amendments in the original complaint justified any minor delay^ and because 
the case had not passed litigation on the defendant's initial answer to the complaint, 
there was no undue prejudice to the opposing party. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the district court's denial of plaintiff's 
motion to amend the complaint because plaintiff'sjnotion to amend was timely. 
B. The trial court erred or abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion 
to amend the complaint because the amendment did not address "any new 
issues in this matter." 
In plaintiff's motion to amend Ihe complaint the .amended compiamLadded 
"new material facts to the Complaint. The following lines would be added to the 
Complaint in sequence of the existing lines in the Complaint: 
"60. On or about May 20, 1997, Plaintiff suffered a psychotic 
breakdown during his employment hours at BYU during a 
conversation with BYU Political Science Department 
Chairman David B. Magleby. 
"61 . On or about November 21, 1998, Plaintiff discovered that 
Defendant BYU's employees' actions were direct and 
proximate causes of Plaintiffs major psychotic breakdown 
that took place on May 20, 1997. 
"2 . Plaintiff also edited statements of claim in the counts of the Complaint. 
" 3 . Justification for this motion derives from Plaintiffs mental illness and disability > 
which causes confusion, memory loss; depressive, manic, hypermanic, and mixed 
depressive-manic episodes; and other debilitating symptoms, which caused 
Plaintiff to forget about his discovery, on or about November 21, 1998, that 
Defendants' actions averred in the Complaint were a direct and proximate cause 
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of Plaintiff's major psychotic breakdown that took place on May 20, 1997. 
Medical testimony at trial will verify the discovery." 
Aplt. App., pp. 137-138. 
Evidence of plaintiff's original intention to include the additional facts in the 
complete are numerous, to wit: 
1. Dr. Lambert on August 29,2000 and the Utah Third District Court on 
December 14, 2001 declared Lowery mentally disabled. Aplt. App., pp. 118-121. On 
March 2002, less than three months after the Utah Third District Court declared Lowery 
mentally disabled, Lowery brought this lawsuit against BYU, claiming torts of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
requesting compensation for his injuries and losses. Aplt. App., pp. 25-50. With the 
complaint, Lowery also filed a Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules based oa 
his disability and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act for extra time to initiate 
and respond to arguments given the symptoms of his illness and disability. Aplt. App., 
pp. 51-67. The trial court granted the motion. Aplt. App., pp. 75-76. 
While preparing the complaint between December 14, 2001 and March 11, 2002, 
the symptom's of Lowery's illness and disability caused Lowery to forget to include in 
the complaint facts about his discovery x>f the causal connection between BYU's 
actions in this case and his later psychotic break and disability. Aplt. App., pp. 137-140. 
However, Lowery referred to the causation numerous times in his pleadings in this case, 
to wit: 
In Lowery's Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules, which was filed on 
March 11, 2002 and granted by the trial court on June 7, 2002, Lowery stated in J 67 
that his "illness was triggered and exacerbated by the defendant BYU." 
In Lowery's Exhibit F, Affidavit, of his "Motion for Expedited Disposition of 
Plaintiff's Notice to Submit for Decision on Motion for Reasonable Modification of 
Rules, and Defendant's Objection to the Same, and Memorandum," filed with the trial 
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court on April 9, 2002 (not May 5, 2002 as stated in the Motion), and granted on June 7, 
2002, Lowery stated in 5J5 6-8: 
6. The incidents described in my civil complaint against Brigham 
Young University and other defendants (Civil No. 020902112) 
exacerbated my mental illness and led to a total mental breakdown 
in May 1997, two years Later. 
7. My total mental breakdown in May 1997 was also directly caused 
by an employee of Brigham Young University, Dean David 
Magleby. 
8. I am currently, and have±>een since May 1997, under medical care 
for my illness, including psychotropic medications and regular 
therapy by psychiatrist Dr. Michael Goates and clinical 
psychologist Dr. Michael Lambert, who was provided to me by 
Brigham Young University Vice President Noel B. Reynolds. 
Aplt. Add., pp. 73; cf., 69-74. In 5 13. of the same affidavit, Lowery stated: 
13. The dangerous mental health condition I suffer from now is at least 
in part a consequence of the incidents decribed in my complaint 
(Civil No. 020902112). 
Aplt. Add., pp. 74; cf., 69-74. Lowery also referred to the same affidavit on page 17 of 
his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss All Claims. Aplt. Add., 
pp. 93. 
Lowery also referred to the same affidavit on page 4 of his Reply to Defendant^ 
Belated Written Response to Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Motion to 
Amend Complaint and Memorandum. Aplt. Add., pp. 170. 
The two forgotton paragraphs erf material facts in the amended complaint (Aplt. 
Add., pp., 137, 149) provide a basis for tolling the statute of limitations under the 
discovery rule, as plaintiff argued in the October 18, 2002 hearing: 
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Mr. LOWERY: Your Honor, the two — the two — the two sets of facts, 
two paragraphs of facts that I have added to the [amended] complaint arise 
out of the — the actions of the defendants and I give justification in the 
motion [to amend] for the necessity of adding them, and if the Court looks 
closely at them, the Court will see that this would move the statute of 
limitations up until November [21]. 
Aplt. Add. p. 4. 
The district court replied: 
Your complaint states that in 1995 you knew about these facts. 
Aplt. Add., p. 5. The district court's statement was impossible because it was absurd. It is 
impossible to know something in 1995 which happened in 1997. 
Again in the October 18, 2002, hearing, during argument on the motion to dismiss, 
plaintiff, after having cycled through depression into hypermanic paranoia, which 
depression and cycling was caused by the district court's prejudicial dismissal of the 
case prior to plaintiff's opportunity to make shedeuled oral argument, stated: 
Furthermore, the defendant attempts to deceive the Court once again with 
an anachronistic argument that ray — that he has shown that in 19951 had 
recognized and had knowledge that the — that the actions of the 
defendants in this case, that I had a knowledge that those actions 
contributed to the psychotic break that took place on May 20, 1997, at 
11:58 a.m. That is an absurd argument, your Honor, because it's an 
impossible argument. 
Aplt. Add., p. 17. The forgotten facts added in the amended complaint were material to 
this case. 
Once again after having cycled from depression to hypermanic paranoia, caused 
by the court's prejudice, plaintiff stated: 
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I have made a motion to include that fact as only a fact not as a statement 
of claim in this case. That is a fact that and the fact is stated as this: that my 
knowledge that the actions of defendants in this case was a direct and 
proximate cause of my psychotic break on May 20, 1995. That is what 
those facts state. And my argument makes clear that that could not have 
been known in 1995. The issue here is knowledge of the plaintiff of a — 
the knowledge of the plaintiff that the actions of defendants in this case 
were direct and proximate causes of the psychotic break in Decern — on 
May 20, 1997. That if the Court will examine Rule 15, and the sases that I 
cited in my motion, the Court will conclude if the Court thinks it through 
carefully that that extends the statute of limitations to November 21 of 
2002. And I have stated in my motion that medical testimony will verify 
that at trial or in any evidentiary hearing, 
Aplt. Add., p 18. 
The district court erred or abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to 
amend the complaint because the amendment did not address "any new issues in this 
matter." 
In Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, J 13 ( 977 P.2d 497), the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that 
Rule 15(a) [URCP] mandates that leave-to amend pleadings shall be freely 
given when justice so requires/ Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Moreover, 'rule 15 
should be interpreted liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims, 
fully adjudicated.' Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993)X 
'When the statute of limitations has expired before an amendment to a 
pleading is made, the amendment must relate back to the date of th original 
complaint if the amendment is to be effective.' Wilcox v. Geneva Rock 
Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996). 
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More specifically, the Sulzen Court addressed the content of an amended 
complaint and held that 
The relation back doctrine is governed by Utah Rule 15(c), which provides 
that "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted 
to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the 
date of the original pleading." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). 
Sulzen, 1114. 
The Sulzen Court reiterated the Utah Supreme Court holding that the relation 
back doctrine even applies to a substitution or addition of parties in a complaint as well 
as the addition of new material facts, and that such a relation back is not prejudicial. Id., 
5 14. See Wilcox, supra, at 369. 
In Aurora, supra, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a district court's denial of a 
plaintiff's motion to amend "[w]here the amendment would advance a new theory of 
recovery based almost entirely on facts already in evidence." The Court wrote that 
the [district] court should liberally allow amendment because the opposing 
party is then generally prepared to address such a claim. See Rmian 
rv.DavisI, 371 U.S. [178] at 182 [(1962)] (allowing amendment where 'the 
amendment would have done no more than state an alternative theory for 
recovery'). 
Aurora v. Liberty West Development, Utah Supreme Court, No. 970154,536. Cf, Aplt. 
Add., p. 164. 
In this case before the Court, the plaintiff's edited version of the statements of 
claim clarified and simplified the complaint, as the defendant BYU noted in oral 
argument on the motion to amend: "As to the remaining complaint,... 1 do notice that 
that there have been a number of the original causes of action been brought [in 
plaintiffs amended complaint]. The remaining ones, however, are still subject to the same 
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— the same basis for the motion to dismiss which we've already — which we've 
already briefed." 
It is clear that the amended complaint produced no resulting prejudice to the 
responding party, the defendant. Nielsen, 55 2, supra, and Swift Stop, Inc., at 253, supra. 
The Neilsen Court held that "although plaintiff's motion came long after this 
litigation commenced, plaintiff's delay is reasonably explained because defendant did 
not produce its purported original release," which comports with the standards for 
granting motions to amend: 
Although motions raised late during litigation are disfavored, a motion to 
amend raised in response to facts discovered after a prior pleading "should 
be allowed if there is a reasonable explanation for the delay in discovering 
the facts and the amendment is not unduly prejudicial to the opposing 
party." 
Nielsen, 5 3, supra, and Swift Stop, at 253, supra. (See also Aurora Credit Services v. 
Liberty West Development, 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998), 5 36). 
In Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that 
In deciding on a motion to amend, the trial court should primarily consider 
whether granting the motion would subject the opposing party to 
unavoidable prejudice 4by having an issue adjudicated for which he had 
no had time to prepare.' 
In this case before this Court of Appeals, no such prejudice resulted. 
Plaintiff's "motion for leave to amend complaint and motion to amend 
complaint" was timely because the case was young and had not passed litigation ^ n the 
defendant's initial answer to the complaint; was justified because the plaintiff's 
disability and his obvious intent during the case to have included the proposed 
amendments in the original complaint was clearly evident and did not cause undue 
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delay; and even the defendant explicitly stated that the standard of review applied to 
the original complaint also applied to the amended complaint, which precluded any 
prejudice to the opposing party. Aplt. Add., pp. 3-4. 
After reviewing the "outside materials" [sic] related to plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss, including plaintiff's two justified replies to defendant's oral and written 
responses to the motion to amend (Aplt. Add., p. 158-175), the court chose to exclude 
plaintiff's replies as "outside materials" [sic] during his deliberation on the motion to 
dismiss in an attempt (to use a perspicuous vernacular) to "cover his ass." Aplt. Add., 
pp. 177. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the district court's denial of the motion for 
leave to amend and direct the district court to allow plaintiff to file an amemded 
complaint with the district court. The Court of Appeals should also train the district 
court in the rule of law and in judicial integrity to that rule. 
H. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, FAILED 
CORRECTNESS, AND/OR DENIED PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTONAL RIGHT 
TO ACCESS TO DUE PROCESS. 
The district court commited error and prejudice, abused its discretion, failed 
correctness, and/or denied plaintiff access to due process by repeatedly dismissing the 
complaint before allowing the mentally disabled plaintiff scheduled oral argument and 
then attempting to cover up his prejudicial error, thereby triggering depressive-manic 
cycling, including hypermanic paranoia, in plaintiff's brain chemistry immediately before 
plaintiff was subsequently allowed to make oral argument on October 18, 2002. 
The district court then attempted to *wweasel" out of his prejudicial error: 
THE COURT: I'm going to grant the motion to dismiss in this case. 
MR. LOWERY: Without argument? 
THE COURT: You argued. Do you want to argue some more? 
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MR. LOWERY: I've only presented the motion to file [an] amended 
complaint. 
THE COURT: Do you want — I asked you if there was anything else you 
wanted to say. You just said no. So now you want to say something? 
MR. LOWERY: If we're going to discuss the motion to dismiss. Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Okay, what do you want to say? 
MR. LOWERY: Shall I just say it? 
Aplt. Add., pp. 8. The district court's cruel prejudicial dismissal of the case and his 
immediately following arrogant attempt to pin his error on the plaintiff caused severe 
life-threatening exacerbation of plaintiff's disability. 
The district court knew, in depth, the life-threatening character and vulnerablity 
of plaintiff's severe and persistent mental illness and disability on June 7, 2002, after 
having reviewed and granted plaintiff's Motion for Reasonable Modificiation of Rules 
to accommodate his disability. Aplt. Add., p. 51-76. The district court's prejudicial error 
and arrogant attempt to blame it on plaintiff exacerbated plaintiff's disability to think 
and speak clearly during and for an extended period of time beyond the October 18, 
2002 hearing. 
The district court's prejudicial error violated 42 USC, Chapter 126, Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Sec. 201 (2) of ADA states that 
The term qualified individual with a disability means an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or 
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, 
or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility 
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or 
activities provided by a public entity. 
Emphasis added. See PGA Tour Inc. v. Casey Martin, No. 00-24, May 29, 2001; 532 U.S. 661 
(2001). 
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SEC. 202 of ADA, DISCRIMINATION, states: 
Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected 
to discrimination by any such entity. 
The ADA requires state public services to modify rules, policies, and practices to 
accomodate the mentally disabled. The Utah Legislative and Judicial systems select and train 
judges who meet the legal and ethical criteria necessary to treat litigants with respect, 
dignity, and courtesy during litigation, who have been trained to recognize the requirements of 
the law in the Americans with Disabilities Act, including the modification of rules, policies, and 
practices that impede access to the disabled. Such recognition and training are reflected in 
scheduled hearing orders of the court mailed to litigants, which remind litigants of the district 
court's commitment to the ADA. 
While the district court judge in this case appropriately recognized plaintiffs severe and 
persistent disability by granting plaintiffs motion for reasonable modification of rules, he 
knowingly and willingly failed to modify his courtroom practices so as to be respectful, 
courteous, fair, not prejudicial, and certainly not cruel to litigants, especially a litigant the court 
knows to have a life-threatening illness and disability, which decent conduct is the policy of 
the Third District Court and simple human courtesy. 
Sec. 502 of ADA, STATE IMMUNITY, states: 
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent 
jurisdiction for a violation of this Act. In any action against a State for a violation 
of the requirements of this Act, remedies (including remedies both at law and in 
equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are 
available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity 
other than a State. 
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In University of Alabama, et. al. v. Garrett, et. al.. No. 99-1240, an ADA Title I 
Employment case, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down ADA's suspension of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in Title I cases. 
But the Supreme Court let stand ADA suspension of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
under Title II, Public Entities (Id., p. 1, footnote 1), and the Court stated that Congressional 
committees legislating ADA had provided overwhelming historical data on discrimination by 
public entities, which sustains the ADA suspension of Eleventh Amendment immunity under 
Title II (Id., p. 13, footnote 7, and p. 14). 
The district court is a public entity of a state goverment subject to ADA. ADA 201(1)(A-
B). The plaintiff is a qualified individual individual under ADA. ADA 201 (2). The district court 
knowingly engaged in rules, policies, or practices of the district court that denied plaintiff 
access to the public services of the Utah Third District Court, which services included due 
process of law. ADA 202; Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7. United States Constitution, 
Amendments 7, 14. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum Argument in support of his Motion for Reasonable 
Modification of Rules in this appeal is incorporated herein by reference as though fully set 
forth herein at length. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to 
dismiss. The Court of Appeals should also assign plaintiff a serious, respectful, and professional 
judge on remand of the case, as it is absolutely impossible for plaintiff to go before Judge 
Dever" s court again, as Judge Dever was brutally cruel to the plaintiff, who suffered seriously at 
Judge Dever's hand, which experience precludes further experience with Judge Dever. The 
Court of Appeals should reprimand Judge Dever for his cruelty and arrogance to the plaintiff, 
take measures to prevent such cruelty to others seeking due process in Judge Dever's court, 
and impose strong sanctions against Judge Dever if the Court of Appeals finds that Judge 
Dever has breached or betrayed his trust with the public, for he has certainly betrayed his trust 
with the plaintiff by his arrogant cruelty. 
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m. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, OR FAILED 
CORRECTNESS BY EXCLUDING "OUTSIDE MATERIALS" [SIC] IN 
DECIDING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The district court commited error and prejudice, abused its discretion, or failed 
correctness by excluding "outside materials" [sic] from consideration on the motion to 
dismiss. Aplt. Add., p. 177. Given the error or abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff's 
motion to amend, the district court's order to dismiss the case was incorrect. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Motion to Amend 
Complaint, plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Belated Response to Motion for Leave to 
Amend Complaint and Motion to Amend Complaint, and plaintiff's Reply to 
Defendant's Belated Written Response to Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and 
Motion to Amend Complaint are incorporated herein by reference as though fully set 
forth herein at length. Aplt. Add, pp. 137-175. 
Had the district court considered the "outside materials" [sic], the court would 
not have dismissed the case. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, ABUSED DISCRETION, OR FAILED 
CORRECTNESS BY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IN 
THE FACE OF A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE 
CONTRARY. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss All 
Claims is incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth herein at length. 
Aplt. Add., pp. 77-131. 
In plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
All Claims, plaintiff provided copious evidence from the Third District Court record of 
plaintiff's divorce trial, that plaintiff was generally incompetent because he was 
unable in 1995 to manage his own business affairs. The evidence includes the ruling 
of the Third District Court in Lowery v. Lowery, Civil No. 004904704, Dec. 14, 
2001: 
37 
I would find as follows: I think from the evidence — and I think there is 
really no dispute about it — that Mr. Lowery suffers from a serious and 
persistent mental illness.... That was conceded by the three expert 
witnesses. [Id., Dec. 14, 2001, beginning at 12:26:17 p.m., emphasis 
added] i 
... an Axis-I Disorder, biochemical in nature. [Id., Dec. 14,2001, 
12:26:54] 
... all the evidence that has been presented to the Court does nothing 
to undercut that conclusion. [Id., Dec. 14, 2001, 12:27:40] 
... There certainly were manifestations of the disorder early in Mr. 
Lowery's life. [Id., Dec. 14,2001, 12:29:00, emphasis added] 
Aplt. Add., pp. 82-83, Memorandum in Opposition of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 6-7]. 
Plaintiff's psychiatrist testified that plaintiff's mental illness was a genetically 
inherited classic case of bipolar illness, manic depression, which had preceded plaintiff's 
breakdown by many years. Aplt. Add., p. 83-84. 
Plaintiff's primary psychotherapist testified that plaintiff's early family life was 
either biologically or socially disturbing. Aplt. Add., p. 84. 
The divorce court's independent medical examiner "testified that it is very clear 
that the mood disorder and paranoid personality disorder has existed since Plaintiff's 
youth, 'from the time he began to read... at least 20 years ago or so, if not more' (Id.* 
October 30, 2001, 2:17:39-2:20:15; 3:04:05-3:07:40)." Aplt. Add., p. 84. 
"The court also record states some of the effects of the Plaintiffs illness 
in early life: 
11. The Court finds that the Petitioner is, as a 
result of his serious and persistent mental illness, disabled 
from work. The Court finds specifically that he has not 
engaged in some kind of longstanding charade to deceive 
the world, in this litigation or in other areas.... The whole 
history of the Petitioner, as described to this Court, 
including his "tax protestor" history [in the 1970s and 
early 80s] and his whole history of being able to work 
1 All references that include clock time are to official Utah Third District 
Court videotape. 
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better on his own rather than with others, is consistent 
with the Court's findings about his illness. [Exhibit A, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 5J 11] 
"The Plaintiff had never been treated for his mental disorder prior to 
1997: 
10. The Petitioner has been taking psychotropic 
medication as prescribed since May of 1997, including a 
wide spectrum anti-depressant/anti-anxiety medication.... 
He has been in regular counseling with his therapist, Dr. 
Michael Lambert, for several [3.67] years. The Petitioner 
is not malingering in presenting his symptoms to this 
Court, nor is he refusing medication or other reasonable 
treatment for his symptoms. [Exhibit A, Findings of Fact, J 
10] 
"Prior to May 1997, the Plaintiff had never received medical treatment 
for his mental disorder, nor had he taken medications to control his 
mental disorder. 
"Anti-psychotic medications now enable Plaintiff to attempt to 
prosecute this case and others, albeit slowly and arduously given the 
reasonable modification if rules allowed by this Court. 
"The divorce trial record makes clear that even with weekly therapy 
and daily medications, Plaintiffs efforts at legal vindication and 
reparations have failed thus far notwithstanding Plaintiffs graduate 
education in political theory and jurisprudence. 
Aplt. Add., pp. 85-86. 
"Without regular medical treatment, particularly psychiatric and 
psychotherapeutic treatment and anti-psychotic medications to control 
the symptoms of Plaintiffs mental disorder, Plaintiff was certainly 
mentally incompetent in his business affairs at all times relevant hereto. 
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"Even after diagnosis and ongoing treatment of his mental illness and 
prescriptions of daily psychotropic drugs. Plaintiff still experienced and 
experiences severe depression, mania, hyper-mania, paranoia, and 
suicidal and homocidal episodes." Aplt. Add., p. 86. 
"Defendant claims Plaintiff's failed Workers Compensation complaint and 
major civil suit against it filed since filing for divorce on July 31, 2000 is 
evidence that Plaintiff was mentally competent in 1995 through 1999, 
which anachronistic argument is clearly absurd. (Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, p. 7)." 
Aplt. Add., p. 87. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss All 
Claims is incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth herein at length. 
The plaintiff was generally incompetent because he was unable to manage his 
business affairs from the from early life until the present. 
The district court's Memorandum and Order granting the motion to dismiss is 
incorrect in its statement that the "plaintiff has not only pled the date of the accrual of 
the cause of action, thus bringing the statute of limitations defense within the scope of 
rule 12 (b) (6), but in apparent anticipation of the present challenge, asserted that "at 
relevant times hereto, Thomas J. Lowery was a mentally ill man, which tolls the statute of 
limitations for this action. Complaint at 5J 3." Aplt. Add., p. 176 
In fact, the complaint did not include any pleading about the date of the accrual 
of the cause of action, but plaintiff forgot to include that date in the complaint and so 
attempted to amend the complaint to include it Aplt Add., pp. 137-175. This absence 
combines with the above citations in section I-B of this appeal brief, above, to 
demonstrate the validity of plaintiff's failure to include the date of discovery of his 
injury by defendants and of his motion to amend and subsequent pleadings on that 
motion. Plaintiff's motion for reasonable modification of rules, granted by the district 
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court, accounts for plaintiff's failure to include the date of discovery. Aplt. Add., pp. 5 1 -
67. 
The district court's conclusion that "The only allegations in the complaint which 
describe plaintiff's condition discuss his injuries as a result of the defendants' actions/' 
the damages section of statements of claim. Aplt Add., p. 178. The court is incorrect. 
First, the complaint at J 3 includes more than the district court states; it includes the 
following: 
3. At all relevant times hereto, Thomas J. Lowery was a mentally ill man, 
which tolls the statute of limitations for this action. (Ruling, Judge 
William Bohling, Third District Court of Utah, Lowery v. Lowery, Civil 
No. 004904704, Dec. 14, 2001, beginning at 12:26:28 p.m. on the 
certified trial videotape) 
Aplt. Add., p. 25-26. In plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, 
and in other pleadings, plaintiff relies on at length on the court record of Civil No. 
004904704, wherein a respectful judge of the Third District Court elaborated on 
plaintiff's illness and disability in a decision declaring that illness and disability early in 
plaintiff's life. The court failed to consider those citations. 
Further, the court's quotation of the standard damages section of the complaint's 
statements of claim (Aplt. Add., p. 180) do not preclude the validity in plaintiff's 
argument in his motion to amend and amended complaint, which contains two 
paragraphs of facts indicating plaintiff's discovery of the injuries caused by defendants. 
Further, the district court's memorandum order makes a specious conclusion that 
the plaintiff "does not demonstrate that at any time within the intervening period 
between the accrual of the cause of action [which was never stated in the complaint] 
and the filing of the complaint [immediately after plaintiff had been declared disabled by 
his psychotherapist and the Third District Court) plaintiff was unable to protect his legal 
rights." Aplt. Add., p. 180. 
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The court's mistatement of the standard for general incompetences conceals the 
fact that the standard cited by the court is actually "when the disability is of such a 
nature to show him . . . unable to manage his . . . business affairs or estate, or to 
comprehend his . . . legal rights or liabilities." Aplt. Add., p. 179. 
The court on Aplt. Add., p. 180, speciously concludes that the standard is only 
the inability to comprehend legal rights, which it is not. The district court's citation, 
O'Neil v. Division of Family Svc„ 821 PJ2d 1139.1142 (Utah 1991, includes three 
standards, not one. 
The plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss argues that the 
plaintiff was unable to manage his business affairs, and the memorandum provides 
copious evidence to support the argument. 
Finally, the district court's memorandum/order conclusion on Aplt. Add., p. 181, 
engages in gross anachronism, stating: 
plaintiff also provides an affidavit which, while demonstrating the 
difficulties his condition imposes upon him, reveals that plaintiff is 
presently under the same condition he suffered from during the years 
between his injury and the filing of the cause of action. 
The conclusion is incorrect. The affidavit referred to by the court (Aplt. Add., p. 
72-74), does not "reveal" that plaintiffs condition the same as before the psychotic 
break. The affidavit and plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, 
reveals that prior to plaintiffs breakdown in May 1997, plaintiff had not had any 
medical care or medication for his illness and disability, which unsuccessful medication 
began in October 1997 and successful medication began in July 1998. Aplt. Add., pp. 
85-87: 
The Plaintiff had never been treated for his mental disorder prior to 
1997: 
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10. The Petitioner has been taking psychotropic 
medication as prescribed since May of 1997, including a wide 
spectrum anti-depressant/anti-anxiety medication.... He has been 
in regular counseling with his therapist. Dr. Michael Lambert, for 
several [3.67] years. The Petitioner is not malingering in 
presenting his symptoms to this Court, nor is he refusing 
medication or other reasonable treatment for his symptoms. 
[Exhibit A, Findings of Fact, 510] 
Prior to May 1997, the Plaintiff had never received medical treatment for 
his mental disorder, nor had he taken medications to control his mental 
disorder. 
Anti-psychotic medications now enable Plaintiff to attempt to prosecute 
this case and others, albeit slowly and arduously given the reasonable 
modification of rules allowed by this Court. 
Plaintiff's wife began prescribing and administering anti-depressant 
medications to Plaintiff in fall 1997, which medications failed to control 
Plaintiffs symptoms (Id., Nov. 7, 2001, Nancy Lowery's testimony, 
2:53:40-2:54:50). 
Aplt. Add., p. 89. 
During all but five years of his life. Plaintiff suffered the symptoms of his 
disorders without the benefit of psychiatric and psychotherapeutic 
treatment and medications. 
Aplt. Add., p. 94. 
Ignoring all the evidence in plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss, the court writes in its memorandum order: 
Because plaintiffs present pleadings evidence a better understanding 
of his legal rights than is typically demonstrated by a pro-se party, this 
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Court cannot conclude that the plaintiff was at any time incompetent 
for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. 
The court's memorandum and order here mixes two of its major errors: 
anachronism and the incompetence standard of only legal rights, excluding 
management of business affairs, which the plaintiff argued in his memorandum in 
opposition. 
Plaintiff was without psychiatric, psychotherapeutic, and pharmaceutical 
treatment for his disorder during the years in question in this case. The 
preponderance of evidence in this case demonstrates that the court should have 
tolled the statute of limitations and denied plaintiff's motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiff has run out of time to complete his appeal brief because the Court of 
Appeals has not acted upon plaintiff's Notice to Submit for Decision on Motion for 
Reasonable Modification of Rules and Amendment to Motion for Reasonble 
Modification of Rules. Plaintiff must conclude. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The district court erred or abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion 
to amend the complaint; by commiting error and prejudice, abused its discretion, 
failed correctness, and/or denied plaintiff access to due process by repeatedly 
dismissing the complaint before allowing the mentally disabled plaintiff scheduled 
oral argument and then attempting to shift blame for his prejudicial error to the ill 
plaintiff, thereby triggering depressive-manic cycling, including hypermanic paranoia, 
in plaintiff's brain chemistry; by committing error and prejudice, abusing its 
discretion, or failing correctness by excluding "outside materials" [sic] from 
consideration on the motion to dismiss in order to "cover his ass"; and by failing 
correctness on his decision on the motion to dismiss by ignoring the preponderance 
of the evidence. 
Plaintiff asks the Court of Appeals to reverse the district court's denial of 
plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint because plaintiff's motion to amend was 
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timely, the amendment to the complaint contained material facts, and the amendment 
would not cause unjustified delay nor prejudice the defendant. 
Plaintiff asks the Court of Appeals to also direct the district court to allow plaintiff 
to file an amemded complaint with the district court with an affidavit by plaintiffs 
primary doctor verifying the discovery of the accrual of the cause of action. 
Plaintiff asks the Court of Appeals to reverse the district court's grant of the 
motion to dismiss based on the district court's violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the court's "cover-his-ass" behavior, which practice is contrary to 
the requirements the rule of law, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and human 
decency. 
Plaintiff asks the Court of Appeals to reverse the district court's grant of the 
motion to dismiss based on incorrectness by the district court, which ignored the 
preponderance of the evidence in the pleadings. 
Plaintiff asks the Court of Appeals to also assign plaintiff a serious, respectful, 
and professional judge on remand of the case, as it is absolutely impossible for 
plaintiff to go before Judge Dever's court again, as Judge Dever was brutally cruel to 
the plaintiff, who suffered seriously at Judge Dever's hand, which experience 
precludes further experience with Judge Dever. The Court of Appeals should 
reprimand Judge Dever for his cruelty and arrogance to the plaintiff, take measures to 
prevent such cruelty to others seeking due process in Judge Dever's court, and 
impose strong sanctions against Judge Dever if the Court of Appeals finds that Judge 
Dever has breached or betrayed his trust with the public, for he has certainly 
betrayed his trust with the plaintiff by his arrogant cruelty. 
DATED this 14th day of April, 2003, 
Thomas J. Lowery 
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I hereby certify that on this 14th day of April, 2003,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Appeal Brief to be delivered by U.S. Mail to: 
Mr. David B. Thomas 
A-350 ASB 
P.O. Box 21333 
Provo, Utah 84602-1333 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
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i 
i 
1 SA.LT LAKE CITY, UTAH - OCTOBER 18, 2002 
2 HONORABLE L.A. DEVER, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
i 
4 , THE COURT: Okay, this is the matter of Lowery vs. | 
I 
5 Brigham Young University, case number 020902112. Parties would | 
6 like to enter t.heir appearance for the record? 
1 [ MR. LOWERY: Tom Lowery, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Appearing pro se. 
9 MP. LOWERY: Yes. 
10 MR. THOMAS: David Thomas appearing on behalf of 
11 , Brigham Young University. 
12
 { THE COURT: Very well. 
13 ' MR. LOWERY: Your Honor, I would move the Court to 
14 grant leave to amend my complaint and to have a motion to amend 
15 | that complaint. I have here for the Court, that motion for 
16 leave and to grant with a memorandum and an amended complaint, | 
17 i which has been filed with the clerk of the court. 
i 
18 , THE COURT: It's not very timely, is it, Mr. Lowery? 
19 MR. LOWERY: It's very timely. 
I 
20 I THE COURT: This is the date set for the hearing on 
21 ' the motion to dismiss m tnis matter. 
i 
22 I MR. LOWERY: That's correct. 
23 ' THE COURT: Have you given a copy of this to Mr. 
24 | Thomas? 
25 I MR. LOWERY: I have. 
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1 THE COURT: Supplied him copies of it? 
2 i MR. LOWERY: I have. I have a copy for tne Court. 
3 j MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I received that about three 
4 or four - about 10 minutes ago, 15 minutes ago - 25 minutes 
I 
5 ' ago. 
6 , THE COURT: What is the basis for your request to J 
i I 
7 j file an amendea complaint? j 
8 MR. LOWERY: Would the court like to see the motion 
9 [ which is extremely brief? 
10 THE COURT: Bailiff? 
11 ' Mr. Thomas, do you want to respond to any of this? 
I 
12 I MR. THOMAS: If I may. 
13 j THE COURT: You may. 
14 ' MR. THOMAS: In looking at the motion to amend the 
15 | addition of the two additional paragraphs and to amend the 
I 
16 pleading, they appear to not be particular relevant to any of 








complaint. They don't appear to address or provide any new ' 
basis that would substantiate any of the claims that have 
i 
already been made. j 
\ 
i 
As to the remaining complaint, I haven't been able toj 
review that in detail to see if there's anything other than ! 
I 
what has been represented here, but I do notice that there have I 
t 
24 ! been a number of the original causes of actions been brought. j 




the same basis for trie motion to dismiss which we've already - | 
which we've already briefed, i 
THE COURT: Well, it appears from reading through | 
your motion to amend, Mr. Lowery, that two issues that you're j 
asking to be added deal with the same issues you've already 
raised in this matter. j 
MR. LOWERY: Your Honor, the two - the two - the two | 
sets of facts, two paragraphs of facts that I have added to the! 
complaint arise out of the - the actions of the defendants and I 
I give justification m the motion for the necessity of adding | 
them, and if the Court looks closely at them, the Court will [ 
i 
see that this would move the statute of limitations up until | 
November (inaudible)• 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to deny your motion to j 
amend in this matter, Mr. Lowery. I don't believe it's timely | 
being made. Two, I don't believe that it addresses any new I 
issues in this matter. All you're saying in this paragraph 61 | 
the change that I assume the two paragraphs you're adding, I 
don't believe in any way address the issue the motion to 
dismiss is addressing because the issues concerning this matter 
arose in 1995 is what my understanding was. 
MR. LOWERY: That's correct, your Honor, however, 
under the discovery rule, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court have made it very clear that when facts are the substance 
of an amended complaint, unlike addition or subtraction of the 
3 
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1
 ( parties to the suit, that if th^y would have effect on the 
2
 ( outcome of the :ase as a whole, that the court would -
3 ' THE COURT: Mr. Lowery. 
i 
i 
4 MR. LOWERY: - prejudice the plaintiff by not 
! 
5 I granting the motion in the interest of justice. 
I 
6 I THE COURT: Well, Mr, Lowery -
i 
7 J MR. LOWERY: I cited a case -
8 THE COURT: Let me speak when I'm talking, okay? 
9 J MR. LOWERY: May I finish? 
10 ' THE COURT: You may finish. 
11 j MR. LOWERY: And I cited cases in my brief argument 
12 I there that make clear that the Rule 15 is to be construed very 
13 liberally. 
i 
14 | THE COURT: Are you finished? 
15 ! MR. LOWERY: Yes. Well, at least for the time. 
16 , THE COURT: Your complaint states that in 1995 you 
17 knew about these facts. I don't believe that what I reviewed 
i 
18 in your complaint and in your memorandum to me and the response 
19 filed by Brigham Young University and their motion to dismiss 
20 that there's any grounds to toll the statute of limitations. 
21 I MR. LOWERY: Your Honor. 
i 
22 , THE COURT: Your argument - let me finish. 
23 | MR. LOWERY: Excuse me, your Honor. 
24 I THE COURT: You asked me to let you finish. 
25 MR. LOWERY: Yes, sir. 
! 4 
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1 | THE COURT: I let you do it. 
2 ] MR. LOWERY: Yes, sir. 
3 j THE COURT: These issues raised here, I don't 
| 
believe, are sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. \ 
5 
6 
MR. LOWERY: May I respord? 
THE COURT: You may. 
7 < MR. LOWERY: Your Hcnor, under the discovery rule of I 
i 
! | 
8 i tolling the statute of limitations, one of the - one of the J 
9 . means by which the statute is tolled is the discovery or the i 
10 ' additional - an additioral discovery that moves the statute | 
11 ! forward in time. And if you will read the two additional 
12 | paragraphs of facts, you v,iil see that the plaintiff forgot to 
i 
13 • put into the facts the time at which the plaintiff discovered 
14 ' that the actions of the defendants contributed as a direct and 
15 ' proximate cause of the plaintiff's psychotic breakdown on May 
16 i 20, 1997. Under the cases listed in my argument, the discovery 
17 | rule is addressed. \ 
18 j MR. THOMAS: Your Honor? 
19 , THE COURT: Yes. 
20 i MR. THOMAS: If I might try to be a little bit 
21 I helpful and I may not be. One of the issues here is the action 
22 I that occurred in 1995. We have that set of causes of action 
23 ' which have been - at least elucidated in the complaint and we 
24 also have the statute of limitations question overlay. To the 
25 extent that these new two paragraphs come in that talk about a 
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new episode m 1997, and the psychiatric impact - the 
psychiatric impact of those, those have already been subject of 
another suit which was filed before Judge Nehnng and 
dismissed. So we would - we would plead that anything having 
to do with tnat - with this particular episode in 1997 which 
gives basis for any kind of a cause of action, would be barred 
by res judicata in the other case. But to the extent that this 
is now trying to explain that, this xS a psychiatric episode 
which now suspends the statute of limitation. I dor/1 think 
that this has any new information because it was already 
available when the original complaint and in the original brief 
that was provided. So to the extent that this - to try to 
claim a new cause of action, that's already denied - that's 
already been barred because of the prior litigation, 
THE COUR'1: Were these brought up in a case in front 
of Judge Nehring, these issues? 
MR. LOWERY: Your Honor, that case was dismissed 
without prejudice, and that actually doesn't bear on this at 
all. Those are facts put into this complaint. They are not 
related to any of the causes of action in this complaint. 
These are merely facts that give rise to the tolling of the 
statute of limitations based on the discovery of the impact of 
the actions of the defendants upon the plaintiff with regard to 
the psychotic break on May 20, 1997. 
THE COURT: Anything further, gentlemen? 




MR. THOMAS: Nothing further, j 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
, MR. LCWERY: I'm thinking. No. 
4 I THE COURT: Mr. Lowery, I believe that the statute of 
limitations started to run on this matter in 1995. And the 
four year statute expired in 1999. And I don't believe you've 
presented sufficient evidence to establish that there should be 
i 
8 | a toiling of the statute in this matter. Therefore, I'm going 
9 | to grant the motion to dismiss in this case. 
10 • MR. LCWERY: Without argument? 
11 ! THE COURT: You argued. Do you want to argue some 
12 . more? 
13 i MR. LOWEPY: I've only presented the motion to file 
14 amended complaint. 
15 | THE COURT: Do you want - I asked you if there was 
16 i anything else you wanted to say. You just said no. So now you 
17
 t want to say something? 
! ( 
18 i MR. LOWERY: If we're going to discuss the motion to 
19 j dismiss. Yes, I do. 
20 I THE COURT Okay, what do you want to say? 
21 I MR. LOWER*: Shall I just say it? Your Honor, in the 
22 i defendants' motion, the defendant argues in - from O'Neil vs. 
23 ' Division of Family Services that the court, the Supreme Court 
24 | rejected general incompetence as a standard for determining if | 
25 i mental disability tolls the statute of limitations. The | 
! 
i 
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defendant attempts to deceive the Court as the Court can see in 
page 19 of my memorandum in opposition. 0'Neil contends that 
in giving meaning to the term incompetence, and then it cites 
the sections of the code, "we should reject a requirement of 
general incompetence and substitute a very broad definition. 
We reject this argument. The defendants' argument in his 
motion is specious." The O'Neil Supreme Court upheld general 
incompetence as a standard for the tolling of the statute of 
limitations. O'Neil - in addition, O'Neil did not base his 
tolling claim en a mental illness described in the DSM4, which 
the plaintiff in this case was diagnosed as having since early 
life. 
The O'Neil court states "that the general 
incompetence may lie either in the management of plaintiff's 
business affairs or estate, or in comprehension of his legal 
rights or liability, not both. All the facts and all the 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party", which is the plaintiff in 
this case, "demonstrates that the plaintiff at all relevant 
times hereto was mentally ill and incompetent in the management 
of his business affairs or his estate." 
O'Neil court also ruled that in reviewing motion to 
dismiss, we consider the facts and all inferences to be drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
The plaintiff's claim is also based on the discovery 
8 
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1 ! rule. That is the defendants' misleading conduct and j 
2 ; concealment and special circumstances that would, based on a j 
i 
3 j balancing test, render application of the statute of j 
4 ; limitations unjust or irrational which is sufficiently broad - I 
5 | broad standard - a broad standard for adjudicating tolling j 
I 
6 i claims. 
i I 
i j 
7 j The Supreme Court in Williams vs. Howard in 1998 said 
i ! 
8 | that special situations exist in which the so-called discovery j 
i i 
9 | rule tolls the running of the statute of limitations- And they 
[ I 
10 ; said that there are three situations in which we have 
11 | determined that application of the discovery rule is J 
12 ' appropriate. And the first is where the application of the i 
13 i rule is mandated by statute. Two, where plaintiff is unaware j 
i 
14 , of a cause of action because of the defendants' misleading | 
15 i conduct or concealment. And three, where application is 
! 
16 ! warranted by the existence of special circumstances that would, j 
17 ' based on a balancing test, render application of the statute of 
I " | 
18 I limitations unjust or irrational. I 
j ! 
19 , The facts that I have presented in my memorandum in 
j 
20 ! opposition are voluminous to demonstrate by testimony of three 
i 
21 ; medical experts, by a ruling of Judge William Bohling in the 
22 ' Utah Third District Court here in this building, that my mental 
i 
23 : illness has been with me since youth. And on December 14, 
i 
24 ' 2001, Judge Bohling ruled that I was mentally disabled and that 
i 
25 ! I - I had been so mentally ill for at least 20 years. 
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| 
My fact section in the memorandum is voluminous. And 1 
i 
let me make a few references. The first in the fact section, j 
| 
let me say that again the defendants' counsel tries to deceive I 
1 
the Court injecting quoted terms in his memorandum that cannot ; 
I 
be found in my complaint. He replaced bluntly for curtly, I j 
included in my complaint the citation of my divorce trial where j 
i 
in I divorced my wife for deserting me because of my mental j 
illness. And I cited from that - I cited from that citation - j 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Lowery, you're arguing you have 
mental illness and I don't think anyone is disputing that you 
may have some mental illness. But the mental illness doesn't | 
i 
rise to the level of incompetence, and I don't think there's | 
anything - ( 
MR. LOWERY: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: - before this Court that has found you to | 
be adjudicated incompetent. ! 
MR. LOWERY: Your Honor, I would - I would say that | 
the standard is not incompetence. The standard in the cases 
that I cited in my memorandum in opposition were much more 
recent than the only case that the defendant cited, because the 
more recent cases were against his argument. And those cases 
cite the standard, which is - which I just read to the Court a 
few moments ago, and it again is on page 19 of my memorandum. 
The standard is - maybe it's on the next page. Yes, 
it's on page 20, almost mid-page, is the - the incompetence in 
10 
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i 
1 the management of his business affairs or estate, or | 
2 incompetence in comprehension of his legal rights or j 
3 i liabilities. That's tne standard. And I provided m the facts \ 
4 section of my memorandum volumes of evidence to demonstrate 
i I 
5 that my mental illness made me incompetent in the management of| 
i j 
6 I my business affairs and that's one of the reasons that my - j 
7 ! that Judge Bohlmg ruled that my wife should pay me $1,000 a ; 
8 month alimony. That's in my memorandum too. My memorandum , 
9 ' cites ail of the trial record relevant to that. And my j 
10 I memorandum cites the findings of fact and conclusions of law j 
11 I and the divorce decree. | I 
12 ' Now, I was - I was getting ready to make a few 
13 references from Judge Bohiing's ruling on December 14, 2001. 
14 Judge Bohlmg said, the bottom of page six, your Honor, "I | 
15 would find as follows: I think from the evidence and I think , 
16 j there is no - there is really no dispute about it that Mr. I 
17 Lowery suffers from a serious and persistent mental illness and| 
18
 | it was conceded by the three expert witnesses and acts as one 
19 disorder biochemical m nature. All the evidence that has been J 
20 , presented to the Court does nothing to undercut that j 
21 | conclusion. And there certainly were manifestations of the j 
i i 
22 I disorder early in Mr. Lowery's life. I don't know that there's: 
23 , a wide number of jobs where he can engage in the kind of work I 
1
 I 
24 ' that allows someone without the minimum paranoid personality j 
25 , disorder. To kind of exploit a great mental ability, but with I 
Appellant Addendum — 13 
.. j 
i 
that kind of emotional disorder, mental disorder to come to j 
some kind of gainful fashion. I find that difficult to ! 
i 
believe," Judge Bohling says, There certainly Dr. Michael j 
l 
Goates found'' my psychotherapist, that's I suffer from a 
classic case, no even my psychiatrist, "classic case of bipolar j 
j 
disorder with cycling features of mania and depression ! 
sometimes progressing into severe mania or hyper mania. 
Sometimes progressing into severe depression. And that the I 
extremes these cycling swings progress into a psychotic j 
disorder. Dr. Goates testified that plaintiff's major 
depression bipolar disorder was genetically inherited. Dr. | 
Goates testified that plaintiff's mental illness pre-existed I 
his May 1997 nervous breakdown by many years and that j 
plaintiff's last hopes were dashed by BYU political science j 
department chairman, David Magleby. In May 1997, hizli 
i 
psychotic break was characteristic of a pre-existing depressive j 
disorder with psychosis." i 
My - my motion to amend the complaint does not - does 
not involve in any way nor dees the original complaint this j 
tort committed by David Magleby which I may file again in by I 
November 16th. Defendants' argument against that that my 
motion of - my motion to amend the complaint is specious just j 
like his other deceptive arguments are in his motion to I 
dismiss. And I've made those perfectly clear. j 
My - my psychotherapist for nearly four years now, 
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1 J and I would add that my psychiatrist has been treating me for 
2 more than four years, Dr. Michael Lambert testified that I 
3 | suffer from a delusional disorder and a psychotic disorder. 
4 Dr. Lambert testified that when my early family life was either 
5 | biologically or socially disturbed. An independent medical 
6 I examiner that was - testified in my divorce case testified that 
i 
7 j it's very clear that the mood disorder, paranoid personality 
8 | disorder has existed since plaintiff's youth, from the time he 
9 ! began to read at least 20 years ago or so if not more. 
10 j On page nine, the Court should take note that Judge 
i 
11 | Bohiing in the findings of fact said the Court finds that the 
12 j petitioner is as a result of his serious and persistent mental 
13 . illness disabled from work. The Court finds specifically that 
14 I he has not engaged in some kind of long-standing charade to 
i 
15 , deceive the world in this litigation or in other areas. A 
16 ' whole history petitioner has described to this Court in the 
17 | 1970s including his tax protestor history in the 1970s and j 
i 
13 | early '80s. His whole history of being able to work better on j 
19 | his own rather than others is consistent with the Court's 
20 | findings about his illness. The petitioner" - he goes on and 
21 i says the petitioner has been taking psycho tropic medication -
I 
22 I THE COURT: I've read all of that, Mr. Lowery. 
23 MR. LOWERY: Have you read it all? 
24 I THE COURT: Yes, I've read it. 
25 ! MR. LOWERY: Thank you. Let me say this, your Honor, 
13 
I 
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' " ' ' i 
! 
i 
that the evidence in this Court's records under the care taking 
of the clerk of the court makes it perfectly clear that my | 
mental illness has existed for 20 years or more, and that the i 
events that lead up to the tragic conduct of David Magleby at 
BYU on May 20, 1997, at 11:58 a.m., and including all of the | 
events that happened prior to with regard to BYU contributed to 
my psychotic break, and this Court should not deny motion to; 
amend the complaint to include that fact in line 60 and 61 of I 
my motion to amend the complaint and my amended complaint 
itself or this Court will be violating the controlling case law I 
repeatedly articulated by the Supreme Court of Utah and its 
Court of Appeals. And if the Court would take the time to look 
at those cases, the Court would agree that the Court should not j 
deny my motion for leave - for leave to file an amended | 
j 
complaint and the motion to amend the complaint or if the Court j 
refuses my motion to grant leave to file the amended complaint 
without examining that motion itself, the Court is acting in a i 
prejudice manner not even to consider granting leave. 
THE COURT:; Thank you. 1 
I 
MR. LOWERY: And, your Honor, ; een beat • ;|: • f- • 
so long. I gave everything to those people. And if this Court 
would take the time to read the facts of my memorandum in 
opposition seriously, the Court would agree that it should at 
least grant me leave to file an amended complaint which can 
then be disputed by the defendant and be litigated i i 11.e 
14 
16 — Appellant Addendum 
i i 
i 
1 i appropriate fashion of due process. But if the Court refuses 
! 
2 ; even to do that, the court will be doing more helacious damage 
3 to me as has already been done. And it is likely that the 
4 , Court of Appeals will reverse the Court's decision. And thank 
i 
5 | you for letting me gen all this on the record, your Honor. 
6 , THE COURT: Mr. Thomas, do you want to respond to any 
7 ' of this? 
8 J MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, unless you have specific 
9 | questions about anything you'd like me to address, I would feel 
10 ' that this has been adequately briefed ana we'll stand on the \ 
11 i briefing that's been submitted to the Court. 
i 
12 THE COURT: Is it your position that - I believe your 




15 I MP. THOMAS: That's exactly right, your Honor. 
16 j THE COURT: And [inaudible] be incompetent. 
17 ' MR. THOMAS: That's exactly right, your Honor. 
18
 ] Within the meaning of the case law that's been provided that -
19 ' and by his own admission, your Honor, where he's indicated that 
20 i he does appreciate the legal proceedings while he's indicated 
i 
21 I that it is slow for him to respond appropriately to that, that 
22 - that is not an indication that he is not - he is not able to 
i 
23 , understand or able to present those or to appreciate the nature 
i 
24 , of those acts. As to his ability to manage his estate, I think 
25 ! we've submitted to the Court an almost unbroken from 1995 
15 
i 
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through at least the year 2000 an unbroken period of 
employment, not only with BYU but with other employers. 
MR. LOWERY: May I reply, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. LOWERY: Thank you. Your Honor, the defendant 
continues to try and. deceive the court. The defendant cited 
one old case, O'Neil. The defendants' argument based 0'Neil 
was garbage. It - it deceived the Court, if the Court will 
read that portion of my memorandum in opposition. I put forth 
recent cases that demonstrate that my argument and my 
memorandum in opposition is correct. 
Furthermore, the defendant attempts to deceive the 
Court once again with an anachronistic argument that my - that 
he has shown that in 1995 I had recognized and had knowledge 
that the - that the actions of the defendants in this case, 
that I had knowledge that those actions contributed to the 
psychotic break that took place on May 20, 1997, at 11:58 
That is an absurd argument, your Honor, because it's an 
impossible argument. And the damage that - that took place on 
December 20, 1997, at 11:58 a.m. at BYU there is testimony from 
my doctors and from -
THE COURT: You've already told me, Mr. Lowers , that 
subject of another case. What happened -
MR. LOWERY: There is no existing case whatsoever, 
and that is not a cause of action in this case, your Honor. I 
16 
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1 I have made a motion to include that fact as only a fact - as 
2 only a fact, not as a statement of claim in this case. That is 
3 j a fact that and the fact is stared as this: that my knowledge 
4 j that the actions of defendants m this case was a direct and 
5 | proximate cause of my psychotic break on May 20, 1997. That is 
6 | what those facts state. And my argument makes clear that that 
7 i could not have been known in 1995. The issue here is knowledge 
8 I of the plaintiff of a - the knowledge of the plaintiff that the 
9 | actions of defendants in this case were direct and proximate 
10 causes of the psychotic break in Decern - on May 20, 1997. That 
11 j if the Court will examine Rule 15, and the cases that I cited 
i 
12 | in my motion, the Court will conclude if the Court thinks it 
I 
13 i through carefully that that extends the statute of limitations 
i 
14 I to November 21 of 2002. And I have stated also in my motion 
15 that medical testimony will verify that at trial or in any 
16 evidentiary nearing. 
17 | And, your Honor, I would urge this Court not to base 
18 I its decision on these specious arguments that are obviously 
19 I specious put forth by tne defendant saying that O'Neil said 
20 | exactly the opposition that it does say, and that's the only 
21 case he relied on. And it suggests that he's a crook. And 
! 
22 i I've made that clear in my pleadings, and I want the Court of 
i 
23 I Appeals to know it. 
I 
24 | THE COURT: Thank you very much. I'll take the 
25 I matter under advisement, gentlemen. I'll review O'Neil before 
17 
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decision in this matter. Thank you very much. 
MR. LOWERY: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. LOWERY: Would you review the cases I cited 
THE COURT: I will. 
MR. LOWERY: Thank you very much. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801/262-485Q 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Thomas J. Lowery, 
Plaintiff, j 
vs. 
Kathy Carter ] 
Shalene ] 
Eugene Bramhall ] 
Dr. Steve Aforecht 
Dr. Fred Skousen ] 
President Rex E. Lee (deceased) ) 
Brigham Young University ] 
Defendant ] 
) COMPLAINT 
i av i rNo. 020902112 
\ Judge Dever 
1. Plaintiff Thomas J . Loweiy is now, and has been since September 26, 1999, a 
resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, res id in£at4143 S. 635-East, Salt Lake 
City 84107. 
2. Defendant BrighanxYoung University (hereafter BYU), is ^-corporation 
residing in Utah County, at Provo, Utali 84602. 
3. At all relevant times hereto, Thomas J . Loweiy was a mentally ill man, which 
tolls the statute of limitations for this action. (Ruling, Judge William 
Bohling, Third District Court of Utah, Lowery v. Loweiy, Civil No. 
26 — Appellant Addendum 
004904704, Dec. 14, 2001, beginning at 12:26:28 p.m. on the certified trial 
videotape) 
4. At all relevant times hereto, defendant BYU was the employer of plaintiff 
Thomas J. Loweiy, who was a part-time BYU employee. 
5. On or about March KX 1995, Allen F. Thomason (hereafter 'Thomason"), an 
applicant to the BYU Master's of Accountancy, Master's of Organizational 
Behavior, and Law programs at BYU, delivered a BYU confidential letter of 
recommendation form to the plaintiff to submit to BYU as-a-part of 
Thomason's application. 
6. The-official BYU "CONFIDENTIAL LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FOR 
THE MARRIOTT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT GRADUATE PROGRAMS* 
form requested a "frank and confidential evaluation of his or her 
[Thomason's] abilities and attitudes ...." (see attached letter of 
recommendation, 2 pages, with envelope) 
7. The form also included a waiver of any rigjit that Thomason "may have [had] 
under any statute or university policy to obtain access to this 
recommendation," which waiver was signed by Thomason. 
8. On or about March-!2, 1995, the plaintiff wrote, signed, and sent the BYU 
recommendation letter "to the applicant [Thomason] in the pre-addressed 
envelope" after signing his (plaintiff si "name across the back of the envelope 
after sealing" it, according to the written BYU instructions on the letter of 
recommendation form. The letter was stamped as received by BYU "Graduate 
Admissions" on March 15, 1995. 
2 
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9. The plaintiff relied on BYU to keep the letter of recommendation private and 
confidential and especially to keep the letter out of the Jtxands nf Thomason 
as the contents of the letter contained significantly "frank" neggnive 
comments and ratings about Thomason. 
10. The plaintiff had observed Thomason on numerous occasions as emotionally 
unstable and even hostile on a few occasions toward people who didn't agree 
with him. 
11. On_or about April 21, 1995, Thomason phoned the plaintiff and stated 
bluntly that he would arrive at the plaintiffs home "in a few minutes to 
talk-" Thomason said no more. 
12. After searching his memory for a reason for Thomason's blunt phone call, 
the plaintiff associated the phone call with the negative comments and 
ratings he had written in his BYU letter of recommendation for Thomason, 
and lie began to fear reprisal from Thomason, even possible violence 
13. The plaintiff loaded a small family protection pistol and placed it under the 
cushion of the sofa in his home library, in case Thomason became physically 
violent. 
14. When the plaintiff answered his front door a few minutes later, Thomason 
began to attack the plaintiff verb ally for writing the negative comments and 
ratings in the BYU letter of recommendation. 
15. Stepping toward the door, Thomason insisted that he enter. 
16. The door already open, and fearful of the large Thomason, the plaintiff 
opened the door wide, and Thomason walked into the entry and on into the 
adjoining library. 
3 
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17. Thomason then ranted in rage for more than a half an hour at the plaintiff 
about the negative comments in the plaintiffs BYU letter of recommendation 
inJbehalf of Thomason. 
18. The plaintiff readied himself for physical defense. 
19. During this time, the plaintiff repeatedly recalled the presence of the pistol 
under the sofa cushion below him and prepared himself to use it if 
Thomason made any physical assault. 
20. The plaintiff spoke to Thomason softly in efforts to calm him down. 
21. When Thomason finished, the plaintiff asked him to leaye. 
22. Thomason refused, again expressing rage that the plaintiff would say 
negative things about him instead of only positive things in the BYU letter of 
recommendation. 
23. The plaintiff listened quietly, then carefully and kindly apologized for writing 
the negative comments in the BYU letter of recommendation. larhielL placated 
Thomason. 
24. The plaintiff then told Thomason he would do anything possible to help 
Thomason get into a master's degree program except lie. Thomason became 
emotionally aggravated again, saying again that his expectation had been 
that the plaintiff would emphasize only the positive aspects about him. 
25. The plaintiff again spoke softly to Thomason, this time about the possibility 
of Thomason's future success. 
26. Thomason became less irritated, and the plaintiff was able to get him to 
leave the plaintiffs home. 
4 
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27. After the heated conversation in the plaintiffs library, the plaintiff phoned 
the BYU Marriott School of Management and asked to speak to someone in 
charge of graduate program applications and letters of recommendation. A 
receptionist said the person in charge had already left the office for the day. 
28. The plaintiff recounted to the receptionist the brief phone call and visit from 
Thomason. 
29. The receptionist took the message and promised that someone would return 
the plaintiffs phone call the following business day. 
30. On or about April 24, 1995, Kathy Carter, the admissions manager for the 
BYU accounting master's degree program phoned the plaintiff and said that 
the circumstances of the release of the plaintiffs letter of recommendation 
to Thomason had "snowballed.w 
31. Kathy Carter said Thomason had delivered his application and sealed 
envelopes containing letters of recommendation in his behalf to her 
department at BYU. 
32. Kathy Carter also said that Thomason later returned to her department and 
requested copies of the sealed letters of recommendation to deliver to the 
BYU law school in conjunction with his application there and to the 
Department of Organizational Behavior in conjunction with his application 
there. 
33. Kathy Carter also said that she instructed a "new secretary" in her 
department named Shalene to make copies of the plaintiffs letter of 
recommendation for Thomason and to give them to Thomason to deliver to 
the law school and Organizational Behavior department. 
5 
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34. Kathy Carter also said that Thomason did not deliver letters of 
recommendation to the Organizational Behavior department, but had kept 
them. 
35. The plaintiff expressed distress that Thomason had the letter of 
recommendation the plaintiff written, and asked to speak with the person 
ultimately in charge of the confidentiality of the plaintiffs letter of 
recommendation. 
36. Kathy Carter gave the plaintiff the name and phone number of the director 
of the BYU Department of Accountancy and Information Systems, Dr. Steve 
Albrecht, and the name and phone number of the dean of the Marriott 
School of Management T)n Fred Skousen. 
37. The plaintiff phoned Albrecht, who was not in his office, and so the plaintiff 
left a message requesting that Albrecht return the phone call. The plaintiff 
then phoned Fred Skousen. 
38. After the plaintiff recounted to Skousen the release of the plaintiffs BYU 
letter of recommendation in behalf of Thomason to Thomason and 
Thomason's phone call and visit and conversation at the plaintiffs home, 
Skousen apologized to the plaintiff for the breach of privacy and 
confidentiality and said Albrecht would phone the plaintiff. 
39. Albrecht phoned the plaintiff at or about 2:30 p.m., April 24, 1995, and 
confirmed that one of the secretaries uxhis department had given the 
plaintiffs BYU letter of recommendation in behalf of Thomason to 
Thomason after BYU had obtained custody of the letters. 
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40. Albrecht also apologized to the plaintiff for his department's release of the 
letter to Thomason. 
41. The plaintiff asked Albrecht to mail a copy of the plaintiffs letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason to the plaintiff through BYU campus 
mail so the plaintiff could review the letter. Albrecht agreed to do so. 
42. On April 24, 1995, "Michelle Berge" of the BYU "School of Accountancy & 
Information Systems" at "560 TNRB [BYU's Tanner building]" mailed a 
"Memo ... To: Tom Lowery, 783 SWKT [BYlTs Spencer W. Kimball Tower] ... 
re: Letter of Recommendation for Allen Thomason." 
43. The memo said: "Enclosed please find a copy of the Letter of 
Recommendation you wrote for Allen Thomason, which you requested from 
Dr. Steve Albrecht" (attached, with envelope). 
44. During May 1995, Thomason revealed to the plaintiffs neigjibor, Mark 
Poulsen, that the plaintiff had written negative comments in his letter of 
recommendation for Thomason. Poulsen visited the plaintiff and discussed 
with the plaintiff Thomason's anger at the plaintiff. 
45. The plaintiffs fears of harm from Thomason increased in intensity and 
quantity. 
46. Because of his increases of intensity and fear, the plaintiff phoned Steve 
Albrecht again on or about June 2, 1995, and expressed to Albrecht the 
plaintiffs fear of damage to his reputation stemming from Thomason's 
possession of the plaintiffs negative letter of recommendation in behalf of 
Thomason, which Thomason might copy and distribute to others. 
47. The plaintiff asked Albrecht to retrieve the letter from Thomason. 
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48. Albrecht told the plaintiff to contact BYU University Counsel Eugene 
Bramhall (hereafter "BramhalT) and to ask Bramhall to retrieve the letter. 
49. On or about June 5, 1995, the plaintiff reached Bramhall via phone, 
described to Bramhall the aforementioned events and circumstances 
surrounding his BYU confidential letter of recommendation in behalf of 
Thomason and it's release by BYU to Thomason, and asked Bramhall to 
retrieve the letter from Thomason. 
50. Bramhall told the plaintiff that there were no legal problems for the plaintiff 
or for BYU because of Thomason's access to and possession of the letter, 
that only Thomason had violated the law. 
51. Hie plaintiff told Bramhall that BYU personnel had given Thomason a copy 
of the plaintiffs letter of recommendation in behalf of Thomason and that 
BYU should retrieve the letter. 
52. Bramhall told the plaintiff to retrieve the letter himself. The plaintiff told 
Bramhall he feared Thomason's reaction to any request the plaintiff might 
make to get the letter back. 
53. Bramhall then told the plaintiff to retrieve the letter through Thomason's 
mental health therapist. The plaintiff told Bramhall that he didn't know the 
name of Thomason's therapist. 
54. Bramhall told the plaintiflf to visit the plaintiffs and Thomason's common 
church bishop, Lynn Bullock, and ask Bullock to find out who Thomason's 
therapist was and to tell the plaintiff the therapist's name. Bramhall also 
told the plaintiff to then tell Bramhall the therapist's name, that Bramhall 
would retrieve the letter and notify the plaintiff of its retrieval. 
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55. Because the plaintiff felt subordinate to Bramhall's exercise of BYU 
administrative authority over the employee plaintiff, and because of 
Bramh all's commanding exercise of authority upon him, the plaintiff 
followed Bramhall's. instructions. 
56. During June 1995, the plaintiff phoned and visited Bishop Bullock 
numerous times in_attempts to get the name of Thomason's therapist for 
Bramhall. In early July 1995, Bullock told the plaintiff that Thomason was 
seeing a therapist at the Alpine Center for Mental Health. 
57. In early July, the plaintiff phoned Bramhall to tell him the name of 
Thomason's medical clinic. Bramhall could not take the call, so the plaintiff 
left a message. 
58. On or about July 7, 1995, Bramhall returned the plaintiffs phone call; the 
plaintiff told Bramhall the name of Thomason's medical clinic, the Alpine 
Center for Mental Health. 
59. Bramhall never notified the plaintiff that the letter had or had not been 
retrieved. The plaintiff phoned Bramhall numerous times to discover the 
retrieval of his BYU letter of recommendation from Thomason, b u t Bramhall 
never returned the plaintiffs phone calls. 
COUNT 1—NEGLIGENCE 
THOMA? J. LOWERY V. KATHY CARTER, SHALENE, AND BYU 
60. Paragraphs 1 through 59 of this complaint are incorporated herein hy reference as 
though fully set forth herein at length. 
61. The_ aforementioned release of the plaintiffs BYU confidential letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason to Thomason and resulting emotional 
and bodily injuries to the plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery were directly and 
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proximately caused by the negligence of Kathy Carter and Shalene, acting at all 
relevant times hereto entirely within the course and scope of their employment, 
agency, servitude, and /o r workmanship with co-defendant BYU. 
The negligence of Kathy Carter and Shalene, acting at all relevant times-hereto 
entirely within the course and scope of their employment, agency, servitude^ 
and/ or workmanship with co-defendant BYU, consisted of the following acts,, 
and /o r omissions: 
62J . Giving Thomason access to a copy of the plaintiffs BYU confidential letter 
of recommendation in behalf of Thomason by ordering the delivery of and 
delivering the letter, respectively, to Thomason after they obtained custody 
of the letter. 
62.2. Failing to keep private and confident the plaintiffs RYU confidential letter 
of recommendation in behalf of Thomason from Thomason after they 
obtained custody of the letter. 
As a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence, the plaintiff suffered 
severe and lasting emotional distress causing the following^ physical phenomena, 
physical sequelae, and physical manifestations thereof: severe biochemical 
distress and fear of physical harm to himself and his family; anxiety; nervousness; 
sleeplessness adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to function and interact 
normally in the workplace and socially; humiliation; embarrassment; inability to 
concentrate and focus; intense pain in his head, neck, shoulders and back; 
frequent nightmares causing perspiration and disrupted patterns of sleep 
adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to function and interact normally in the 
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workplace and socially; fatigue; overreaction or inordinate reaction to ordinary 
events and occurrences. 
64. As- a further direct and proximate consequence of defendants' negligence,, the 
plaintiff suffered harm to his dignity and interest in privacy. 
WHEREEQRE, plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery hereby demands judgment in his favor 
against defendants Kathy Carter, Shalener and BYU, individually and jointly and 
severally, in an amount not in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) together 
with such other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper. 
COUNT 2—NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: BREACH OF THE 
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
THOMAS J. LOWERY V. KATHY CARTER, SHALENE, AND BYU 
65. Paragraphs 1 through 59 of this complaint are incorporated herein by reference as 
though fully set forth herein at length. 
66. The aforementioned release of the plaintiffs BYU confidential letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason to Thomason and resulting emotional 
and bodily injuries to the plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery were directly and 
proximately caused by the negligence or intentions of Kathy Carter and Shalene, 
acting at all relevant times hereto entirely within the course and scope of their 
employment, agency, servitude, and/or workmanship with co-defendant BYU. 
67. The negligence of Kathy Carter and Shalene, acting at all relevant times hereto 
entirely within the course and scope of their employment, agency, servitude, 
and/or workmanship with co-defendant BYU, consisted of the following acts 
and/or omissions: 
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67.1. Breaching their confidential relationship with the plaintiff by giving 
Thomason access to a copy of the plaintiffs BYU confidential letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason by ordering the delivery of and 
delivering the letter, respectively, to Thomason after obtaining custody of 
the letter. 
67 2~ Failing to keep private and confident the plaintiffs BYU confidential letter 
of recommendation i n h e h a l i of Thomason from Thomason after 
obtaining custody of the letter. 
68. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence or intentions, the 
plaintiff suffered severe and lasting emotional distress causing the following 
physical phenomena, physical sequelae^ and physical manifestations thereofi 
severe biochemical distress and intense fear of physical harm to himself and his 
family; anxiety; nervousness; sleeplessness adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to 
function and interact normally in the workplace and socially; humiliation; 
embarrassment; inability to concentrate and focus; intense pain in his head, neck, 
shoulders and back; frequent nightmares causing perspiration and disrupted 
patterns of sleep adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to function and interact 
normally in the workplace and socially; fatigue; overreaction or inordinate 
reaction to ordinary events and occurrences. 
69. As a further direct and proximate consequence of defendants' negligence or 
intentions, the plaintiff suffered harm to his dignity and interest in privacy. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery hereby demands judgment in his favor 
against defendants Kathy Carter, Shalene, and BYU, individually and jointly and 
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severally, in an amount not in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) together 
with such other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper. 
COUNT 3—NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS 
THOMAS J. LOWERY V. KATHY CARTER, SHALENE, AND BYU 
Paragraphs 1 through 59 of this complaint are incorporated herein by reference as 
though fully set forth herein at length. 
The aforementioned release of the plaintiffs BYU confidential letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason to Thomason and resulting emotional 
and bodily injuries to the plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery were directly and 
proximately caused by the negligence or intentions of Kathy Carter and Shalene, 
acting at all relevant times hereto entirely within the course and scope of their 
employment, agency, servitude, and / or workmanship with co-defendant BYU. 
The negligence or intentions of Kathy Carter and Shalene, acting at all relevant 
times hereto entirely within the course and scope of their employment, agency, 
servitude, and /o r workmanship with co-defendant BYU, consisted of the 
following acts and /o r omissions: 
72.1. Disclosing the private fact that the plaintiff provided negative information 
about Thomason in his BYU letter of recommendation- iiubehalf of 
Thomason. 
722.- Failing to keep private and confident the fact that the plaintiff provided 
negative information about Thomason in his BYU letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason. 
72.3. Disclosing the private facts and opinions provided to BYU by the plaintiff 
in his BYU letter of recommendation in behalf of Thomason. 
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72.4. Failing to keep private and confident the facts and opinions provided to 
BYU by the plaintiff in his BYU letter of recommendation in behalf of 
Thomason. 
73. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence or intentions, the 
plaintiff suffered severe and lasting emotional distress causing the following 
physical phenomena, physical sequelae* and physical manifestations thereof: 
severe biochemical distress and intense fear of physical harm to himself and his 
family; anxiety; nervousness; sleeplessness adversely affecting plaintiff's ability to 
function and interact normally in the workplace and socially; humiliation; 
embarrassment; inability to concentrate and focus; intense pain in his head, neck, 
shoulders and back; frequent nightmares causing, perspiration and disrupted 
patterns of sleep adversely affecting plaintiff's ability to function and interact 
normally in the workplace and socially; fatigue; overreaction or inordinate 
reaction to ordinary events and occurrences. 
74. As a further direct and proximate consequence of defendants' negligence o r 
intentions, the plaintiff suffered harm to his dignity and interest in privacy. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery hereby demands judgment in his favor 
against defendants Kathy Carter, Shalene, and BYU, individually and jointly and 
severally, in an amount not in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) together 
with such other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper. 
COUNT 4—NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
THOMAS J. LOWERY V. KATHY CARTER, SHALENE, AND BYU 
75. Paragraphs 1 through 59 of this complaint are incorporated herein by reference as 
though fully set forth herein at length. 
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The aforementioned release of the plaintiffs BYU confidential letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason to Thomason and resulting emotional 
and bodily injuries to the plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery were directly and 
proximately caused by the negligence or intentions of Kathy Carter and Shalene, 
acting at all relevant times hereto entirely within the course and scope of their 
employment, agency, servitude, and/or workmanship with co-defendant BYU. 
The negligence or intentions of Kathy Carter and Shalene, acting at all relevant 
times hereto entirely within the course and scope of their employment, agency, 
servitude, and/or workmanship with co-defendant BYU, consisted of the 
following acts and /or omissions: 
77.1. Breaching their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by ordering the delivery of 
and delivering, respectively, a copy of the plaintiffs BYU letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason to Thomason after creating a 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff to keep the letter private after the plaintiffs 
letter had entered the custody of the defendants. 
77.2. Breaching their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by failing to keep private the 
plaintiffs BYU confidential letter of recommendation in behalf of 
Thomason from Thomason after creating a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff to 
keep the letter private and after the plaintiffs letter had entered the custody 
of the defendants. 
As a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence or intentions, the 
plaintiff suffered severe and lasting emotional distress causing the following 
physical phenomena, physical sequelae, and physical manifestations thereof: 
severe biochemical distress and intense fear of physical harm to himself and his 
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family; anxiety; nervousness; sleeplessness adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to 
function and interact normally in the workplace and socially; humiliation; 
embarrassment; inability to concentrate and focus; intense pain in his head, neck, 
shoulders and back; frequent nightmares causing perspiration and disrupted 
patterns of sleep adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to function and interact 
normally in the workplace and socially; fatigue; overreaction or inordinate 
reaction to ordinary events and occurrences* 
79. As a further direct and proximate consequence of defendants' negligence or 
intentions, the plaintiff suffered harm to his dignity and interest in privacy. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery hereby demands judgment in his favor 
against defendants Kathy Carter, Shalene, and BYU, individually and jointly and 
severally, in an amount not in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) together 
with such other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper. 
COUNT 5—NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BREACH OF CONTRACT 
THOMAS J. LOWERY V. KATHY CARTER, SHALENE, AND BYU 
80. Paragraphs 1 through 59 of this complaint are incorporated herein by reference as 
though fully set forth herein at length. 
81. The aforementioned release of the plaintiffs BYU confidential letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason to Thomason and resulting emotional 
and bodily injuries to the plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery were directly and 
proximately caused by the negligence or intentions of Kathy Carter and Shalene, 
acting at all relevant times hereto entirely within the course and scope of their 
employment, agency, servitude, and/or workmanship with co-defendant BYU. 
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The negligence or intentions of Kathy Carter and Shalene, acting at all relevant 
times hereto entirely within the course and scope of their employment, agency, 
servitude, and /o r workmanship with co-defendant BYU, consisted of the 
following acts and /o r omissions: 
82.1. Breaching their contract to privacy with the plaintiff by giving Thomason 
access to a copy of the plaintiff s BYU confidential letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason by ordering the delivery of and 
delivering the letter, respectively, to Thomason after obtaining custody of 
the letter. 
82.2 Breaching their contract to privacy with the plaintiff by failing to keep the 
plaintiffs BYU confidential letter of recommendation in behalf of 
Thomason from Thomason after obtaining custody of the letter. 
As a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence or intentions, the 
plaintiff suffered severe and lasting emotional distress causing the following 
physical phenomena, physical sequelae, and physical manifestations thereof: 
severe biochemical distress and intense fear of physical harm to himself and his 
family; anxiety; nervousness; sleeplessness adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to 
function and interact normally in the workplace and socially; humiliation; 
embarrassment; inability to concentrate and focus; intense pain in his head, neck, 
shoulders and back; frequent nightmares causing perspiration and disrupted 
patterns of sleep adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to function and interact 
normally in the workplace and socially; fatigue; overreaction or inordinate-
reaction to ordinary events and occurrences. 
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84. As a further direct and proximate consequence of defendants' negligence or 
intentions, the plaintiff suffered harm to his dignity and interest in privacy-
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery hereby demands judgment in his favor 
against defendants Kathy Carter, Shalene, and BYU, individually and jointly and 
severally, in an amount not in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) together 
with such other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper. 
COUNT 6—NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS: RECKLESS FALSITY AND DECEIT 
THOMAS J. LOWERY V. EUGENE BRAMHALL AND BYU 
85. Paragraphs 1 through 59 of this complaint are incorporated herein by reference as 
though fully set forth herein at length. 
86. The aforementioned campaign of statements and /or actions by Bramhall over a 
duration of time and the resulting emotional and bodily injuries to the plaintiff 
Thomas J. Lowery were directly and proximately caused by the negligence or 
intentions of Bramhall, acting at all relevant times hereto entirely within the 
course and scope of his employment, agency, servitude, and/or workmanship 
with co-defendant BYU. 
87. The negligence or intentions of Bramhall, acting at all relevant times Jiereto 
entirely within the course and scope of his employment, agency, servitude, 
and/or workmanship with co-defendant BYU, consisted of the following acts 
and/or omissions: 
87.1. Making false and deceitful statements to convince the plaintiff there 
were no violations of law by BYU related to Thomason's access to and 
possession of the copy of the plaintiffs letter of recommendation in 
behalf of Thomason. 
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87.2. Making false and deceitful statements to cause the plaintiff to put 
himself in way of foreseeable and actual severe and intense emotional 
and bodily harm from Thomason. 
87.3. Making false and deceitful statements to cause the plaintiff to engage 
in and involve other persons, including clergy, in BramhalFs plan to 
recover the plaintiffs BYU letter of recommendation from the. public 
realm, which statements would foreseeably and did certainly cause the 
plaintiff severe and intense emotional distress. 
87.4. Making false and deceitful statements to convince the plaintiff that 
Bramhall would retrieve the letter and report to the plaintiff that the letter 
had been retrieved, in order to convince the plaintiff to follow Bramhall's 
instructions, which foreseeably and certainly caused the plaintiff 
additional severe and intense emotional distress. 
As a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence or intentions, the 
plaintiff suffered severe and lasting emotional distress causing the following 
physical phenomena, physical sequelae, and physical manifestations thereof: 
severe biochemical distress and fear of physical harm to himself and his family; 
anxiety; nervousness; sleeplessness adversely affecting plaintiff's ability to 
function and interact normally in the workplace and socially; humiliation; 
embarrassment; inability to concentrate and focus; intense pain in his head, neck, 
shoulders and back; frequent nightmares causing perspiration and disrupted 
patterns of sleep adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to function and interact 
normally in the workplace and socially; fatigue; overreaction or inordinate 
reaction to ordinary events and occurrences. 
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89. As a further direct and proximate consequence of defendant's negligence or 
intentions, the plaintiff suffered harm to his dignity and interest in privacy. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery hereby demands judgment in his favor 
against defendants Eugene Bramhall and BYU, individually and jointly and 
severally, in an amount not in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000) together with such other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and 
proper. 
COUNT 7—NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: ABUSE OF POWER 
THOMAS J. LOWERY V. EUGENE BRAMHALL AND BYU 
90. Paragraphs 85 through 87 of this complaint are incorporated herein by reference 
as though fully set forth herein at length. 
90.1. Exercising abusive power and authority for: 
90.1.1. Paragraphs 87.1 through 87.4 of this complaint are incorporated 
herein by reference as though fully set forth herein at length. 
91. Paragraphs 88 through 89 of this complaint are incorporated herein by reference 
as though fully set forth herein at length. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery hereby demands judgment in his favor 
against defendants Eugene Bramhall and BYU, individually and jointly and 
severally, in an amount not in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000) together with such other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and 
proper. 
COUNT 8—NEGLIGENT EMPLOYMENT, HIRING, 
TRAINING, MONITORING, EVALUATION, 
AND SUPERVISION ON A SYSTEMATIC 
OR PERIODIC BASIS 
THOMAS J. LOWERY V. KATHY CARTER, DR. STEVE 
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ALBRECHT, DR. FRED SKOUSEN, REX LEE (DECEASED), AND BYU 
92. Paragraphs 1 through 91 of this complaint are incorporated herein by reference as 
though fully set forth herein at length. 
93. The aforementioned campaign of respective statements and /or actions of Kathy 
Carter, Shalene, and Eugene Bramhall , acting at all relevant times hereto 
entirely within the course and scope of their employment, agency, servitude, 
and /o r workmanship with co-defendant BYU, and resulting emotional and 
bodily injuries to the plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery were directly and proximately 
caused by the respective negligence of Kathy Carter, Dr. Steve Albrecht, Dr. Fred 
Skousen, and BYU President Rex E. Lee (now deceased), acting at all relevant 
times hereto entirely within the course and scope of their employment, agency, 
servitude, and /or workmanship with co-defendant BYU. 
94. The negligence of Kathy Carter, Dr. Steve Albrecht, Dr. Fred Skousen, and Rex E. 
Lee, acting at all relevant times hereto entirely within the course and scope of 
their employment, agency, servitude, and /or workmanship with co-defendant 
BYU, consisted of the following acts and/or omissions: 
94.1. Neglecting to employ and/or hire competent persons on a systematic or 
periodic basis, and/or 
94.2. Neglecting to train, monitor, evaluate, and /o r supervise employees on a 
systematic or periodic basis. 
95. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' respective negligence, the plaintiff 
suffered severe and lasting emotional distress causing the following physical 
phenomena, physical sequelae, and physical manifestations thereof: severe 
biochemical distress and fear of physical harm to himself and his family; anxiety; 
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nervousness; sleeplessness adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to function and 
interact normally in the workplace and socially; humiliation; embarrassment; 
inability to concentrate and focus; frequent nightmares causing perspiration and 
disrupted patterns of sleep adversely affecting plaintiffs ability to function and 
interact normally in the workplace and socially; fatigue; overreactkm or 
inordinate reaction to ordinary events and occurrences. 
96. As a further direct and proximate consequence of defendants' respective 
negligence, the plaintiff suffered harm to his dignity and interest in privacy. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery hereby demands judgment in his favor 
against defendants Kathy Carter, Dr. Steve Albrecht, Dr. Fred Skousen, Rex E. Lee 
(deceased), and BYU, individually and jointly and severally, in an amount not in 
excess of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) together with such 
other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and proper. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Thomas J. Lowery Date 
Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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In terms of overall competence and potential as a successful MSM itudent, this candidate ranks in the upper D 151 D 5% D 10% D25% 
/ H 0 % of all the college seniors 1 have known. 
How would you evaluate yourself in giving ratings of this kind to students: 3 Generous D Average ^ Very conservative 
The MSM assumes that in all likelihood the applicant is i competent person. It would be most appreciated if, instead of describing .lis or her 
general excellence, you could tell what makes this candidate especially promuing when compared to other applicant* who may appear equally 
well qualified. If for any reason you have substantial reservations about the candidate's potential for success m the field of management, please 
explain. (Write your comments either on this form or on a separate page.) 
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MEMO 
School of Accountancy & Information Systems 
April 24, 1995 
Tc Tom Lowery 
783SWKT 
From: Michelle Berge 
560TNRB 
Re: Letter of Recommendation for Allen Thomason 
Enclosed please find a copy of the Letter of Recommendation you wrote for Allen 
Thomason which you requested fivrn Dr, Steve Albredit. 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801/262-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





Eugene Bramhall ] 
Dr. Steve Albrecht ] 
Dr. Fred Skousen ] 
President Rex E. Lee (deceased) 
Brigham Young University ) 
Defendants ] 
) MOTION FOR REASONABLE 
\ MODIFICATION OF RULES 
AND MEMORANDUM 
i Civil No. 020902112 
\ Judge Dever 
1. Pro Se Plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant 
reasonable modification of the court's rules, particularly to extend time for the plaintiff to 
respond to pleadings and to expeditiously consider other reasonable modifications of rules 
that may be immediately necessary during the litigation of this case. 
2. The plaintiff requests specifically at this time that he be allowed as many as and no 
more than 30 days to respond to each pleading, consecutively and not concurrently, 
submitted by the defendants in this action, the time period commencing at plaintiffs 
reception of a pleading or at plaintiff's filing of a response to an immediately preceding 
pleading, no two such time periods overlapping. 
3. This motion for a grant of extended time (30 days total per pleading) is based on: 
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3.1. The plaintiff's mental illness, which impedes normal flow of thought 
processes, and which requires-much more time for ihe plaintiff to construct Jegal 
arguments according to the recpjurements of the court. (See declaration of plaintiffs 
mental illness by Judge William Bohling, Third District Court of Utah, Lowery 
a. Lowery, Civil No. 004904ZQ4, Dec. L4r 2QOL beginning a l l 2:26:28 p .m. on 
the cour t s certified-triaLvideotape; see also attached affidavit of plaintiffs 
clinical psychologist Dr. Michael Lambert; and medical repoits by Dr. Lambert 
ai idDr. Michael Goates. exhibits "A" through UC); 
3.2. The probable impossibility of the plaintiff meeting the pleading response 
time limit for any given pleading under the rules of the court; 
3.3. The certain impossibility of the plaintiff moving the court for any 
particular extension of time needed and responding to the defendants' potential 
opposing response to such plaintiffs motion without failing to meet the subject 
response pleading's deadline,, should the defendants exercise their right to refuse the 
plaintiff courtesy extra time to respond to any given pleading by the defendants; 
3.4. The expressed hostility of defendant Brigham Young University (hereafter 
"BYU") toward the plaintiffs unpredictable needs for extended time, in a previous 
civil case (see the May 30, 2001 letter from BYU counsel Justin Matkin, exhibit "D"); 
3.5. The Americans with Disabilities Act; 
3iL United States Supreme Court decision in PGA Tour Inc^ ZL Casey Martin, 
532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
MEMORANDUM & ARGUMENT 
AMERICAN'S WITH DISABILITIES ACT (hereafter "ADA") 
% 
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4. 42 USC 12131, Title II, Sec. 201, the Public Services title of the ADA defines "public 
entity" as (1)(A) "any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special 
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." 
5. Sec. 3 (2) states that 
The~term disability means^ with respect to an. individual (A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual; B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded a s having such 
an impairment" (emphasis added). 
6. The plaintiffs disability complies with all three definitions. 
7. Title II, Sec. 201 (2) states that 
The- t e rm qualified individual with, a disability m e a n s a a individual with, a 
disability who, with, or without reasonable modif icat ions t o rales, pol ic ies , 
or pract ices , t h e removal of architectural^ communicat ion^ or t ranspor ta t ion 
barr iers , or the provision of auxiliary a ids a n d services, mee ts the essent ia l 
eligibility requi rements for t i e receipt of services or the par t ic ipat ion In 
programs or activities provided by a.public entity (emphasis added}, 
8. The court has substantial evidence, provided by Judge William Bohling of the Third 
District Court of Utah, by clinical psychologist Dr, Michael Lambert,, assigned to me by 
defendant Brigham Young University, and by psychiatrist Dr. Michael Goates, that I am 
mentally disabled. The Constitution of the State of Utah and of the United States and the 
complaint in this case demonstrate that I meet the essential eligibility r e t i r e m e n t s for 
access to due process of law in the State of Utah. 
9. I am a qualified individual. 
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10. The remaining question is,, does the ADA intend that I am entitled by law to 
'reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices'* of this Honorable Court 
to facilitate my right to due process. 
11. It does. ADA, Sec. 2. (a) states: 
Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with 
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive 
social problem; 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical 
areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, 
transpoliation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health 
services, voting, and access to public services, (emphasis added) 
Individuals with disabilities a re a discrete and insular minority who have been 
faced with restrictions, and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful 
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness 
in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such 
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of 
the^individual ability of such individuals to participate in, andLcontribute to, 
society, (emphasis added) 
12. ADA Title II, Public Services states: 
SEC. 202. DISCRIMINATION. 42 USC 12132. 
Subject to the provisions^of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall, 
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
4 
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benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity (emphasis added) 
13. Because the plaintiff's disability is- an advantage to the defendants in this caser the 
court should not allow the defendants to decide whether or not the plaintiff will he 
accorded extra time to respond to pleadings via the defendants' "professional courtesies" 
(see exhibit "D") 
PGA TOUR INC. V* CASEY MARTIN, 53ZLLS. 661 (2001) (hereafter "PGA") 
14. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in PGA Tour Inc. v. Casey Martin, 532 U.S^ 
661 (2001) provides a parallel, similarities, and a few differences to the case before this 
Honorable Court. 
15. The game of golf, like most games,, is very much like the game of litigation. Roth are 
products of modern rationalisu^ in that they are both sysiexns of discursive rules that 
follow logical paths from antecedents to consequences,, premises to conclusions^ and 
beginning to end. Golf moves from the teeing ground to the green and hole repeatedly, 
according to game rules, until eighteen holes are completed and the player with the least 
strokes wins. Lawsuits begin with a complaint and move through a series of pleadings and 
rational (sometimes not so rational) arguments^ according to the rules of law and the 
court, until one party prevails. Both games are made possible by rational rules. Both, in 
fact, find their very existence in rational rules,, for that is what games and legal systems are 
— rules expressed in a conunon language and enforced by an authoritative body with 
power of sanction. 
16. Casey Martin was denied access to golf games because his disability made compliance 
with a rule of that game impossible. ADA required the rule to be modified to give Martin 
access. 
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17. It should be said that the plaintiff minimizes the importance o£ the rule of law by 
comparing it to the game of golf. Golf is a leisurely gentlemen's game (not a sport, as it 
lacks the elements of speedy strength^ and endurance) wherein mostly middle and upper 
class men play to relax, do business,, and expand political networks- It also offers spectators 
good entertainment. 
18. Tlierule of law, due process,, and }usticer however^ are fundamental to the existence 
of a civilization. In modern civilization^ they also provide for equality of opportunity 
through laws protecting the individual front institutions^ the weak from the strong. 
19. Justice through due process of law is far more important that a game of golL 
20. The plaintiff's request for a reasonable modification of the rules of the court far 
exceeds the importance of Casey Martin's request to ride in a golf cart a t a country club to 
play a game. 
21. As for disabilities, my mental disability is just as much an obstacle to me before the 
court as Casey's disability is to him on the links. 
22. The plaintiffs life-threatening mental illness is just as serious as Casey Martin's 
physical handicap. 
23. Due process in my case is }ust as important to me as the golf cart is to Casey. 
24. The outcome of my case is just as important to me as finishing a PGA tournament is 
to Casey. 
25. Whining my case is just as Important to m e as winning a PGA tournament is to 
Casey. 
26. The United States Supreme Court ruled that the ADA required a waiver of the rules 
of golf for Casey Martin so he could play in PGA tournaments requiring all golfers to walk 
the course. And it intends that the court in this case grant a mere modification of rules so 
6 
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disabled plaintiff's can litigate in a court requiring all parties to convey and clarify their 
meanings in framing and presenting claims, arguments, responses,, replies, rebuttals, 
demands for relief and ail other communications within, time limits; to submit strictly to 
the court's schedule for recess in hearings; to comprehend and articulate the rules and law, 
in and outside of the courtroom. 
27. The plaintiff can do these things in. this case, but only intermittently and even then 
very slowly. The plaintiff needs waivers or modifications of the rules to facilitate the 
prosecution of his case. 
28. In Casey Martin's behalf at Stanford University, the NCAA waived the walking rule 
so he could play in NCAA tournaments (PGA v. Martiti, p . 5). Rather than resent Casey for 
any advantage he might have, NCAA teams responded with support His coach reported: 
Everybody recognized Casey for the person he was, and what he was doing with his 
life, and every coach, to my knowledge, and every player wanted Casey in the 
tournament and they welcomed hint there. (IcL) 
29. In Lawery v. BYUr et^aL (see exhibit "D"Xr defendant BYU responded to the plaintiff 
in a hostile way when he asked them for extra time to file a responsive pleading; they 
threatened the plaintiff with the denial of due process^ "If a response is not filed with the 
Court by June 15, 2001, BYLL will file a notice to submit and proceed without any written 
objection from you." BYU wanted to control auy waivers of rules for me through their 
"professional courtesies," much like the elite PGA Tour, Inc. responded to Casey Martin 
when they denied him access 4o the most elite golf tournaments. 
30. Casey's disability reached a point where he could not walk the course because of 
great pain and danger to his health. The plaintiffs illness is not so stable. It has a life of its 
own (see exhibits "A" through. "C"). 
/ 
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31. Casey's disability was inflicted on him by nature (PGA, 5), but my illness was 
triggered and exacerbated by BYUemployees. 
32. Casey made a request to the PGA, supported by detailed medical records; the PGA 
refused even to review those records,, let alone to waive the walking rule (Idr 6). BYU 
threatened to deny me due process by withholding their "professional courtesies" to allow 
me enough time to prepare responses to their pleadings. 
33. The PGA walking rule caused Casey severe pain, fatigue, and anxiety, a risk of 
hemmorrhaging, blood clots, and bone fracture (Id., 5). The limiting rules of this court, 
particularly time limits on pleadings, cause me mental anguish, extreme pain, confusion, 
memory loss, despair, paranoia, loss of concentration, anxiety, and other mind obscuring 
effects that result in tumultuous sleep, and prevent me from access to due process. 
34. Even if the PGA had waived the walking rule, Casey would have had no advantage 
but still a disadvantage in the game (Id., 9). If the BYU defendants were to concede the 
plaintiffs motion and this Honorable Court to modify the xules, the plaintiff would still be 
at a huge disadvantage, with only half my brain a t b e s t The plaintiff is always in pain, 
fighting off confusion and obscurity in the mind. Thinking for the plaintiff is like chasing 
electrons in quantum motion while his mind must slog through cold molasses, It gives 
him head, neck, shoulder, chest and spine pain and makes him short of breath. 
35. Waiver of the PGA rule would "not fundamenally alter the nature of the PGA 
Tour's game to accommodate [Casey Martin] with a cart" (Id.) Selective waiver or 
modification of those rules of this Honorable Court that would inhibit the plaintiffs 
pursuit of due process and justice would not fundamentally alter the nature of the 
litigation. It would merely allow for less inequality between the plaintiff and BYU's 
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lawyers, who would deny the plaintiff due process if this Honorable Court allows (see 
exhibit T T ) . 
36. Casey's use of "a golf cart was bath a reasonable and a necessary solution to the 
problem of providing him access to the tournaments' ' (Id. 10). The selective waiver or 
modification of Utah's Third District Court rules is both a reasonable and a necessary^ 
solution to the problem of allowing the plaintiff access to due process of law. 
37. Casey's appeal for access to the PGA Tour was extremely rare. Physically disabled 
golfers seldom move into the ranks of the best. The plaintiff's right of access to the court's 
due process is very rare. Mentally ill plant if fs seldom represent themselves against 
lawyers. 
38. The plaintiff's claims to the access equalizing protections of the ADA for due process 
and civil justice are far more important than the game of golf. If the LLS, Supreme Court 
can protect a successful, prominent, gentleman expert in the game of golf with a physical 
disability from the PGA Tour Inc., then, they will certainly protect the plaintiff here from 
the amoral BYU defendants. 
THE-U.S. SUPREME COURTS RULING 
39. In PGA, the Supreme Court said of the ADA that "one of the Act's 'most impressive 
strengths' has been identified as it's 'comprehensive character'." The Act itself is 'a 
milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society'" (PGA, 12-13). 
40. The bold statements follow the court's ADA quotations of some of the purposes of 
ADA: 
Historically, society ha& tended to isolate and segregate individuate with 
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination 
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against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive 
social problem 
Discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in SUCIL critical 
areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, 
transportation, cormrmniration, recreation^ institutionalization^ health 
services, voting, and access to public services 
Congress eoncludecLthat there: was a "compelling need" for a "clear and 
comprehensive national mandate" to eliminate discrimination against disabled 
individuals, and to integrate them "into the economic and social mainstream 
of American life." (emphasis added, Id., 12) 
41. The Court recognized Congress's ''broad mandate" to carry out the ADA's 
comprehensive character £M.J. 
42. The Court addressed-two-questions in the threshold case PGA v. Martin: 
first, whether the Act [ADA] protects access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified 
entrant with a disability; and second,, whether a disabled contestant may be denied the use 
of a golf cart because it would 'fundamentally alter the nature' of the tournaments. (Id. 1) 
43. The two questions addressed protection of access for the disabled and whether or not 
the accommodations necessary for access would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
game. While-the Court addressed these questions in the context of the PGA-Martin facts, 
the Court regards PGA-Martin ^as a thresliold matter" (Id. 13), which falls under Title III of 
ADA, Public Accommodations. 
44. The plaintiffs ADA claim here falls under Title II, Public Services. 
45. The Court then quoted the "general rule" prescribed by ADA under public 
accommodatons: 
10 
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No individual shal l be discr iminated aga ins t o n the bas is of disability in the full a n d 
equal enjoyment of the goods^ services, facilities, privileges, advantages , or 
accommodat ions of any place of public accommodat ion by any p e r s o n w h a owns, 
leases (or l ea ses to), or operates a place of public accommodat ion. $&. 131 
46. The Court then notes the list of types of private entities subject to the ADA in "the 
phrase "public accommodations'™, which the legislative history indicates/should be 
construed liberally' to afford people with disabilities 'equal access' to the wide variety of 
establishments available to the nondisabled'" (Id, 13-14). 
47. The Court concludes that "it seems apparent, from both the general rule and the 
comprehensive definition of 'public accommodation/ that the petitioner's golf tours and 
their qualifying rounds fit comfortably within the coverage of Title III, and Martin within 
its protection" (Id. 14). 
48. The Court finds the ADA's "comprehensive character" and "broad mandate" in 
Title II as well. The Court writes: 
It would therefore appear that Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms,, prohibits 
petitioner [PGA} from denying Martin equaL access to its tours on the basj^ irf his 
disability. Cf. Pennbifhumia DepL of Carrectiorib u. Yebkey, 524 LLS. 206, 209 (1998) 
(holding that text if Title II's prohibition of discrimination by "public entities" 
against disabled individuals "unnustakeably includes State prisons and prisoners 
within it's coverage")^ (Id^ 15; dL p, 19) 
49. The Court reminds the reader that Title-II applies to rules in all state and local 
government entities as well as to Title III private entities offering pxiblic accommodations. 
The Court also states that its conclusion is consistent with with the CiviL Rights Act of 1964 
on discrimination for race, color, religion^ or national origin (Id. 18). 
11 
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50. Title II's prohibition of discrimination by "public entities" against disabled 
individuals unmistakably includes state courts as well. The plaintiff's request here — 
through the normal precediure and rules for pleadings — for access-ta d u e process by 
reasonable modif icat ions to rules , po l ic ies , or practices" is a modest request. It 
allows the court to open the way to due process for the plaintiff without the plaintiff 
enduring the nastiness and brutality expressed in the letter of BYU and the denial of due 
process as well (see exliibit "&"}. ADA itself demonstrates that such.behavior is contrary to 
the law: 
SEC. 502. STATE IMMUNITY. 42 USC 122Q2L 
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States from, an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction 
for a violation of this Act. In any action against a State for a violation of the 
requirements of this Act, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) 
are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available 
for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a 
State. 
51. AsTor the behavior of defendant BYU,. ADA.warns: 
SEC. 503. PROHIBITION AGAINST RETALIATION AND COERCION. 42 USC 
12203. 
Retaliation. No person shall discriminate against any individual because such 
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this Act or because 
such individual made a charge,, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in 
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this Act. Interference, Coercion, or 
Intimidation. It shal l be unlawful to coerce, int imidate, threaten^ or interfere 
12 
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with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or OIL account of his or her 
having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or 
encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right 
granted or protected by this Act. 
REASONABLE MODIFICATIONS TO RULES, POLICIES, OR PRACTICES 
52. As to the second issue before the PGA Court, whether or not the accommodations 
necessary for access would fundamentally alter the nature of the game, the Court looks at 
ADA's rule prohibiting discrimination based on disability: 
The question whether petitioner has violated that rule depends on a proper 
construction of the tenn "discrimination/ which is defined hy Title III to 
include: 
"a failure to make reasonable modifications impolicies, practices, or 
procedures, when such.modifications are necessary to afford such goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals 
with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such 
mod^lcations ux)uldjimdam^ntally otter the nature of such^goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations." (h~L2G; first emphasis by 
me; second emphasis by the Court) 
53. There was no dispute that a golf cart for Casey Martin was a reasonable and 
necessary modification of the PGA rules. The question was whether or not a waiver of the 
walking rule was a fundamental alteration of the game, either altering an essential aspect 
of the game equally for all, or only a peripheral alteration that would create an advantage 
to the disablied participant and alter the character of the competition. 
13 
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54. The Court found that there have been many changes to the rules of golf that didn't 
change the nature of the game (Id. 22). 
55. Court rules change as well, and some are waived by opposing litigating parties if 
they agree not to enforce the rules on one another, as in the informal "professional 
courtesy" rule that allows more time for litigants to file pleadings. Court rules are waived 
just as golf rules are. Time limit rules are waived for pro se plaintiffs as welLas mentally 
disabled p ro se plaintiffs, but no litigant sliould be dependent on their legal adversary to 
get a rule waiver, especially when the litigant is mentally disabled. 
56. The case before this Honorable Court is a parallel to PGA v. Martin. The^ADA 
clearly applies to in this case for a mentally disabled plaintiff. 
57. The plaintiff is a qualified individual. Title II defines a qualified individual and 
discrimination by public entities: 
Qualified individual with, a disability. The term qualified individual with a 
disability means an individual with a disability who, w i t h or without 
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of 
architectural, communication^ or transportation barriers* or the provision of 
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the 
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a 
public entity. (Sec. 201(2), emphasis added) 
SEC. 202. DISCRIMINATION. 42 USC 12132. 
Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, he excluded from participation in or be 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 
14 
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58. It is clear that ADA Title II applies to the plaintiff in the same way as Title III applies 
to Casey Martin. Title II provides for "reasonable modifications to rules,, policies^ or 
practices" in "services, programs,, or activities of a public entity." 
59. The PGA walking rule was adopted "to inject the element of fatigue into the skill of 
shotmaking" (PGA, 24). The time limit rules of the Utah District Court are to move 
litigation along swiftly. 
60. The walking rule exacerbated Casey's circulatory disease; sorne rules of the court 
exacerbate my ability to think. 
61. Casey got relief from the LLS. Supreme Court; I deserve relief from the Utah District 
Court. 
62. As for competitive advantage,, the Supreme Court found that even with the walking 
rule waived, Casey was still at a disadvantage (Id- 25-26). I, a mentally ill plaintiff with little 
income, will be at a disadvantage far greater than Casey. I must keep up with the pleadings 
of seasoned attorneys, whose client triggered and exacerbated my illness. 
63. Further, the Supreme Court said the refusal of the PGA ''to consider Martin's 
personal circumstances in deciding whether to accommodate his disability runs counter to 
the clear language and purpose of the ADA" (Id. 26). The plaintiff deserves such 
consideration. The PGA court found that ''whether a person has a disability under the 
ADA is an individualized inquiry" (IcL27), not a generalization of a class. 
64. In striking down down the PGA's "claim that all the substantive rules for its 
'highest level' competitions are sacrosanct and cannot be modified under any 
circumstances is effectively a contention that it is exempt from Title Ill's reasonable 
modification requirement," the court said. "But that provision carves out no exemption 
for elite athletics" (Id. 27). 
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65. Neither does Title II carve out exemptions for mentally ill pro se plaintiffs seeking 
access to due process via public entities. 
66. Quoting itself again in PemLsyluatiia DapL of Corrections, a t212, tlie Title II case, the 
court stated, "Tlie fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated 
by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth'" (kU 27). 
67. If Casey Martin, an elite PGA golfer with a physical disability falls under the ADA, 
which requires the PGA to waive rules so he can play golf, then certainly tlie plaintiff, an 
obscure unemployed mentally disabled man — whose illness was triggered and 
exacerbated by the defendant BYU — falls under the ADA, wliich requires public entities to 
waive and modify rules so disabled plaintiff's may pursue due process-^ law and justice. 
68. Based on tlie foregoing motion and memorandum, which the plaintiff asks the 
court opportunity to clarify in hearing on this motion, the plaintiff maves this Honorable 
Court to grant this Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules. 
DATED this l l l k d a y of Mardv2002. 
Thomas^. Lowery 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of March, 2002,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules and Memorandum to be 
hand delivered to the following: 
Mr. David B. Thomas 
A-350 ASB 
P.O. Box 21333 
Provo, Utah 84602-1333 
DATED this 11th day of March, 2002. 
Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
685-0998, 262-4850 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801/262-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






Dr. Steve Albrecht 
Dr. Fred Skousen 
President Rex E. Lee (deceased) 
Brigham Young University 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR EXPEDITED DISPOSITION 
OF PLAINTIFFS NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR 
DECISION ON MOTION FOR 
REASONABLE MODIFICATION OF RULES, 
AND DEFEND ANTS' OBJECTION TO THE 
SAME, AND MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 020902112 
Judge Dever 
Plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery respectfully moves this Honorable Court to expedite 
disposition of plaintiffs Notice to Submit for Decision on Motion for Reasonable 
Modification of Rules and Memorandum, for the following reasons. 
MEMORANDUM 
1. This motion is based an Rule 4-501 (4) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
which provides for waiver of Rule 4-501 "where time is of the essence and compliance 
with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable/' 
2. The defendants: 
2.1. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and a Memorandum in Support; 
12, failecLta file a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs Motion for 
Reasonable Modification of Rules within time limits required by Rule 4-501 
Appellant Addendum — 69 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (29 days as of the filing of this 
motion); 
2.3. and then filed an Objection ta Plaintiffs Notice to Submit for Decision on 
Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules. 
The plaintiff is mentally disabled, which disability makes impossible his responses 
to the defendants' Motion to Dismiss and defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs Notice 
to Submit for Decision on Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules within time 
limits required by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
(Please see exhibit E (enclosedXr final ruling by Judge William Bohling on the mental 
illness of Thomas J. Lowery, Third District Caurt of Utah, Lowery v. Lowery, Civil 
No, 004904704, Dec. 14, 2001, beginning at 12£5:55 p.m. on the certified trial 
videotape (also see trial testimony of Drs^ Michael Lambert, October 30, 2001, and 
Michael Goats, October 3 1 r 2002); exhibit!7, affidavit of Thomas J, Lowery, May 5, 
2002; exhibit G, affidavit of Dr. Michael Lambert, August 14, 2001; exhibit A, medical 
report by Dr. Michael Lambert, August 29, 2000; exhibit B, medical report by Dr. 
Michael Goates, November 10, 1999; exhibit C, medical report by Dr. Michael 
Lambert, November 5, 1999; and exhibit I, medical reports by Dr. Walstir Fonseca, 
April 7, 1999 through August 24, 1999.) 
The plaintiffs Motion far Reasonable Modification of Rules (exhibit H), filed with 
the Complaint to the Utah Third District Court Clerk, requests relief by this 
Honorable Court from the impossiblity of responding to defendants7 pleadings 
within Rule 4-501 time limits, basing the request on the failure of defendants to 
respond to plaintiffs Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules within Rule 4-
501 time limits, or in the alternative on the legal rights of the disabled-provided in 
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the Americans with Disabilities Act and decisions by the LLS. Supreme Court and 
various U.S. Courts of Appeal, particularly PGA Tour Inc. v. Casey Martin, No. 00-
24, May 29, 2001, pp. 1-29 (enclosed); 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
5. In past litigation, defendant Brigham Young University denied the plaintiff in this 
case a voluntary extension of time to respond to defendant Brigham Young 
University's pleadings. (Please see exhibit D, letter from Brigham Young University 
(hereafter "BYU") counsel Justin Matkin to the plaintiff, May-30, 2001). Plaintiff 
cannot trust defendant BYU to accord professional courtesies for informal time limit 
extensions. 
6. Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides for modification of 
itself in Rule 4-501 (4) "where time is of the essence and compliance with the 
provisions of this rule would be impracticable." The plaintiffs mental illness makes 
Rule 4-501 time limits for responding to pleadings impracticable, even impossible, 
for the plaintiff, thus justifying expedited disposition on plaintiffs Notice to Submit 
for Decision on Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules and Memorandum. 
7. The plaintiff respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant this motion for 
expedited disposition on his Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules and 
Memorandum, and to grant a hearing on this Motion for Expedited Disposition and the 
Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules before plaintiffs time limits for responding 
to defendant BYU's pleadings in this case expire. 
DATED this 9th day of April, 2002. <^ 
Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
685-0998, 262-4850 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of April, 2002,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion for Expedited Disposition of Plaintiff's Notice to Submit for Decision 
on Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules, and Defendants' Objection to the Same to 
be hand delivered to: 
The Honorable Leon A. Dever 
Third District Court of Utah 
450 S. State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
> > 
Thomas I. Lowery 
4 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801/262-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






Dr. Steve Albrecht 
Dr. Fred Skousen 
President Rex E. Lee (deceased) 
Brigham Young University 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 020902112 
Judge Dever 
Thomas J. Lowery, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I have been mentally disabled since early life with a genetic bipolar disorder with 
paranoia inherited from my father, who had been hospitalized in a psychiatric ward 
during my youth. 
2. The decaying body of my youngest sister Susan, a drug addict, was found in her 
home at age 41. Doctors attributed her death to mental illness and suicide. 
3. My middle sister Kathy has been under medical care and medication for depression. 
4. My mother has taken prescribed medicine for depression for. many years. 
5. My older brother has exhibited symptoms of bipolar disorder for many years. 
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The incidents described in my civil complaint against Brigham Young University 
anil Ili i I i1 ni it I mils (Civil No. 020902112) exacer l\\ ivi 1 mi imiLiI iilliiiv. annul I Il II 
a total mental breakdown in May 1997, two years later. 
My total mental breakdown in May 1997 was also directly caused by an employee of 
Brigha niversity, Deai i D< it • i I Magleby. 
1
 currently, and have been since May 1997, under medical care for 111) illness, 
including psychotropic medications and regular therapy by psychiatrist Dr. Michael 
Goates and clinical psyt »», y 
Brigham Young University Vice President Noel B. Reynolds. 
I was taking no medications for my mental illness during the time of the events 
described in i :i it i y c : i :i iplaii it (Civil No. 020902112), ai i cl t ;: : II ;,  m i c i i tedicatioi y 
mental illness until after my May 1997 mental breakdown. 
Dr. Michael Goates testified in my divorce trial that I have a major chemical 
ii i iballai i :e in i it m i r I: i aii i an id a ' "t sxtbook case " c if bipolai disoi clei i \ ith paranoia. 
J u d g e William Bohling, Third District Cour t of Utah {Lowery v. Lowery, Civil 
No. 004904704, Divorce, Dec. 14, 2001 , beginning at 12:26:28 j; > i i < • i I t he 
certified trial videotape) ruled tha t I have h a d a genetic bipolar disorder from 
early life, with early manifestat ions tha t led to the total breakdown in May 
1997 caused by David Magleby. 
! ptoms associiili ill " iilllli In III nail liiiiiiiii I! Il 11 iiiiiii iiliiiill III'SUIIIM ill 
in my complaint, Civil No. 020902112, and post-tramatic symptoms from the May 
1997 breakdown caused by BYU Dean David Magleby, including suicidal and 
1 loi it it : cid- all episodes, as \ v ell II < i s i i iiei irtall c : illusion, auuonia, an? .., aebilitating 
symptoms. 
74 — Appellant Addendum 
13. The dangerous mental health condition I suffer from now is at least in part a 
consequence of the incidents decribed in my complaint (Civil No. 020902112). 
14. I experience daily multiple cycles of depression and mania and other catatonia. 
15. Reading, processing information in my brain, and writing is extremely difficult for 
me most of the tim i. 
16. Day sleep is often necessary for m e to recover from manic and other catatonic 
episodes. 
17. I suffer horrific nightmares almost every nighV the subject of which are betrayals by 
employees of Brigham Young University and others, and which severely impair my 
sleep. 
18. It is impossible for m e to respond to one average legal pleading in less than 20 days. 
19. I need extra time to respond to legal pleadings in order to obtain due process of law 
under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions and laws. 
20. I cannot trust defendant Brigham Young University to grant me professional 
courtesies of informally extending time limits for me to respond to their legal 
pleadings, as they have refused to give such courtesies in the past and, thus, are not 
trustworthy. They are my proven adversaries. 
DATED this 9th day^oLAprjl, 2002. 
Thomas J. Lowery 
ACKNOWLEDGED, SUBSCRIBED, AND SWORN to before me this day of 
April, 2002. < T " ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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PLFS MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
RULES AND MEMORAND 
Case NO: 020902112 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Date: 06/7/2002 
Clerk: debbiep 
1. Plf is granted 30 days to respond to any motions filed by 
deft's. If multiple motions are filed, the court will review 
set dates for response upon notice from either side. 2. The 
parties are cautioned to abide by page limitations 3. Court denied 
Plf's request to deem service upon "Shalene" to be valid. 
J u d g e L A DEVER 
% Q L — — 
STAMP Vrv"-~-! v r ••• 
„.„**»•"*""* 
Page 1 ( las t ) 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020902112 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
DEFENDANT 
A-350 ASB 
P.O. BOX 21333 
PROVO, UT 84602-1333 
Mail THOMAS J LOWERY 
PLAINTIFF 
4143 SOUTH 63 5 EAST 
SALT LAKE UT 84107 
Dated this 16 day of (JfiA/V^ , 20OZ . 
Of 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801/262-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Thomas J. Lowery, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ' 
Brigham Yxmng University ', 
Defendant ', 
\ MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
1 DEEENU4NTS MOTJON-TO DISMISS 
ALL CLAIMS. 
Civil No. 020902112 
Judge Leon Dever 
Plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery respectfully moves this Honorable Court to deny the 
Defendants Motion to Dismiss All Claims, as the tailing of the statuteol limitations is 
valid, and the Complaint makes clear and valid statements of rlaim Plaintiff also 
requests a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. 
i su- to Plaintiffs mental illness from youth, ai id due to n iisleading and delaying 
actions by Defendant, the Defendant should be estopped from relying on the-statute of 
limitations as a defense to this action {UCA3&--lZ-3^Williams v. Howard, 97(XP2d. 1282 
(Utah 1998), Envirotech Coiy v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994)). 
Ihe motion is ti< ng mem* a. 
DATFD this 5th day of August^ 2002. 
Thomas J. Lowery 
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SUMMARY OF MEMORANDUM 
Statute of Limitations — Plaintiff's mental illness 
The facts of the caser particularly those contained in the Complaint in Lowery v. 
Lowery, Civil No. 004904704J}efore Judge William Rohling in theJJtah ThircLDistrict 
Court, Oct. 30 and 31, Nov. 1 and 7, and Dec. 14, 2001 (Complaint, \ 3). 
Defendant's reliance on O'Neal v. Division of Family Sennces, 821 P.2d 1139 
Utah 1991) is faulty and deceptive. The Q'NeaL Supreme Court upheld "general 
incompetence/' The Court did not xejecl it (jD'Neal, 1142-43), as Defendant argue 
(Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 6). 
The Court ruled that O'Neal was not mentally incompetent under the discovery 
rule within the meaning of tolling statutes-because O'Neal admitted-that-he had not 
repressed his memory of sex abuse against him while basing his claim olmenial 
incompetency on the sex abuse discovery rule. Neither did O'Neal did base his tolling 
claim on a mental illness described in DSM IV, for which the Plaintiff in this case was 
diagnosed as having since early life (kL-L14Q), 
All the facts and all inferences to be drawiL therefrom in a light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, the Plaintiff (O'Neal, at 1140), demonstrate that the Plaintiff at all 
relevant times hereto was mentally ilT and incompetent in the management of his 
business affairs or estate, or unable to comprehend. his~ legal rights or liabilities" 
(Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P2d.ia45 (Utah, 1993^at 1147). 
Statute of Limitations — Defendant's misleading conduct and concealment in 
exceptional or special circumstances 
Plaintiffs claim of tolling is also based on the discovery rule and "the 
defendant's misleading conduct and concealment" in "special circumstances that 
would, based on a balancing test, render application of the statute of limitations unjust 
2 
Appellant Addendum — 79 
or irrational," which is a "sufficiently broad" standard for adjudicating tolling claims 
(Williams v. Howard, 970 E2d. 1282 (Utah 1998^ at 1285), 
"Special situations exist in which the so-called discov ery .rule t o l l s tl te it i u ti ii/ii ig • : f 
the statute of limitations," according to the Utah Supreme Court in Meyers v. 
McDonald,635 P2d. (Utah 1981)^ata6). 
The Williams Supreme Court held that three situations determine the valid use 
of tl le discover y i i lie: (1) where mand -t >i by statute, (2) where a plaintiff is unaware of 
a cause of action because of the defendant's misleading conduct or concealment^ (3) and 
where application is warranted by the,existence of special circumstances, that would, 
based on a balancing test, render application of the statute of limitations unjust or 
irrational (Id., at 1285; also see Berenda v. Langford, 914 P2d. 45 (Utah 1996), at 51). 
Paragraphs 48 through 59 and other facts in the Complaint state~prima-iacie ::.. 
Eugene Bramhall mislead the mentally ill Plaintiff. 
Envirotech Corp v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994), at 493 states that a 
defendant wTho misleads a plaintiff or "causes a delay" in the bringing of a cause of 
action is estopped froi i i relying on the statute of limitations 
The Berenda Court, at.53-54, said the trial court and finder of fart necessarily 
apply the concealment version of the discovery rule to any particular set of facts, 
including considerations pertinent to the difficulty a plaintiff may have in recognizing 
and diligently discovering a cause of action. 
The Williams v. Howard Supreme Court held 111at Itie discovery rule applies 
when at least one of the three situations applies (Id., at 1286). 
Negligence 
Defendant's arguments that Gerbich u. Numed Inc., 977 P.wd 1205, at 12Q7 (Utah 
1999) ruled tl te defei idai it i n tl tat case had no duty.because t; ' } '\v.-\; >U1WM U , 
evidence that showed it did not owe a duty to Gerbich, thereby negating the first 
3 
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element" of negligence is false. In fact, Gerbick says that the Gerbich defendant 
"submitted evidence that showed.it did not owe a duty to Gerbich. BYU has showed no 
such evidence. 
Defendant's citationxrf Beach u~ University of Utah, 726 P.2d-4134Utah 1986), 
writh no references, supports Plaintiffs ComplainL Plaintiff both a "special 
relationship" and an exclusive relationship. 
Defendant cites, again with no references,H/ggms i>. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231 (Utah 1993) against the special relationship Defendant had withthe Plaintiff. 
The Higgins Supreme Court upheld the Higginjs Plaintiffs claim_ that defendant 
mental health institutions had a duty to control the mentally ill assailant Trujilla 
{Higgins, at 233 & 240). In the case at bar, BYU and its employees created a duty to keep 
Plaintiffs letter of evalution confidential after taking it into custody. 
Intentional inflication of emotional distress 
Satums i;. Ecc/es, 358-P^d-344 (Utah. 1961-)- and argue that theiacts^allegedin 
Plaintiff's, Complaint contaiiL "nothing" in_the Complaint would rise to_thelevel of 
outrageous and intolerable behavior. Release of the contents of Plaintiffs letter of 
recomendation to BYU is clearly outrageous — particular given that the severe 
emotional distress were foreseeable by BYU because its^ employee responsible to 
maintain confidentiality had opened and read the negative contents of the letter. 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The Complaint fulfills the requirements of Johnson v. Rogers and Hansen v. ML 
Fuel Supply. 
Breach of Duty of Confidential Relationship 
The Complaint fulfills the requirements of Webster v. Lehmer, Z42 P^d 1203 
(Utah 1987). 
Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
4 
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The Complaint fulfills the requirements of Stein v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 
Inc., 944 P.2d 374 (Utah A p p . 1997), the facts of which are the opposite of the facts in this 
case at bar. 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
The Complaint fulfills the requirements of Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Company, 
915 P.2d 1060. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that a confidential relationship exists 
> IMTI a party vvlu had gained the trust and confidence.of another exercises 
extraordinary influence over the other party (Id., at 769), which Defendant BYU did in 
this case. 
Reckless Ealsity and Deceit 
The Federal Courts in the 10th Circuit have recognized a cause of action for 
reckless falsity and deceit, and this Court should do so to rectify damage done to the 
Plaintiff. 
Abuse of Power 
Defendant does not cite an abuse of power tort case, but insteacLcites a-criminal 
misdemeanor o r 4 defendant mounted a constitutioi lal cl taHenge_Q£a_..CQi i i it y 
ordinance requiring filing of campaign statements and disclosure of campaign 
contributions. The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the defendant. 
Defendant's response here is~nonexistent-and-therefore admitted. 
"Negligent hiring" 
Plaintiffs Complaint-.provides sufficient tacts to Jun\ 111 t! I l.ttmhU's statements 
of claim for negligent employment, hiring,, training, monitoring, evaluation^ and 
supervision on a systematic or periodic basis, as addressed in Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 p.2d 949 (Utah 1992) is valid. 
DATED this 5th da> • -;-;ust, 2QD2. 
Breach of Contract 
3 
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Defendant fails to respond to Count 5- of the Complaint and therefore admits the 
allegations and statements of claim. 
MEMORANDUM 
FACTS 
The Defendant fails ta deny Plaintiffs averments in the Complaint and therefore 
admit the Plaintiff's averments as facts in this case under Rule 8(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Further, the defendant misrepresents the facts in the Complaint on^page 2, 
paragraph 2 of their memoranduirLby supplanting "curtly" for "bluntly" in the 
plaintiffs statement of facts in the complaint. Neither "curtly" nor "curt" appears in the 
complaint; "bluntly" occurs in the complaint once (f 11) and "blunt" occurs once (% 12). 
The defendant's also misrepresent the plaintiff's basis for claims on page 2, 
paragraph 2. of their memorandum^ minimizing the causes of actionL-"From_this 
confrontation [Allen Thomason's visit to plaintiffs home], Plaintiff claims that he had 
various emotional reactions...." (emphasis added) 
In fact, the Complaint describes in detail many more reckless and outrageous 
actions by the defendant's that inflicted severe emotional distress on the mentally ill 
plaintiff. (See Complaint, \ \ 27-55) 
Plaintiffs claim of tolling the statute of limitations is based on facts in the case of 
Lozveiy v. Lozvery, Civil No. 004904704, before Judge William Bohling in the Utah 
Third District Court, Oct. 30 and 3i> Nov. 1 and 7, and Dec 14, 2001, as cited in the 
Complaint (<[ 3). 
Judge Bohling ruled on Dec. 14, 2001: 
I would find as follows: I thinkfrom the evidence —and I think there is 
really no dispute about it — that Mr. Lowery suffers from a serious and 
6 
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persistent mental illness That was conceded by the three expert 
witnesses. [Id^Dec. M^lQQl^ beginning at 12:26:17 p.rrw emphasis added] 1 
... an Axis-I Disorder, biochemical in nature. [Id., Dec. 14, 2001,12:26:54] 
... all the evidence that has been presented to the Court-does nothing to 
undercut that -conclusion. [H^-Dee. 14, 200^ 12:27:40] 
... There certainly were manifestations oi *he disorder early in Mr. 
Loweiy's life. [Id., Dec. 14, 2001,12:29:00, emphasis added] 
... I don't know that there's a wide number of jobs where he [Tom Lowery] 
can engage iiu~ the kind of work that allowrs someone with at the 
m i n i m u m a paradigm personality disorder to kind of exploit a great 
mental ability but with that kind of emotional disorder — mental disorder 
— to some kind of gainful fashion^ I &nd that difficult-ta believe.\ld^r Dec. 
14, 2001,12:3257, emphasis added) 
The court record states that Plaintiffs mental illness is complex, with many 
symptoms: 
[Plaintiffs psychiatrist for more than 4 ongoing years^I^, Oct. 31^2001, 
9:56:30], Dr. Michael Goates found that the Petitionee suffers from a 
"classic" case of bi-polar disorder [DSM IV, pp. 350-358 and references] with 
cycling features of mania and depression, sometimes progressing into 
severe mania or hyper-mania, and sometimes progressing inta-seuere 
depression, and a t the extremes of these cycling swings, progressing into a 
psychotic disorder [Exhibit A, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, % 8] 
1
 All references that include clock time are to official Utah Third District Court 
videotape. 
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Dr. Goates testified that Plaintiffs major depressive bipolar disorder was 
genetically inherited (Id., October 31,2QQ1,_957:1Q-9:58:19; 11:01:20-11IQ1I48; 11:01:14 
11:02:14; 11:15:33-11:17:18). 
Dr. Goates testified that Plaintiffs menial illness pre-existed his^May 1927 
nervous breakdown by man}7 years, and that Plaintiffs last hopes were dashed by BYU 
Political Science Department Chairman David Magleby in May 1997, which psychotic 
break was characteristic of a pre-existing depressive disorder, of a psychosis (Id., Oct. 31, 
2001,11:15:33-11:22:08; Il:01il4-11:Q2J4). 
[Plaintiffs psychotherapistior 3.67 ongoing_years, (ldn Qct-30,2001^9:54:00] 
Dr. Michael Lambert testified that the petitioner suffers from a. dilusional 
disorder and a psychotic disorder. [Exhibit A. Findings_oLEact,_l8; 
Dilusional Disorder, pp. 296-301] 
Dr. Lambert testified that Plaintiffs early family life was either biologically or 
socially disturbing (Id., Oct^3(V2001,U^l l - l l^ lcQQ), that Plaintif£s.rigid personality 
was behind Plaintiffs conversion taMormonism, making the Plaintiff ^-"super-
Mormon," "a Mormon's Mormon/ ' absolutely committed to the church (Id., 1139:53-
11:41:45). 
[Independent Medical Examiner] Dr. Stephen Golding found tha l the 
Petitioner suffers from cLmood disorder including a paranoid personality 
disorder. [Exhibit A, Findings of Fact, \ 8] 
Dr. Golding testified that it is very clear that the mood disorder and paranoid 
personality disorder has existed since Plaintiffs youth, "from the time he began to 
read... at least 20 years ago or so, if nol more" (Id., October 30, 2001, 2^17:39-2:20:15; 
3:04:05-3:07:40). 
The court record states that Plaintiffs genetic biochemical mental disability is not 
intellectual or physical but emotional, causing incompetence (Id., Dec 14> 2001,.Judge 
8 
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William Bohling's ruling, beginning atl2:2&17,1236:54, 12:27:40, 12*29:00, & 12:32:57; 
Oct. 3Q, 2001; Dr. Michael Lamberts testimony, 10:25:05-10:29:40,10:31:29-10:324)2* & 
11:52:04-11:52:30; Oct. 31, 2001, Dr. Michael Goates's testimony, 11:19:08-11:22:08. 
The court record also states some of the effects of the Plaintiffs illness in early 
life: 
11. The Coutt finds that the Petitioner is, as a, result 
of his serious and persistent mental illness, disabled from work. 
The Court finds specifically that he has not engaged in some kind of 
longstanding charade to deceive the world, in this litigation or in 
other areas^.. The whole history of the Petitioner^ as described to 
this Court, including his "tax protestor" history [in the 1970s and 
early 80s] and his whole history of being able to work better on his 
own rather than with others^ is consistent with the Courts findings 
about his illness. [Exhibit A^ Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, f11] 
The Plaintiff had never been treated for his mental disorder prior to 1997: 
10. The Petitioner has been taking psychotropic 
medication as prescribed since May of 1997, including a wide 
spectrum anti-depressant/anti-anxiety medication.... He has been in 
regular counseling with his therapistr Dr. Michael Lambert, for 
several [3.67] years. The Petitioner is not malingering in presenting 
his symptoms to this Court, nor is he refusing medication or other 
reasonable treatment for his symptoms. [Exhibit A, Findings of Fact, 
110] 
Prior to May 1997, the Plaintiff had never received medical treatment for his 
mental disorder, nor had he taken medications to control his mental-disorder. 
9 
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Anti-psychotic medications now enable Plaintiff to attempt to prosecute this case 
and others, albeit slowrly and arduously given the reasonable modification of rules 
allowed by this Court. 
The divorce trial record makes clear that even with weekly therapy and daily 
medications, Plaintiffs efforts at legal vindication and reparations have failed thus far 
notwithstanding Plaintiffs graduate education in political theory and jurisprudence. 
Dr. Michael Goates, Plaintiffs psychiatrist, testified that the best psychotropic 
medications currently available, which Plaintiff has been taking since July 1998, provide 
less tharua complete response to Plaintiffs biochemical symptoms, that medications 
capable of countering Plaintiffs symptoms are many years away from being developed 
(Id., Oct. 31, 2001,10:51:15-10:51:55,10:02:05-10:04:57,11:01:35). 
Dr. Michael Lamberts testimony supported tha^of Dr. Goates^(IcMDct^30r 2001, 
11:44:05-11:45:49). 
Without regular medical treatment, particularly psychiatric and 
psychotherapeutic treatment and anti-psychotic medications to control the symptoms 
of Plaintiffs mental disorder, Plaintiff was certainly mentally incompetent in his 
business affairs at all times relevant hereto. 
Even after diagnosis and ongoing treatment of his mental illness-and 
prescriptions of daily psychotropic drugs, Plaintiff still experienced^ and experiences 
severe depression, mania, hyper-mania, paranoia, and suicidal and homocidal 
episodes. 
Dr. Michael Goates testified that Plaintiffs illness is chronic, that medications are 
not effective enough to counter symptoms (Id., Oct. 31, 2001,10:00:16-10:01:44 & 10:02:05-
10:04:57). 
Dr. Michael Lamberts testimony supported that of Dr. Goatee(Id^ GcL-30,2001, 
10:05:34-10:32:02 & 11:44:05-11:45:49). 
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For 20 years the Plaintiff has not demonstated competence in managing his 
business or legal affairs (Exhibit A, Findings oi Fact a n d Conclusions of Law, f. U) . 
Defendant claims Plaintiffs failed Workers Compensation complaint and major 
civil suit against it filed since filing for divorce on July 31, 2000 is evidence that Plaintiff 
was mentally competent in 1995 through 1999„ which, anachronistic-argument is clearly 
absurd. (Defendants Motion to Dismiss, p^7 \ 
Plaintiff was unable to prosecute both cases, which were dismissed. (Exhibit B, 
Dismissal of workers comp; Id., Nov. 7, 2001, Thomas Lowery's testimony, 9:18:22-
9:19:40; Oct. 30, 2001, Dr. Michael Lambert's testimony^ 10:04:00-10:05:32 &u 10:2349-
10:24:10; Lowenj v. IDS Churchy eL aL, Civil No^Q10902154, dismissed by Third District 
Court Judge Ronald Nehring in Oct.). 
Defendants dissemble the facts to confuse this Court, while claiming to be 
people of God. 
Defendant BYU noted the deficiency of Plaintiff s performance in graduate school 
from 1991 through 1996 in its Motion to Dismiss (p. ) in Loweiy v. LDS Church,, et al, 
Civil No. 010902154, before Judge Ronald Nehring.) 
Plaintiff, 50 years old, lives in the basement of his aging parents. His only income 
is $1,000 monthly alimony from his former wife and $208 per month interest on an 
investment arranged by his^stepfather for him (Exhibit C, Divorce Decree^ \ 12). 
During all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiff was financially supported 
primarily by his wife (Exhibit A, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, \ 15). 
Plaintiff had depressive and manic episodes early in and throughout his 
marriage of 1976: 
Plaintiffs wife testified that Plaintiff expressed a manic personality7 throughout 
their marriage (in-1976), exhibiting fierce anger and hatred similar to Plaintiff's 
behavior at the time of their separation in September 1999. She testified that Plaintiff 
11 
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would yell with a reded face, very much the same as after Plaintiffs psychotic 
breakdown in 1997. She testified that Plaintiff was very controlling in conversations. 
She testified that Plaintiff had abused alcohol, that her own immediate family and 
other people did not want to be around her husband. She testified that Plaintiff asked 
her on three different occasions to "hold on" while he attempted to overcome his 
personality problems. Plaintiffs wife said she almost annulled the marriage 
immediately after it took place in 1976. Plaintiffs wife testified: 'That was Tom's 
personality through all the time Fve known him." Plaintiffs wife testified that after 
Plainttiff s May 20, 1997 injury caused by BYU Dean David Magleby, Plaintiffs, 
personality became worse,- resulting in severe depression, suicidal ideation, and a desire 
to destroy the people who caused the destruction of his professonal life (Id., Nov. 7, 
2001, Nancy Lowery's testimony, 2:37:20-2:55:23). 
Plaintiffs involvement in the 1970s tax protestor movemenLand his-1979 
indictment, conviction, and imprisonment for Willful Failure to Pile aJFedernl Income 
Tax Return are also evidence of his lifelong mental disorders (Exhibit A, Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Lawr, *[ 11); Id., Oct. 30, 2001, Dr. Stephen Golding's testimony, 
3:04:20-3:04300. 
Plaintiff earned only $18,612 gross income in 1995, the year the Complaint's 
causes of action took place, and virtually all of that was student income (see Fxhibit D, 
Plaintiffs 1995 Federal Income Tax Return). 
Plaintiffs struggling business failed entirely in June 1996 after eight years trying 
to provide for his family. 
Plaintiffs wife had borrowed $10,000 in. December 1994 to finish.earning her 
nursing degree throughout 1995 to earn more income to support the Plaintiff's family. 
Plaintiff interviewed for a tenure track position at BYU in December 1995 but was 
rejected. 
12-
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Plaintiff accepted a tenure track position at Southern Virginia College beginning 
August 1996, but his contract was not renewed after the first nine months because of 
Plaintiffs involvement in political wars between faculty and administration (M.., Oct. 
30, 2001, Dr. Michael Lamberts testimony, 10:00:37-10:01:46; Oct. 31, 2001, Michael 
Goates's testimony, 11:03:11-1H}3^0; Oct 31,200-VBriaivWoodfield^iestimony, 2:06:20-
207:00 & 2:11:10-2:13:10). 
Plaintiff was recruited for a visiting pxofessorship at BYU during his 
employment at Southern Virginia College hut the visiting professorship was denied 
him after his return to Utah from Virginia in April 1997, due to political conflict in the 
BYU political science department (Id.., Oct. 30, 2001, Dr. Michael Lambert's testimony, 
10:00:37-10^)2:30 & 11:05:44-11:07:30); QdL3l7 2Q01. Brian Woodfield's testimony^ 2:13:55-
2:14:10; Thomas Lowery's testimony, 4LLL:5Q-4LL25Q. 
Most recently, Plaintiff has been restrained by temporary and permanent civil 
stalking injunctions issued by Utah Third District Court Judge Stephen Henroid, Civil 
No. 020904571, on June 17, 2002 and July 29, 2002, 
Plaintiff experienced a severe mixed depressive-hypermanic episode in Judge 
Henroid's court on July 29, 2001, from 11:00 a.m. through the end of the hearing, 
including time testifying under oath, which episode rendered him disfunctional for 
days thereafter, and which delayed this memorandum response to Defendant RYU's 
Motion to Dismiss All Claims in this case (see Court videorecord, l&45:Q&-end). 
Plaintiffs wife began prescribing and administering anti-depressant medications 
to Plaintiff in fall 1997, wThich medications failed to control Plaintiffs symptoms (Id., 
Nov. 7, 20Q1, Nancy Lowery's testimony, 2:53:4Q=r254£Q). 
Plaintiff sought employment for one year without success^ collecting 
unemployment benefits, and then sought medical care for his mental disorder in June 
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1998 and was referred to Dr. Michael Goates {Id., Oct. 31, 2001, Thomas Lowery's 
testimony, 4:18:55-4:20:46; Dr. Michael Goates'JL testimony, 9:56:30) 
Plaintiff also sought employment through 1999 while collecting unemployment 
benefits. 
In September 1999, Plaintiffs wife told Plaintiff she didn't love him anymore, 
that she couldn't have intimate, relations with him anymore. Plaintiff left the home in 
suicidal despair and was taken in by his aging parents, who have cared for him since 
(Id., Oct. 31, Thomas Lowery's testimony, 12:04:35-12:07:56). 
Plaintiff's wife rented out-the family home, moved to Arizona, and cut off 
Plaintiff's medical and prescription d rug insurance, as well as all support. 
Under the guidance of Plaintiff's primary Dr. Michael Lambert, Plaintiff w^as 
given a one-year vocational rehabilitation program at BYU beginning January7 4, 2000, 
partially funded by the Utah State Office of Vocational Kehabilitatian~(Id^QcU31, 2001, 
Dr. MichaeLGoates's testimony, lQ:06:00-lfl:QZ:fl9; QcL 10^2001, Dr. Michael Lambert's 
testimony, 10:24:10-plus. 
In spring 2000, Defendant BYU officials contacted Plaintiffs psychotherapist, Dr. 
Michael Lambert, to discover whether or not Plaintiff was dangerous on BYU campus. 
Dr. Lambert said yes (Id., QcL3Q, 2001^0:19:42:10:2045). 
In October 2000, BYU terminated the Plaintiff's vocational rehabilitation program 
early because it had failed, Plaintiff was dangerous, and Plaintiff was frightening people 
on BYU campus, and Plaintiff was filing criminal complaints with five police 
departments against BYU administrators and churck leaders. (Id.,; QcL 31, 2001^ BYU 
Vice President Noel Reynolds's testimony, 4:38:56-4:40:00, 4:50:43-4:53:42; Oct. 30, 2001, 
Dr. Michael Lambert's testimony, 11:55:40-11:56:13,10:19:42-10:20:15; Oct. 31, 2001, 
Thomas Lowery's testimonyv 12:29:20020230). 
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The ongoing divorce moved Plaintiff to attempt other legal actions against 
people who had harmed him. 
In September 1999, Plaintiff received from his church bishop a letter from 
Michael F. Watson, Secretary to the First Presidency- of the LDS Church, which stated: 
After a careful and thorough review of the matter involving an Area 
Authority Seventy and Brother and Sister Tom and Nancy Lowery, the 
First Presidency has concluded that this is a civil rather than an 
ecclesiastical matter. As such and if the parties concerned cannot come to 
an amicable solution, the issue may require consideration by the 
appropriate civil authorities. 
While the Brethren were saddened to learn of the difficulties faced, by 
Brother and Sister Lowery, the Church, by Policy, must remain neutral in 
this and other civil disputes. 
The Brethren have asked that you extend to Brother and Sister Lowery 
the hope that this difficult situation might be appropriately resolved. [Ld., 
Oct. 31, 2001, Thomas Lawery's testimony^ 12:13:52-12:16:00) 
Upon conversion to the Mormon church, the Plaintiff became a totally 
committed ''super-Mormon" in September 1976 (Id., Oct. 30, 2001, Dr. Michael 
Lambert's testimony (11:39:53-11:41:45)), psycho emotively captured by the poetic pious 
rhetoric of Mormon Church leaders^ which caused absolute commitment to such 
leaders. 
Dr. Stephen Golding testified that Plaintiff had "flipped," that is , a reversal of a 
category of Plaintiff's fundamental beliefs all at once, which is one symptom of 
Plaintiffs personality disorder (3:08:00-3:08:38). 
One profound expressions of PlaintifTs disorders was his Mormon conversion in 
1976, a "flip" within his "hard-wired" personality structure (Id, 3:05:50-3^:04)^ from a 
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rowdy, reckless, hard-drinking construction worker (Id., Oct. 30, 2001, Thomas Lowery 
testimony, 4:31:17-4:34:01). 
Dr. Golding also testified about another of Plaintiffs profound flips: the psychotic 
break caused by BYU Dean_David Maglehy on May 20,1997 (Id., 3:04iQ5-3:07:4QVThis 
event caused Plaintiff to flip from a rigid super-Mormon viewing church leaders as 
infallible to disallusioned, demoralized, suicidal member of the church. 
Likewise, the First Presidency letter caused a "flip" in the Plaintiffs brain and 
freed the Plaintiff from a psycho-emotive obligation ta Mormon churclrleader 
defendants (below), who had insisted that Plaintiff "could not" take legal action against 
church leaders or the church, and left him a maniac relentlessly pursuing vindication. 
Plaintiff has since conceived of filing a divorce lawsuit (July 2QQ0) against his 
wife, Nancy Lowery; a civil lawsuit (March 2001) against BYU, BYU President Merrill 
Bateman, BYU Vice President and BYU LDS First Stake President Noel Reynolds, BYU 
Dean and LDS Bishop David Magleby, and BYU Professor and LDS Bishop Ralph 
Hancock; a lawsuit (March 2001) against Southern Virginia College (hereafter SVC), 
SVC President and LDS Seventy Area Authority David Ferrel, SVC Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees and LDS Stake President Glade Knight; SVC Trustee and LDS Stake 
President Don Davis, and SVC Provost/Dean and LDS Bishop Roger Barrus; a lawsuit 
(March 2001) against the LDS Church, LDS Highland Utah East Stake^President and SVC 
Trustee Stephen Studdert, and LDS Utah South Area President John Groberg (Utah 
Third District Court, Civil No. 010902154); a lawsuit (April 2002) against BYU (Utah 
Third District Court, Civil No. 020902112); a medical malpractice notice of intent to 
commence action (July 2002) and a request for hearing before the Utah Department of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing against Dr, Walstir Fonseca, plaintiffs family 
doctor; and is now preparing a lawsuit against Plaintiffs LDS East Millcreek Stake 
President Don Cook, who won a frivolous civil stalking injunction against Plaintiff 
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July 26, 2002), and a refiling of his lawsuit dismissed by Judge Ronald Nehring October 
2001. 
A t the divorce trial three expert-witnesses~in psychiatry and psychology testified 
that thg-Plaintiff was dangerous toLhimself and to others (Id., Oct. 30^ 2QQl^Dr_Michael 
Lambert's testimony, 10:14:04-10:16:46,10:20:16-10:21:42, 10:56:00-10:57:03; Dr, Stephen 
Golding's testimony, 3:11:25-3:14:00, 3:22:05-3:22:21). 
At all times relevant heretoJ?laintiff-was- "unable to protect [his^legaLrights 
because o£ an overall inability t a function JTLsociety." 
Plaintiff has not had "a solid work history" for more than 20 years (Olsen v. 
Hoolcy, 865 P2d. 1345 (Utah 1993), at 1347; Exhibit A, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, f 11). 
Plaintiffs divorce trial ended oivjan. 17r 2002- Shortly thereafter Plaintiff 
conceived,of filing the Complaint in this action. 
From the time of the occurrence of the actions in the Complaint to the time the 
Plaintiff conceived of taking legal action in this case, the Plaintiff suffered hundreds of 
depressive and manic cycles,, suicidal and homocidal episodes, paranoia, and suicidal 
incidents (ldv Oct. 31, 2001, Dr. Michael Goalees testimony, 10:10:53-10:1128). 
Exhibit E, Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of Motion for Expedited Disposition of 
Plaintiffs Notice to Submit for Decision on Motion for Reasonable Accommodation of 
Rules, which the Court granted7 affirms symptoms of Plaintiffs disability that 
precluded and still preclude competence inJiis business and legal affairs, including 
"suicidal and homocidal episodes, mental confusion, catatonia, and other debilitating 
symptoms" (<[ 12; Oct. 30, 2001, Dr. Michael Lambert's testimony, 10:05:34-10:32:02, 
10:52:40-10:52:57; Lamberfs testimony to direct examination by Judge Bohling, 11:39:10-
11:46:48; (see DSMIV, Dilusional Disorder, pp . 296=301, Bipolar Disorder^ pp. 350-358, 
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Paranoid Personality Disorder, p and references, including manic and mixed episodes, 
pp. 328-338)). 
Doctors' reports attached to the Exhibit E Affidavit describe conditions and 
symptoms the Plaintiff has experienced at all times reLevant hereto. 
During the 34 months of separation from his wife, the Plaintiff has incurred a 
net debt of $37,671 unsuccessfully and recklessly attempting to regain everything he has 
lost in his life (Exhibit F, current credit card bills; Id^OcL 30, 2001). 
This net debt was incurred is a result of the Plaintiffs mental disorder and 
consequent lack-of employment. 
From the time of the actions described in the Complaint through January 2002, 
the Plaintiff was unable to comprehend his legal rights and liabilities in this case; the 
Plaintiff for 81 months did not conceive of filing a lawsuit against Defendant for the 
actions described by the facts of the Complaint, which facts clearly constitute a prima 
facie case against the Defendant. 
Finally, Plaintiff has suffered for many years the debilitating symptoms of bipolar 
disorder, dilusional disorder^ and paranoid personality disorder which_have distorted 
and distort his view of reality at virtually all times. Depressive and manic and jnixed 
cycles of the two continue to distort his reality at any given moment and often sweep it 
away entirely when changes in circumstances of thought or events occur, sometimes in 
seconds, minutes, or hours^ daysA weeks,, or months (hLt Oct. 31, 2QQ1, Dr. Michael 
Goates testimony, 11:19:08-11:22:08, 10:22:13-10:32:50; Oct. 30, 2001, Dr. Stephen Golding's 
testimony, 2:56:58-2:57:35; Dr. Michael Lamberts testimony, 9:55:15-9:58:44,10:05:34-
10:32:02,10:16:46-10:18:30,10:20:16-1001^42,10;50;10-10:55:16,11:09:25-1100:16; Exhibit G). 
During all but five years of his life, Plaintiff suffered the symptoms of his 
disorders without the benefit of psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment and 
medications. 
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ARGUMENT 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Plaintiffs Mental Illness 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim of tolling of the statute o t limitations is 
invalid because the Plaintiff has not fulfilled the legal requirement of inability to 
manage his business affairs or estate, or to comprehend his legal rights and liabilities. 
Defendant argues that the Utah Supreme Court in O'Neal v. Division of Family 
Services, 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah-1991) "rejected 'general incompetence7" as a standard for 
determing if mental disability tolls the statute of limitations (Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, p. 6). 
Defendant attempts to decieve the Court. 
In fact, the O'Neal Supreme Court ruled the opposite; it rejected Q^Neal's 
argument against general incompetence. The Court wrote: 
O'Neal contends that in giving meaning to the term "incompetence'' in 
code sections 78-12-36 and 63-30-11, we should reject the requirement of 
general incompetence and substitute a very broad definition We reject 
this argument (Id. 1142-43) 
The O'Neal Supreme Court upheld general incompetence as a standard for-
tolling the statute of limitations. 
Further, the Court ruled that O'Neal was not mentally incompetent within the 
meaning of tolling statutes because O'Neal admitted that he had not repressed his 
memory of sex abuse against him while basing his claim of mental incompetency on 
the sex abuse discovery rule. 
O'Neal did not base his tolling claim on a mental illness described in DSM IV, for 
which the Plaintiff in this case was diagnosed as having since early life (Id, 1140). 
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The O'Neal Court also ruled that in reviewing "a motion to dismiss, we consider 
the facts and all inferences to he drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party" (Id. 1140). 
The facts in this memorandum concerning Plaintiffs mental illness, disability, 
and incompetence since early life, including testimony and rulings in Plaintiff's divorce 
trial, are found in the Complaint by reference to 1 owery. v. Lowery, Civil No^QQ49Q4704 
in the Utah Third District Court (Complaint, 1 3). 
The Plaintiffs claim of statutory tolling of the statute of limitations is based on 
his mentaLillness,, disability, and general incompetence in the management of his 
"businessaffairs or estate, or comprehension of] his.~ legal rights or liabilities" (Qlsen 
v. Hooley, 865 P2d. 1345 (Utah, 1993), at 1147) under Utah Code § 78-12-36. 
All the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, the Plaintiff (O'Neal,-at 1140), demonstrate that the Plaintiff at all 
relevant times hereto was mentally ill and incompetent in the management of his 
business affairs or estate, or unable to comprehend his... legal rights or liabilities" 
(Olson, at 1147) 
Defendants misleading conduct-ajid^concealnaexit-irLexceptionaLor special 
circumstances 
Plaintiffs claim of tolling is also based on the discovery rule, that is,, "the 
defendants misleading conduct and concealment" in "special circumstances that 
would, based on a balancing test, render application of the statute of limitations unjust 
or irrational," which is a "sufficiently broad" standard for adjudicating tolling claims 
(Williams v. Howard, 970 P2d, 1282 (Utah 1998), a t 1285). 
"Special situations exist in which the so-called discovery rule tolls the running of 
the statute of limitations," according to the Utah Supreme Court in Meyers v. 
McDonald, 635 P2d. (Utah 1981), at 86), 
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In Williams, at 1285, the Supreme Court held: 
There are three situations in which we have determined that application 
of the discovery rule is appropriate: (1) where the application of the rule is 
mandated by statute; (2) where a plaintiff is unawrare of a cause of action 
because of the-defendantis misleading conduct or concealment; ^xxd (3) 
where application is warranted by the existence of special circumstances 
that would, based on a balancing test, render application of the statute of 
limitations unjust or irrational.... These situations are sufficiently broad to 
allow us to address the issue in the instant case. (Also see Bevetida v. 
Langford, 914 P2d. 45 (Utah 1996), at 51) 
Paragraphs 48 through 59 of this complaint are incorporated herein by reference 
as though fully set forth herein at length. 
Among the other facts of the Complaint, these paragraphs state prima facie that 
Eugene Bramhall engaged in misleading conduct and concealment in behalf of 
Defendant BYU against the mentally ill Plaintiff. 
Etwirotech Coiy a Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utait App. 1994), at 493 states: 
Under the concealment version of the discovery rule, a defendant who 
misleads a plaintiff or "causes a delay in the bringing of a cause of action is 
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the 
action." Warren [v. Prove C ^ 8 3 & P ^ d a t l l 3 0 . 
The Envirotech Court found that the concealment theory applied where the 
plaintiff had reasonable grounds for not bringing the action within the statute of 
limitations. 
In this case, the reasonable grounds for the Plaintiff not bringing the action 
within regular limitations are "special circumstances that wrould, based on a balancing 
21 
98 — Appellant Addendum 
test, render application of the statute of limitations unjust or irrational/' (Williams v. 
Howard, at 1285; Berenda i\ Langford* at51). 
In Berenda, at 53, the Supreme Court wrote: 
We leave as the lawr the general rule that a plaintiff must make a prima 
facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that, 
given the defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered his or her claim earlier. 
The Plaintiff here was not "a reasonable plaintiff." He had been and was a 
mentally ill BYU employee with severe mental disorders, as demonstrated,by the 
foregoing evidence, when Defendant BYU authorized agent, chief legal counsel Eugene 
Bramhall, told the mentally ill Plaintiff "that there were no legal problems for the 
plaintiff or for BYU because of Thomason's access to and possession of the letterT that 
only Thomason had violated the law" (Complaint, H 48-50) and when Bramhall sent 
the mentally ill Plaintiff to other persons to facilitate recovery of the copy of Plaintiff's 
letter of recommendation given by Defendant to Thomason (Complaint, \ \ 51-59). 
Plaintiff remained such a mentally ill man at all relevant times hereto in this 
case, without the benefit of psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment and 
psychotropic drug treatment. 
The Berenda Court, at 53-54, continued: 
The application of this legal rule to any particular set of facts is necessarily 
a matter left to trial courts and finders of fact. In making that 
determination, the factors that underlie the more specific subrules 
discussed above may be relevant to the extent that they highlight 
considerations pertinent to the difficulty a plaintiff may have in 
recognizing and diligently discovering a cause of action when a defendant 
affirmatively and fraudulently conceals it. 
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The mental disorders of the Plaintiff in this case requires such a determination 
based on the evidence provided above a n d any other evidence that may come forward. 
The trial court and finders of fact should decide. One of the features of a serious 
depressive disorder is self-blame and shame,, especially after life experiences that cause 
depressive episodes, partioiarLy when manic cycling is involved. Evidence of such self-
blame occurred in Plaintiffs divorce trial testimony (Oct. 30, 2001, Thomas Lowery's 
testimony, 4:26:50-4:29:30 & 4:30:00-4:30:40). 
Defendant BYU's Chief Counsel Rramhall's misleading concealment and delay of 
action against the mentally ill Plaintiff certainly constitutes speciaLcircumstances. To 
hold the Plaintiff to the regular statute of limitations would clearly be unjust and 
irrational. It would be unconscionable. 
The Williams v. Uowaxd Supreme Court holds that 'The discovery rule has no 
application when none of the three aforementioned situations are present/7 (Id., at 
1286) 
In the case at bar, all th ree "of the three aforementioned situations are present/ ' 
When all inferences iire drawn from the facts in this case in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving Plaintiff, it is clear that the court should toll the statute of 
limitations to accommodate the special circumstances of the serious and persistently 
mentally ill Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff asks this Honorable Court to rule that Defendant BYLTs legal counsel 
Eugene Bramhall and BYU misled the Plaintiff and caused a delay in the bringing of the 
cause of action and that Defendant is "estopped from relying on the statute of 
limitations as a defense to the action/' 
Plaintiff asks this Honorable Court to recognize tolling of the statute of 
limitations under Utah Code § 78-12-36, as the Plaintiff has provided in this 
memorandum "an initial showing... that the plaintiff did not know of and could not 
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reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim 
within the limitation period,/ due to his mental disorders, or the misleading conduct 
and concealment by Defendant within special circumstances of a mental illness and 
disability, or both. 
NEGLIGENCE 
Defendant argues that Gerhich v. Named Inc., 977 P.wd 1205, at 1207 (Utah 1999) 
precludes Plaintiffs valid cause of action in Count 1 of the Complaint because "the 
plaintiff has failed to claim or establish any duty owed to him by BYU to him 
personally/' that "there is nothing in the form or directions in the letter he was asked 
to fill out that established any kind of duty on the part of BYU, or right granted to the 
preparer." 
In fact, Gerbich supports Plaintiffs claim. The Gerhich court ruled the Gerbich 
defendant in that case had no duty because the defendant "submitted evidence that 
showed it did not owe a duty to Gerbich, thereby negating the first element" of 
negligence (Id., emphases added). BYU has showrn no such evidence. 
The Gerbich defendant "referrledj to Gerbich's admissions, which showed that 
there were no material facts in dispute, and by offering a copy of the contract which 
negated the existence of a duty" (at 1208). 
Defendant in this case has submitted no such evidence to negate the obligation 
created by BYU in its "'CONFIDENTIAL LETTER OP RECOMMENDATION EQR THE 
MARRIOTT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT GRADUATE PROGRAMS' form" 
(Complaint, VI 5-8 and Complaint exhibit form letter, envelope, and memo of 
transmittal), which states: 
Your frank and confidential evaluation of his or her [Allen Thoinason's] 
abilities and attitudes will be appreciated. 
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Finally, the Gerbich appeal was based on a motion for summary judgment after 
the closing of the discovery process^ not on a motion to dismiss, which_given 
circumstances relinquished the court, under the rules of civil procedure, from taking as 
true all allegations in the plaintiffs third amended complaint. 
The Defendant's still face unchallenged statements of clainv in the Complaint, 
wThich the Court must assume are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. 
The Defendant also argues Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah.1986), 
with no references, not surprisingly. Beach also supports Plaintiffs claims. 
Addressing duty for and causation of actions by a third party, the Supreme Court 
dismissed Beach's claims that she had a "special relationship" wit l iher university that 
created a university duty to tuck her into bed at night while on a field trip, to teach her 
how to camp, to prevent the instructor not to drink alcohol on the field trip, to prevent 
Beach herself from becoming intoxicated from alcohol — and this because Beach had 
no special relationship with the university that distinguished her from any other 
student. 
Iiv this- case at bar, Plaintiff had not only a "special relationship" with BYU but an 
exclusive relationship: Plaintiff was approached by BYU through Allen Thorn a son to 
give BYU a "frank and confidential evaluation of his or her [Thomason's] abilities and 
attitudes...." (Complaint, <[ 6), an evalution that no one else could give, that is, the 
Plaintiffs "frank and confidential evaluation" of Thomason. No other person could 
have fulfilled this obligation to BYU in exchange for confidentiality and waiver of 
Thomason's right of access to the letter, which Thomason relinquished in the letter. 
The Beach Supreme Court wrote that special relationships generally arise wThen 
one assumes responsibility for another's safety or deprives another of his or her normal 
opportunities for self-protection (at 415). 
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The facts and exhibit in this case at bar make perfectly clear that the Defendant 
entered into an explicit special relationship with, the Plaintiff for the purposes of 
obtaining from the Plaintiff a frank and confidential evalution while promising the 
Plaintiff safety from any negative consequences that might come from publicity of that 
evaluation^ which is the very purpose of confidentiality in frank and honest solicited 
evaluations of applicants to institutions of higher education, including RYLJ. 
In exchange for his evaluation of Thomason, Plaintiff was assured by BYU that 
his evaluation would not be revealed to Thomason, which the Plaintiff knew could 
jeopardize his safety. BYU included no disclaimers on the confidential letter of 
recommendation form in cases of harm to the evahiator by the applicant to BYU (see 
Complaint exhibit). 
The Defendant offered the Plaintiff safety; Plaintiff accepted the offer and 
expected Defendant to fulfill its duty, as Plaintiff had fulfilled his duty to provide the 
frank and confidential evaluation. 
Beach failed to prove "that she had a special relationship with the University to 
supervise and protect her and that the duty was breached, causing her injuries" (at 416). 
The facts of this case at bar demonstrate that the Defendant offered and created 
their duty ta protect the Plaintiff; they also demonstrate that the Defendant breached 
that duty by releasing the Plaintiff's sensitive letter of recommendation to Allen 
Thomason and into the public realm after it had entered their custody, fraudulently 
concealed from the mentally ill Plaintiff knowledge of the cause of action, and caused a 
delay in the bringing of the cause of action (Complaint,, <[<[ 30-59). 
Finally, Defendant also argues from Higgitiz v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d231 
(Utah 1993) against the obvious special relationship Defendant had with the Plaintiff, 
again with no references. 
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As a major mentally ill victimizer control case, Higgins applies here only in part, 
but given Defendant's reliance on Higgins, Plaintiff will be prepared by showing that 
the case at bar conforms to Higgins as well as to the other cases Defendant has relied on. 
The Higgins Supreme Court upheld the Plaintiff s claim that defendant mental 
health institutions did have a duty to control the mentally ill assailant Trujillo 
(Higgins^ at 233 & 240). The Court ruled that the mental health institutions treating 
Trujillo "should have known of such [likely] danger/ ' even though they didn't know 
that Trujillo would likely harm Higgins. The Court rather based its affirmation of the 
trial court on the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiff will argue thai RYU and its employees created a duty to keepi Plaintiff's 
letter of evalution confidential by stating so in the evaluation letter form, that BYU and 
its employees knew that providing Thomason, or anyone else, with access to Plaintiffs 
letter after gaining custody of the letter constituted a risk of harm to Plaintiff, and other 
applicants^ that RYU knewT or should have known that giving Thomason access to 
Plaintiff's letter constituted an even greater than the average risk of harm to Plaintiff 
because of the negative assessment and comments Plaintiff wTrote in the letter, and BYU 
knew or should have known that the content of the negative comments placed 
Plaintiff irtyet greater risk of harm by Thomason, which is verified by Eugene 
Bramhairs knowledge of the content of the letter when Plaintiff spoke to him about the 
release to Thomason and Bramhairs instructions to Plaintiff to discover Thomason's 
mental health caregiver (Complaint, %% 53-58). 
The Higgins Court articulates two exceptions to the general rule that no one has 
a duty to control the conduct of third persons: first, where a special relation exists 
between the actor and the third person; second, where a special relation exists between 
the actor and the other, which gives the other a right to protection (at 236). 
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The Court's three categories of factors that determine the existence of a duty via 
special circumstance are: 
(1) the identity and character o£ the actor, the victim, and the victimizer; 
(2) the relationship of the actor to the victim and the victimizer; and 
(3) the practical impact that finding a special relationship would have on 
the parties and society {Higgins, at 237). 
The Court then states its standard: 
Our overriding practical concern is whether the one causing the harm has 
shown him- or herself to be uniquely dangerous so that the actor upon 
whom the alleged duty would fall can be reasonably expected, consistent 
with the practical realities of that actor's relationship to the one in custody 
or under control, to distinguish that person, from others similarly situated, 
to appreciate the unique threat this person presents, and to act to 
minimize or protect against that threat. When such circumstances are 
present, a special relationship can be said to exist and a duty sensibly may 
be imposed. [Higgitis, at237] 
(1) The identity of actor BYU and its employees is a large institution of higher 
learning owned and operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
(hereafter "LDS church"), that Allen Thomason was an applicant to BYU, and that the 
Plaintiff wras an evaluator of Allen Thomason as a applicant to BYU, solicited by BYU 
and Allen-Thomason. 
The character of actor BYU was of an institution of higher education with 
extremely high standards of honesty, forth rightn ess, fairness, virtue, trustworthiness, 
piety, love for all human beings, an advocate of strengthening families and 
individuals, especially those who mourn and stand in need of comfort and special 
assistance, such as the sick and afflicted, including the mentally disabled 
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Its renowned faculty and student honor code was advertised internationally in 
promotional literature, television, radio, newspapers, the internet, speeches by BYU 
and LDS church leader/BYU trustees worldwide, spread through the media by huge 
public relations and communications departments of the LDS church. 
BYU wore the mantle of ecclesiastical authority bestowed by church leaders 
throughout the world and particularly in Utah, which heightens BYU and its 
employees as not only obedient to the laws of the land but to the highest ethical 
standards. LDS church members especially honor and trust BYU and those affiliated 
with it. 
BYU sought applicant evaluations to maximize the quality of its students and 
minimize the costs involved in selling higher education^ and BYU was aware and 
sensitive of the fact that applicant evaluators take a risk of harm when providing 
evaluations, particularly negative evaluations, that applicants rely heavily on to get 
admitted, graduate, begin professions, and earn income to support their families and 
loved ones — and so BYU offers all evaluators the promise of confidentiality. 
BYU operates on a system of strict control of administrators, faculty, staff, and 
students, even to the extent of placing limits on academic freedom that most colleges 
and universities would reject. The ultimate power of decisionmaking lies with one 
man, the president and prophet of the LDS church. 
BYU promises such strict confidential control on evaluation letters by evaluators 
who require applicants to waive their right to access of the letters of evaluation. 
The character of Allen Thomason was to do virtually all possible ta get admitted 
to BYU, as he had been terminated from a substantial professional position and failed 
to find employment for a long period of time. Thomason regarded letters of evaluation 
as crucial to reviving his professional life, as they wrere the key to the gate of admission 
to BYU as well as to his personal family, and financially recovery and well-being. 
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Thomason also had characteristics of one who would more likely do harm to a person 
who gave him a negative evaluation, even beyond the assumed danger implicit in 
BYU's offer of guaranteed confidentiality to the Plaintiff and all other evaluators. 
The character of the Plaintiff was a mentally ill friend of Allen Thomason wrho 
reluctantly agreed to Allen Thomason's request to submit a letter of evaluation to BYU 
in Thomason's behalf, and was an honest man.2 
(2) Actor BYU's relationship to the Plaintiff victim was as a solicitor of a letter of 
evaluation of Allen Thomason and a guarantor of the safety of the Plaintiff against any 
harms by Allen Thomason's reactions to Plaintiff's letter of evaluation, through BYU's 
offer and contract of confidentiality. The BYU Marriott School of Management letter 
form's statement about confidentiality created solid expectations in the Plaintiff's 
psycho-emotive system. 
Actor BYU's relation to victimizer Allen Thomason was as a provider of a 
service to Allen Thomason, including required forms for letters of evaluation in BYU's 
required application process, a corporation who had control of Allen Thomason's access 
to letters of evaluation, which access to Thomason could cause harm to evaluators, 
especially those who gave negative comments. 
(3) As for the practical impact of finding a special relationship between BYU and 
Allen Thomason, and thus a duty of Defendant to keep Plaintiff's letter of evaluation 
confidential, if the Court in this case at bar were to find a duty of BYU to protect the 
Plaintiff from harm by Allen Thomason caused by BYU violating its promise of 
confidentiality with regard to the Plaintiffs letter of evaluation of Thomason, the 
practical impact on future evaluators would be less harm to evaluators by applicants 
who perceive the evaluation letter as negative to them; evaluations of applicants 
2 It is important to note that discovery will reveal that Thomason's two other evaluators, Thomason's 
bishopnc second counselor and former bishop lied in their letters of evaluation fbr Thomason. 
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would be more honest; honesty, a necessity for every civilization governed by law, 
would be fostered to a greater degree; large^ powerful institutions would not release as 
many letters of evaluations for applicants to those applicants and to the public and 
cause harm to innocent honest evaluators; and the propensity for and numbers of 
illegal acts would be reduced. 
The content of these factors in this case at bar makes clear that there are "special 
relationships" between the actor Defendant and the victim Plaintiff, as well as between 
the actor Defendant and the victimizer Allen Thomason. 
While the special relationship in Higgins applies only to Plainttiff s letter's 
content of negative comments about Thomason's social and emotional problems, the 
basic special relationship of the Defendant BYU as education service provider and 
Thomason as the applicant applies to BYLZs given knowledge of risk to evaluators 
generally and evaluators who make negative comments specifically. 
BYU's Marriott School of Management letterhead induces trust in evaluators 
that confidentiality will be maintained,, as^BYU advertises internationally that honesty-
is required of all wrho work at and attend the university. No shell games will be 
allowed, according to the BYU Honor Code for administration, staff, faculty, and 
students. 
This induced trust is even more effective on LDS church members, including the 
Plaintiff. 
The content of Plaintiffs letter of evaluation of Allen Thomason, which BYU 
had in its custody prior to giving the letter to Thomason, certainly gave warning that 
Thomason posed a greater than normal risk to the Plaintiff. 
BYU promised to treat the Plaintiff differently from evaluators who did not 
require confidentiality7, and certainly different from all other evaluators who would 
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give unique evaluations, which is why BYU's policy was to request more than one 
evaluation from Thomason and all other applicants. 
Thomason's waiver gave control to BYU to prevent access to Plaintiffs letter, to 
keep its promise of confidentiality. The Complaint makes clear that Thomason made 
the letter public to others (f 44). 
The Complaint and its exhibit make clear that the Defendant entered into a 
relationship with Thomason as an applicant to the Marriott School of Management, 
gave Thomason required official evaluation^ letter forms for obtaining evaluations 
from members of the community. Thomason followed the instructions on the forms 
and signed the waiver of access to the Plaintiffs letter of evaluation according to 
Plaintiffs requirement. 
BYU offered and promised the Plaintiff safety from any negative consequences 
that might come from publicity of his letter of evaiution of Thomason^ Plaintiff 
accepted the offer of protection, wrote and submitted the evaluation and expected 
Defendant to fulfill its duty to protect him just as Plaintiff had fulfilled his duty to 
provide the frank and confidential evaluation. 
The Complaint's exhibit includes BYlX's invitation to evaluators: 
If for any reason you_ have substantial reservations about the candidate's 
potential for success in the field of management, please explain, [p. 2] 
Defendant knew there was a general risk of harm to Plaintiff as an evaluator and 
even invited negative comments from PlaintifL Defendant thus knew or should have 
known that the negative comments increased that risk, and knew or should have 
known that the specific content of those negative comments increased that risk many 
fold. 
According to Higgins, Defendant had a duty to keep Plaintiffs letter of 
evaluation confidential, and they failed to do so and attempted to cover it up by 
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misleading the Plaintiff, fraudulently concealing the cause of action, and delaying the 
cause of action. 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Defendant cites Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961) and argues that the 
facts alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint contain "nothing" in the Complaint would rise to 
the level of outrageous and intolerable behavior. 
In response, Plaintiff simply poses this question to the Court and all officers 
thereof in this case: 
If you were to ask one hundred people in our society how they would describe 
the release of their confidential letter of evaluation they had written for an 
acquaintance or friend that contained their own negative comments about their 
friend's "social and emotional problems," including the statement that their friend had 
lost numerous jobs due to their social and emotional problems, about their 
"professional indiscretions" and "professional difficulties," their deep distress about 
their "childhood difficulties" and "immediate family relations, something he can't 
seem to shake off," that you think "he may struggle in your graduate program and in 
the business world thereafter," that "he will do [well] only if he can somehow put his 
past behind him and develop tactful and respectfuL skills in human relations. Maybe he 
deserves another chance, but that is your call" (Complaint's exhibit)— and that the 
large institution who promised you that your letter would not be made public to 
anyone, especially to the friend you wrote about, the bureaucratic institution who had 
given the letter to the friend and attempted to cover up the illegality of it by deceiving 
you, telling you the you should retrieve the letter and telling you to retrieve the letter 
by intruding into a confidential clergy relationship of your friend, and by delaying the 
cause of action beyond the statute of limitations — if you asked one hundred people in 
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our society how they would describe such conduct against them, how many do you 
think would say it was outrageous and intolerable? 
It is clear that all of them would say it was at least outrageous and intolerable, 
and probably criminal, and far exceeded generally accepted standards of morality and 
decency — particulary because-BYLL employees responsible for confidentiality had 
opened and read the negative contents of the letter prior to giving it to Thomason. 
As for Schuurman v. Shingleton, this case at bar isn't about consensual sex in a 
therapeutic setting; there was nothing at all consensual about the Defendant's actions in 
this case. It is about a gross breach of duty that put a mentally ill man in harm's way and 
made public his seriously critical confidential statements about his friend and member 
of the community, which injured Plaintiff's reputation. 
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION O F EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
The Complaint fulfills the~Te<juirements of Johnson v. Rogers and Hansen v. Mt. 
Fuel Supply. 
Plaintiff has proferred^sufficient~evidence to indicate that his distress is 
sufficiently severe to constitute menial illness, in the Complaint's citation of Plaintiff's 
divorce trial record. 
The foregoing evidence-of Plaintiff s-mentaL disorders demonstrates with 
"certainty," and "there is really no dispute about it — that Mr. Lowery suffers from a 
serious and persistent mental illness/' that the Plaintiff's disorders are organic, 
biochemical in nature subject to severe physical pain caused by distressful events. 
The Court finds that the Petitioner is, a s a result of his serious and 
persistent mental illness, disabled from work. The Court finds specifically 
that he has not engaged in some kind of longstanding charade to deceive 
the world, in- this litigation or in other areas. [Exhibit A, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law,.^ 11] 
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The Plaintiff has not "feined disturbances/' 
Plaintiff describes the physical pain caused by Defendant in each count of the 
Complaint OT 63, 68, 73, 78, 83, 88, 91, 95). 
BREACH OF DUTY OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
Defendant's argue from Webster v. Lehmer, 742 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1987) that "in 
this instance, no confidential relationship was ever created, or even alleged, and 
certainly no transaction existed between BYU or any other defendant that benefitted 
them to the detriment of the plaintiff/7 
Defendants statement is false. 
The Webster Supreme Court made clear (at 1206) that: 
"A confidential relationship arises when one party, having gained the 
trust and confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over the 
other party/ ' Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
The doctrine of confidential relationship rest upon the principle of 
inequality between the parties, and implies a position of superiority 
occupied by one of the parties over the other. 
The confidence must be reposed by one under such circumstances as 
to create a corresponding duty, either legal or morale upon the part 
of the other to observe the confidence, and it must result in a 
situation where as a matter of fact there is a superior influence on 
one side and dependence on the other. 
If a confidential relationship is found, "any transaction that benefits the 
party in whom trust is reposed is presumed to have been unfair and to 
have resulted from undue influence and fraud." [Webster, at 1206] 
35 
112 — Appellant Addendum 
Defendant gained the trust of mentally ill Plaintiff by means of its institutional 
projection of itself as an institution o£ higher education with extremely high standards 
of honesty, forthrightness, fairness, virtue, trustworthiness, piety, love for all human 
beings, an advocate of strengthening families and individuals, especially those who 
mourn and stand in need of comfort and special assistance, such as the sick and 
afflicted, including the mentally disabled, which was implicit in BYU's official letter of 
evaluation form required by the BYU application process for the Marriott School of 
Management. 
As the Complaint states, the Plaintiff was an employee of BYU, and discovery 
will reveal that the Plaintiff was also a graduate of BYU and a member of the owner 
and operator of BYU, the LDS church. 
Discovery will reveal that Plaintiff had made covenants in the LDS temples to 
sacrifice even his life itself to the LDS churchy to cease to speak evil of church leaders, 
and to consecrate all that he had or ever would have to the LDS church. 
Plaintiff "did not believe the confidential relationship would be unfair" 
(Webster, at 1207. 
The BYU evaluation letter form promised confidentiality to those evaluators 
whose corresponding applicant had signed the waiver of access to the evaluator's letter. 
This confidence was reposed by the Plaintiff under such circumstances as to 
create a corresponding fiduciary duty, either legal or moral, upon the part of BYU to 
observe the confidence. The relationship resulted in a situation where as a matter of 
fact BYU had a superior influence and the Plaintiff was dependent. 
Any benefit to the Plaintiff was certainly lost when Defendant BYU breached the 
trust reposed by the Plaintiff. 
The relationship was consummated when the Plaintiff signed a n d BYU received 
the Plaintiffs letter of evaluation in behalf of Thomason. Defendant BYU benefitted 
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from the relationship by receiving information provided by the Plaintiffs letter of 
evaluation upon which to consider the admissions application of Thomason. At all 
times that the relationship existed, BYU had an unfair and unequal superiority over 
the Plaintiff. 
In fact, BYU was able to breach it's fiduciary trust and duty to Plaintiff by releasing 
Plaintiffs confidential letter o£ evaluation to-Thomason. 
"Ample evidence exists to sustain [a] finding of the trial court that a confidential 
relationship existed between" BYU and the Plaintiff (Webster, at 1207). 
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS 
The Complaint fulfills the requirements of Stein v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 
Inc., 944 P.2d 374 (Utah App. 1997), the facts of which are the opposite of the facts in this 
case at bar. 
Because Defendant BYU gave Thomason access to the letter^ after BYU had 
gained custody of the letter^ and shared the_private_facts with Mark Poulsen that the 
Plaintiff had written negative comments in his confidential evaluation of Thomason 
and that those negative comments contained serious criticisms of Thomason's social 
and emotional character, personality, and capability: o£ succeeding in. graduate-school or 
the business world, as well as other negative comments (see above),. Defendant BYU in 
fact did make a public disclosure of Plaintiffs confidential and highly offensive private 
facts. 
As made clear above, few members of society would not think those facts were 
offensive and objectionable. 
In Stien, the alleged invasion of privacy video (intrusion privacy) d i d not 
include the name or identity of the Plaintiffhnor were any facts about the Plaintiff 
included. (Stein, 379-80). 
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In the case at bar, Plaintiffs name, identity, and private facts were made public by 
the Defendant. 
The facts of the Complaint demonstrate that Defendant made a public disclosure 
of private facts, as Thomason was a public person at the time, not privy to Plaintiffs 
confidential letter of evaluation, and he shared the private facts with another public 
person not privy to the facts. 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
The Complaint fulfills the requirements of Gold Standard v. Getty Oil Company, 
915 P.2d 1060. The Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
Under Utah law, a fiduciary on confidential relationship will be found 
only "when one partyv having, gained the trust and confidence of another, 
exercises extraordinary influence over the other party. Von Hake v~ 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). Moreover, when the parties deal "at 
arms length" or in an adversarial relationship, no fiduciary relationship 
can be said to exist. [Id,, a t 1064]. 
In this case at bar, the facts state clearly that Defendant BYU gained the trust and 
confidence of the Plaintiff and exercised extraordinary influence over the Plaintiff, as 
made clear above. 
The facts also state clearly that the Plaintiff and Defendant BYU were never in an 
adversarial relationship, as both worked together toward the same end, that of 
providing BYU with evaluation information upon which to determine if Thomason 
could qualify for admission to the Marriott School of Management. 
RECKLESS EALSHY AND DECEIT 
The Federal Courts in the 10th Circuit have recognized a cause of action for 
reckless falsity and deceit, and this Court should do so to rectify damage done to the 
Plaintiff. ABUSE OF POWER 
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Defendant does not cite an abuse of power tort case, but instead cites a criminal 
misdemeanor case where defendant mounted a constitutional challenge of a county 
ordinance requiring filing of campaign statements and disclosure of campaign 
contributions. The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the defendant. 
Defendant's response here is nonexistent and therefore admitted. 
NEGLIGENT HIRING 
Plaintiffs Complaint provides sufficient facts to show that Plaintiffs statements 
of claim for negligent employment, hiring, training, monitoring, evaluation, and 
supervision on a systematic or periodic basis, as axldressed in RethetforcL v, AT&T 
Communications, 844 p.2d 949 (UtatLl992) are valid. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 2002. 
BREACH O F CONTRACT 
Defendant fails to respond t a Count 5 of the Complaint and-therefore admit the 
allegations and statements, of claim. 
Based on the Complaint's foregoing factual evidence and arguments, Plaintiff 
asks this Honorable Court to deny the Defendants Motion to Dismiss All Claims. 
DATED this 5th Day of August, 2002 ^ ^ 
Thomas J. Lowery 
4143S.635"East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
685-0998, 262-4850 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of August, 2002,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules and Memorandum 
to be Mailed to the following: 
Mr, David B, Thomas 
A-350 ASB 
P.O. Box 21333 
Provo, Utah 84602-1333 
DATED this 5th day of August, 2002. 
Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
685-0998, 262-4850 
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MARY C. CORPORON, #734 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 801-328-1162 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
By. 
JUL a 2 2002 
2£z^ puty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS I OWER Y. 
Petitioner, 
s 
NANCY D. LOWERY, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil I Ii : 00490- 1- 70 4 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come before the court for trial on October 
nrslh n I , ,'001 , N«, > <tTiiibt?r 7, 2001 a i] 11 i \ u j i b i i 14, JCHJl 
the Honorable William B, Bohling, District Coun Judge presiding, Petitioner appearing in person 
i i I Ii iiiiiiiil (In uml. In . i. UIISJL MI mi in 1 Mil ( < « ip<n n jiiid Kt'sponidtii! appearing in 
person and by and through her counsel of record, D. Miles Holman, the court having proceeded 
I 11 c JI II I il i i t i f i n i i n i [hiiiicH «.tji i i in II I I ' I C H W I Ihrh ink let n cti iht* e\h.ihil o I the parties, 
and having heard the arguments of counsel, having made a partial ruling in the matter on 
laving made a 
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further ruling in the premises, and the parties having further stated that ruling into the record, 
based thereon and for good cause appearing, the court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1, The parties to this action are husband and wife having been married on May 28, 1976 
2, The parties are both residents of the State of Utah and both maintain their marital domicile 
within the State of Utah. 
3, The Petitioner was a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for a period of three 
months or more immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
4, Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties which have made 
continuation of the marriage impossible and the marriage no longer viable. 
5, There are no living minor children of the parties, the surviving child of these parties having 
achieved his majority No minor children are expected to be born to these parties in the 
future. 
6, The court finds that the Petitioner, Thomas Lowery, suffers from a serious and persistent 
mental illness. The court finds that all three experts who testified at trial in this matter 
agree that he suffers from a serious and persistent mental illness, though these experts all 
disagreed with each other about the specific nature or parameters of the illness 
7, The court finds that the "Axis I Diagnosis" for the Petitioner is depression, sometimes 
presenting itself as severe depression, which is biochemical in nature 
2 
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8. As set forth above, the three expert witnesses who testified disagreed on the specific 
diagnosis h i ill t hiiiliuiu i 1 »i eplicu o.elding ( mm ilni ii'ir Pvnn mci suH r IT in > 
mood disorder including a paranoid personality disorder. Dr. Michael Lambert testified 
that the Petitioner suffers from a delusional city H> JC I«I | ,I yn\ ,hv\n JIM," Jri '. i"1 "' 
onset. Dr. Michael Goates found that the Petitioner suffers from a "classic" case of bi-
polar disorder, with cycling features of mania and depression, sometimes progressing 
severe mania or hyper-mania, and sometimes progressing into severe depression, and at 
the extremes of these cycling swings, progressing into a psychotic disorder. 
9 In court finds that the disparity among the diagnoses of the three experts at trial is 
indicative of the limitations of psychiatric diagnosis and not indicative of any possibility 
that the Petitioner does not actually suffer from a serious and persistent mental illness. 
The court further finds that it is not necessary to resolve the conflict in the testimony of 
these experts in or ciei tc i esolve the determination in this case. Ail that is necessary is for 
this Court to determine that the Petitioner suffers from a severe and persistent mental 
Illi jess which is debilitating. I i 1 s zo\ n t fii i is tl lat tl: ins ilii tess A a s Ukeh " manifested e at K i 
his adult life, and that in May of 1997, he suffered a "psvchotic break7' or, in laymen's 
terms a i lervous breakdown,' and that he has not ttad much relief in terms of his 
psychological or psychiatric functioning since that time. 
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10. The Petitioner has been taking psychotropic medication as prescribed since May of 1997, 
including a wide spectrum anti-depressant / anti-anxiety medication, and the court finds 
that he is still taking his medications and is cooperating in the taking of his medications. 
He has been in regular counseling with his therapist, Dr. Gordon Lambert, for several 
years. The Petitioner is not malingering in presenting his symptoms to this Court, nor is 
he refusing medication or other reasonable treatment for his symptoms. 
11. The court finds that the Petitioner is, as a result of his serious and persistent mental illness 
disabled from work. The court finds specifically that he has not engaged in some kind of 
long-standing charade to deceive the world, in this litigation or in other arenas. The court 
finds that the Petitioner's outbursts in court have been a manifestation of his illness, and 
not grandstanding or playacting on the Petitioner's part. Even if these outbursts were 
somewhat exaggerated, they are still primarily a symptom of the Petitioner's mental 
illness. The whole history of the Petitioner, as described to this Court, including his "tax 
protester" history and his whole history of being able to work better on his own rather 
than with others, is consistent with this Court's findings about his illness. 
12. The three experts have testified to this Court that the Petitioner is disabled from work to 
some extent, with the extremes running from Dr. Stephen Golding's testimony that he is 
10% to 30% disabled, as compared to Dr. Michael Lambert's testimony that he is &0% to 
100% disabled. The court finds that it is not necessary to resolve this conflict in the 
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testimony about the percentage of degree of 
The court finds that, as a practrca; maner, it would be difficult for someone with the 
Petitioner's illness inn MIIMIII "» ik in " HIT JIM! HI >MIJ H IJIIUU e\ JI'IUIUK especially 
given Petitioner's age ^50) and especially given the history with his most recent employer 
(Brigham Younu, I 'nn ersity), wh : .-(is was another symptom of his 
mental illness and consistent with his mental illness. 
)me extent, of earning some income, and 
the court, in making its orders in this case, assumes that the Petitioner is capable of 
earning income in the approximate amount of $1,200.00 per month. 
rhe court finds that it should conduct periodic reviews of the Petitioner's circumstances 
aiid earning capability, the first at s;x months, and then annually after that, for at least five 
years. 
fhe court finds that the Petitioner * highest income during the last two decades of his 
adult life is $31,220.00 for tax year 1997, gross, and that was earned e 
academic professor. The court finds that, even if the Petitioner were fully recovered from 
his mental illness, there would *till be a wide discrepancy between thr P 
capability and the Respondent's earning capability, and that this would still be a case in 
which alimony should be paid to the Petitioner, in any event. 
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16. The Respondent is educated, has a Master's Degree* and is licensed and employed as an 
experienced nurse practitioner She earns or is capable of earning income of at least 
$63,000.00 per vear, grosr 
17. During the course sf their marriage, the parties acquired an interest in cenain real property 
located in Utah County, State of t^ah, and commonly known as 4938 West Panorama 
Drive, Highland, Utah. The Petitioner has requested that the house be awarded to him, or 
in the alternative, that it be sold and the proceeds of the home divided between the parties 
The court finds that it is nor eauitatle to award the house to Petitioner, and that it is more 
equitable to award the house to the Respondent, due to the significant financial burden 
which she carries from having a long term marriage with a severely disabled husband. The 
court finds that the home has a fair market value of approximately $260,832.00, and that it 
is subject to marital indebtedness on the first mortgage of approximately $136,950.00 and 
a second mortgage, the marital f ortion of which is approximately $18,800.00 The court 
finds that the balance due on the second mortgage is actually higher, but the Respondent 
has taken draws against the second mortgage balance during the parties' separation, and 
these are properly her separate non-marital expenses. 
18. The court finds that the marital residence has equity, after the mortgage lien obligations, of 
$106,405.00, if the value of the property is not to be determined upon sale The Petitioner 
should be awarded his equity from the marital residence, however, in the immediate future, 
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and if the Responcent is unable to do so, then the Petitioner 
opportunity to atterrpt to refinance ;he residence and to occupy it on his own. 
Specifical e parties should use the follow * e 
court' 
a. Till :i i:!11 R espoi iclei i\ $\-o\ ild b -  gi ai ttecl a pet i ::i ::! c <i *5 ci ays in: i w I i ic! i t : attei i n: t to 
refinance the maritai residence, to give to Petitioner his portion of the equity 
ence, 
b. In the event that she is unable to do so within 45 days, then the Petitioner should 
be granted a similar right to attempt to refinance the marital residence and to cash 
out the Respondent5? interest. He should be given 45 days after the Respondent's 
oeriod of opportunity. 
c> In the event that neither party is able to refinance the marital residence and occupy 
the residence within the time frame allowed, !:hen the property should be placed for 
sale forthwith with a duty qualified real estate agent pursuant to a multiple listing 
contract and should be sold as soon as is commercially feasible at a commercially 
reasonable sales price. In the event of the sale of the home, then the sale proceeds 
should be divided equally between the parties, whether they are greater than or 
lesser than the court's finding of the equity in the residence as set forth herein, 
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subject however to the costs of sale and to the offsets set forth in the following 
paragraphs. 
19. During the course of the parties5 marriage, the Petitioner received the cash proceeds of the 
New York life insurance policy in the sum of approximately $15,000.00, and these shculd 
be awarded to the Petitioner as his sole and separate property, subject to the offset of one-
half the amount of this life insurance, or $7,500.00, against the equity to be paid to 
Respondent by Petitioner out of his share of his equity from the marital residence 
20. During "he course of the parties' marriage, the Petitioner received an employment 
severance package from Brigham Young University, in the net amount of approximately 
$23,800.00. after all taxes and withholdings. The Respondent should be awarded 
$6,500,00 of this total amount and the Petitioner should be awarded the remaining amount 
as bus sole and separate property, as it represents his income for a year or more, and is 
consistent with the court*s findings and assumptions about his income earning capability 
21. During the course of the parties' marriage, the parties have acquired an interest in a 
time^hare vacation condominium which the court finds to have a fair market value of 
$10,000 00 This should be awarded to the Petitioner, free and clear of any interest of the 
Respondent, subject to the Petitioner paying to Respondent the sum of $5,000.00 
representor g Respondent's one-half interest in the timeuhare vacation condominium, with 
said sum to be paid in conjunction with the refinancing or sale of the marital residence. 
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During the separation of the parties, the Respondent resided in the marital residence and 
'"i" |«J I i fct'ii f.ni i^ijL,at'ons assccutk ' ' »' *iint niu u \\ f »i,k" '' mg \\ e marital 
residence, including paying the regular monthly payments on the first mortgage and the 
ror repairs and maintenance to ti ie home, and paying the annual 
fees associated with the timeshare vacation condominium The total amount paid by 
Respondent for the first mortgage obligation during this time frame, net of rents 
Respondent received, was represented by Respondent to be approximately $41,050 00; 
the total marital balance due for the second mortgage was represented by Respondent to 
be approximately $18,800.00; she paid $3,349.00 for the interest on this dtumt this 
action; the to'al paid for repairs tc the home by Respondent was approximately $770 0C, 
and the total paid for the timeshare condominium annual fees b> P espoi idem v 'as 
$1,440,00. The court finds that a portion of these expenses are property attributable to 
the Respondent's own regular living expenses an i i i : i chargeable tc IMC Petitieni?: I ' 
court also finds that a portion of these payments have been to preserve the joint marital 
assets of the parties during the pendency of this M lion 1 h n i«m- t it* i^mt ii u \\uu a 
portion of these expenses should be charged to the Petitioner, of SI 1,050.00 of the first 
mortgage, plus the repairs. The court finds that the si inis paid \ < I ii ::1 i si i : \ lid 1:x j- : n: itly 
charged to the parties equally, are as follows; a portion of the payments to the first 
mortgage mthe sum of S3 0,000 00, *V ^rspf^ier.* r. pa\r<j,,r" ' ,^» n,., .lortgaue ii\ 
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the sum cf SI8,800 00, and the timeshare costs in the sum of $1,440.00 Further, the 
court finds that the Petitioner has incurred credit card expenses to the Responded1 's credit 
accounts which are properly chargeable to the Petitioner, as his separate debt, in the sum 
of approximately $1,15*7.00. Accordingly, the Petitioner's separate responsibility tor one-
half all of these expenses during the separation of the parties is in the sum of $18,552 00, 
and the Respondent should be granted credit against the sum she must pay to Petitioner, 
to equalize the parties* equity in the marital residence, for this amount of $18,552 00 
23. The Respondent should be ordered to pay to Petitioner all alimony arrearages owing to 
him through and including the date of refinancing of the residence, out of her share of the 
equity in the marital residence That money is in the sum of $12,250.00 representing 
alimony arrearages through January 31, 2002, and $1,000.00 per month in alimony owing 
commencing February 1, 2002. 
24. During the course of the parties' marriage, they have acquired an interest in two burial lots 
which the court finds to have a fair market vaiue of $1,850.00. These burial lots should be 
awarded to the Respondent subject tc her paying to Petitioner one-half the value of these 
lots, or $925.00, as an offset in conjunction with the refinancing and/jr sale of the marital 
residence. 
25. During the course of the parties' rnaniage, they have acquired an interest in two motor 
vehicles, including a Honda and a Jeep The Honda should be awarded to the Respondent 
10 
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free and clear of any interest of the Petitioner. The court finds that the Honda has a fa:r 
market value of $10,000 00. The Jeep should be awarded to the Petitioner free and clear 
of any interest of the Respondent. The court finds that the Jeep has a fair market value of 
$2,500.00. The court further finds that the Respondent should be ordered to pay to 
Petitioner the sum of $3,750.00 to equalize llic uiinrs i il tlw mmm S'HIITIMS ni \hr \\ n h^ 
and that this sum should be paid tc Petitioner in conjunction with the refinancing or sale oi 
the marital residei ice. ::)i it c f til: :t 2 1 n :: i in e e qi ilty. 
26 The cour t finds that these parties appeared before the District Cour t Commiss ioner on 
nissioner awarded the Peti t ioner 
t emporary alimony in this case o f $"75.00 per month. Though never reduced to 
judgment , the rulings of the Ui unci Lunrt Commissioner and the Minute Entr ies thereof 
const i tute the orders of this Court from the date of the ruling until modified That order 
has never beeis modified and the court does not now modify that order. Accordingly, the 
Responden t was obligated to pay temporary alimony in this case to the Peti t ioner, 
i, i i i in h int \ i. i IK M 2000 and continuing through November, 2001 in the sum of 
$775 .00 per month. The court finds that the Respondent never paid any of this temporary 
igation to the Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to recover against 
the Responden t for unpaid alimony arrearages from the effective da te of the temporary 
11 
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order through January 31, 2002, in the sum of $12,250.00 This shall be set off against 
her share of the equity in the marital home, as set forth above. 
27. The Petitioner has monthly living expenses of 52,200.00, which the court finds to be 
reasonable. 
28. The Petitioner is in need of alimony to meet his expenses. The Respondent has the ability 
to pay alimony to Petitioner. The court awards the Petitioner alimony in the sum of 
$1,00C 00 per month, commencing effective February 1, 2002, and continuing until the 
death of :he Petitioner, the death of the Respondent, the Petitioner's remarriage or 
cohabitation, or until further order of the court, whichever occurs first. The prior alimony 
awards are subsumed in the lump sum order in ^ 23 above 
29. The court finds that the Respondent has incurred an obligation to Dr. Stephen Goiding, of 
about 54,908.00, for his testimony at trial and to Dr. Nancy Cohn of about $437.00, for an 
incomplete effort at a psychological evaluation of the Petitioner, and the court finds that 
the Respondent should bear the costs of these debts, except that Petitioner should be 
ordered to pay tc Respondent $1,000.00 of these expenses. The Respondent should be 
responsible for the remaining balance of the indebtedness owing or paid to Dr. Nancy 
Cohn and to Dr. Stephen Goiding. This $1,000 00 should be deducted from the sum the 
Respondent owes to Petitioner by reason of the refinancing or sale of the marital 
residence. 
12 
Appellar11 A<1 < 1 v i1 el u11 i •»-• I 2 9 
30. The court finds that the Petitioner has an outstanding debt to Dr. Michael Lambert and an 
outstai iciii ig ii ldebtedness upon his c : p i i ci edit cai: els,, a: id tl lat!: le should pay these debts 
and obligations as his own separate indebtedness and that he should hold the Respondent 
harmless thereon. 
31. During the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired an interest in certain 
personal property, including household furnishings and fixtures. Each party should be 
awarded his or her own personal clothing and effects. Each party should be awarded 
those items owned by him or by her prior to the date of the parties' marriage or received 
by him or by her by reason of gift or inheritance from extended family The remaining 
items of the parties should be divided equitably between the parties, in as nearly equal a 
manner as possible. In the event that the parties are unable i o agree \ ip : n till: i , list il: \ itic i \ 
of the personal property, then they should divide the personal property by rotating the 
selection of the personal property, one item to be selected by each nil 
the entirety of the marital personal property has been divided, with the parties to toss a 
coin to determine who shall have the first selection. 
32. The Petitioner does not have the economic capacity to pay the attorney's fees of the 
Respondent, and the Respondent's request for an award of her c > * i i art' : rne> : • fees shoi ilci 
be denied, and Respondent should be ordered to pay her own court cost and attorney's 
fees. 
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33. The Petitioner's reasonable court costs and attorney's fees incurred in these proceedings 
in the sum of $16,000.00. The Respondent's reasonable court costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in these proceeds is in the sum of $35,331.00 Petitioner should be ordered to 
pay his own fees. Respondent should be ordered to pay her own attorney's fees. 
34. During the marriage of the parties, the Respondent has acquired an interest in various 
pensions, profit sharing, retirement, stock options, deferred compensations or tax deferred 
accounts, which the court collectively will refer to as "retirement accounts." The court 
finds that these should be awarded to Respondent as her sole and separate property, at a 
value of 529,920.00, subject to her paying to Petitioner one-half of the value of the 
retirement out of Respondent's share of the equity of the marital home. 
35. The Petitioner should be permitted to go to the home of the Respondent to divide the 
personal property between the parties and for him to pick up his own personal property, in 
conformity with the foregoing orders of this Court. With this exception, each party should 
be mutually restrained and enjoined from going upon the premises of the other party's 
residence, or from doing anything to harass, abuse or annoy the other party. 
36. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all necessary documents to transfer 
the title and ownership of the property of the parties pursuant to the decree entered herein. 
BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The coi irt has jurisdiction over the parties of this action .1 ^ H""i" viM^c:! : i^ti of ihn 
action. 
I iiiii ,1 iii „ r e c ml ill mi iim'e ' I I H U W MI <I ^ u i i i . ' i i I D l V r . M n n e i n "i* t Ma.iMi u i i r v i i n e i i a b l t 1 
differences, the same to become final immediately upon being signed by the Court and 
enterc 
That said decree of divorce should be in conformance with the foregoing findings of 
fact. 
DATED THIS Q. day of _ L , 2002. 
z> 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
District Court Judge _-> 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
C V b LOWERS 
Respondent 
DATED: 7V 'C /« 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be faxed and mailed to: 
d 
NANCY LOWERY 
4938 West Panorama Drive 
Highland, Utah 84003 
on this \r day of 
Secretary 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





DEFT'S MOTION TO DISM ALL CLAIMS 
Case No: 020902112 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Date: 09/9/2002 
Clerk: debbiep 
On order of Judge Dever, deft's Motion to Dismiss is granted. Plf's 
claims are barred by Statue of Limitations. Plf's claim of tolling 
of statue is without merit, c/o atty for the deft to prepare an 
order for the court to sign. 
Page 1 
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Case No: 020902112 
Date: Sep 10, 2002 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify tnat a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020902112 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail THOMAS J LOWERY 
PLAINTIFF 
4143 SOUTH 635 EAST 
SALT LAKE, UT 84107 
Mail DAVID B. THOMAS 
ATTD 
A-350 ASB 
P.O. BOX 21333 
PROVO UT 84602-1333 
Dated this (0 day of ~ Z ^ ^ v 2O0Z-_. 
puty Court Clerk 
Page 2 (last) 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





PRIOR RULING ON DEFT'S MOTION TO 
DISM 
Case No: 020902112 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Date: 09/11/2002 
-> 1 | . , 3 i f 
Clerk: debbiep 
On order of Judge Dever, the court's prior ruling on the left's 
Motion to Dism is set aside and Plf's request for a hearing in this 
matter is granted. Clerk to set a date and send notice to all 
parties. 
Page 1 
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Case No: 020902112 
Date: Sep 11, 2002 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020902112 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 




P.O. BOX 21333 
PROVO, UT 84602-1333 
Mail THOMAS J LOWERY 
PLAINTIFF 
414 3 SOUTH 635 EAST 
SALT LAKE UT 84107 
Dated thi s j 1 day of 
OP 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 2 (last) 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 655 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801/262-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Thomas J. Lowery, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Brigham Young University 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR LEAVETQ AMEND 
COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO 
AMEND COMPLAINXAND 
MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 020902112 
Judge Dever 
1. Pro Se Plaintiff Thomas J, Lowery respectfully moves this Honorable-Court 
for leave to amend the Complaint and moves the Court to amend the~ Complaint in 
this case by adding new material facts to the ComplainL The following lines would 
be added t a the Complaint in sequence of the existing lines in the Complaint: 
60. On or about May 20,1997, Plaintiff suffered a_psycholic 
breakdown during his employment hours at BYU during a 
conversation with BYU Political Science Department 
Chairman David B. Magleby. 
61. On or about November 21, 1998, Plaintiff discovered that 
Defendant BYU's employees' actions were direct and proximate 
causes of Plaintiffs major psychotic breakdown tha i took place 
on May 20,1997. 
2. Plaintiff also edited statements of claim in the counts of the Complaint. 
3. Justification for this motion derives from Plaintiffs mental illness and 
disability, which causes confusion, memory loss; depressive, manic, hypomanift, and 
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mixed depressive-manic episodes; and other debilitating symptoms,, which caused 
Plaintiff to forget about his discovery^ an or about Navember 21, 1998r that 
Defendants' actions averred in the Complaint were a direct and proximate cause of 
Plaintiffs major psychotic breakdown that took place on May 20, 1997. Medical 
testimony at trial will verify the discovery. 
4 Plaintiff bases this motion on Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 10(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, which requires reasonable modification of rules by public services to 
accommodate the mentally disabled. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2002. 
Thomas J* Lowery 
MEMORANDUM 
ARGUMENT 
5. Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
5.1. "(a) ... a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given 
when justice so requires/' 
5.2. "(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or 
defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurance set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the 
original pleading/' 
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6. The Utah Court of Appeals in Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247 (2002) stated: 
6.1. "It is well established that '""rule 15 should be interpreted 
liberally so as to allow parties to have their claims fully adjudicated."'" 
Sulzen v. Williams^ 1999 UT App 76, f 13, 977 P.2d 497 (quoting T i m m 
v. Dewsnup 851 P.2d 1178,1183 (Utah 1993)). This is especially true 
when the motion to amend is made well in advance of trial. 
7. The court overturned the trial court's denial of Plaintiff's motion to amend 
the complaint. (Also see Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West Development, Utah 
Supreme Court, No. 970154 (1998) andNielsen v. Herreron, 1999 UT App 317 (Utah 
App 1999). 
8. See Exhibit VV, Amended Complaint. 
DATED this 18th Day of October, 2002, 
Thomas J. Lowery 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of October, 2002,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules and 
Memorandum to be hand delivered to the following: 
Mr. David B. Thomas 
A-350 ASB 
P.O. Box 21333 
Provo, Utah 84602-1333 
Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
685-0998,262-4850 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801/262-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Thomas J . Lowery, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Brigham Young University ("BYU") 
Defendant 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 020902112 
Judge Dever 
1. Plaintiff Thomas J . Lowery is now, and has been since September 26, 
1999, a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, residing at 4143 S. 635 East, Salt 
Lake City 84107. 
2. Defendant Brigham Young University (hereafter BYU), is~a corporation 
residing in Utah County, at Erovo, Utah 84602. 
3. At all relevant times hereto, Thomas J . Lowery was a mentally ill man, 
which tolls the statute of limitations for this action. The record of Lowery v. 
Lowery, Civil No. 004904704, Dec. 14, 2001, Utah Third District Court is 
incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth herein at length. 
4. At all relevant times hereto, defendant BYU was the employer of plaintiff 
Thomas J . Lowery, who was a part-time RYU employee. 
5. On or about March 10, 1995, Allen F. Thomason (hereafter Thomason"), 
an applicant to the BYU Master's of Accountancy, Master's of Organizational 
Behavior, and Law programs at BYU, delivered a BYU confidential letter of 
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recommendation form to the plaintiff to submit to BYU as a part of 
Thomason's application. 
6. The official BYU "CONFIDENTIAL LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FOR 
THE MARRIOTT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT GRADUATE PROGRAMS" form 
requested a "frank and confidential evaluation of his or her [Thomason's) 
abilities and attitudes ...." (see attached letter of recommendation, 2 pages, 
with envelope) 
7. The form also included a waiver of any right that Thomason "may have 
[had] under any statute or university policy to obtain access to this 
recommendation," which waiver was signed by Thomason. 
8. On or about March 12, 1995, the plaintiff wrote, signed, and sent the 
BYU recommendation letter "to the applicant [Thomason] in the pre-addressed 
envelope" after signing his {plaintiffs] "name across the back x>f the -envelope 
after sealing" it, according to the written BYU instructions on-the letter of 
recommendation form. The^ letter was stamped as received by BYU "Graduate 
Admissions" on March 15, 1995. 
9. The plaintiff relied on BYU to keep the letter ofxecommendation private 
and confidential and especially to keep the letter out x)f the hands of 
Thomason, as the contents of the letter contained significantly "frank" negative 
comments and ratings about Thomason. 
10. The plaintiff had observed Thomason on numerous occasions as 
emotionally unstable and even hostile on a few occasions toward people who 
didn't agree with him. 
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11. On or about April 21,1995, Thomason phoned the plaintiff and stated 
bluntly that he would arrive a t the plaintiffs home "in a few minutes to talk/ 
Thomason said no more. 
12. After searching his memory for a reason for Thomason's blunt phone 
call, the plaintiff associated the phone call with the negative comments and 
ratings he iiad written in his JBYU tetter of recommendation for Thomason, .and 
he began-to fear reprisal from Thomason, even possible violence. 
13. The plaintiff loaded a small family protection pistol and placed it under 
the cushion of the sofa in his home library
 r in case Thomason became 
physically violent. 
14. When the plaintiff answered his front door a few minutes later, 
Thomason began to attack the plaintiff verbally for writing the negative 
comments and ratings in the BYU letter of recommendation. 
15. Stepping toward the door, Thomason insisted that he enter. 
16. The door already open, and fearful of the large Thomason, the plaintiff 
opened the door wide, and Thomason walked into the entry and on into the 
adjoining library. 
17. Thomason then ranted in rage for more than a half an hour at the 
plaintiff about the negative comments in the plaintiffs BYU letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason. 
18. The plaintiff readied himself for physical defense. 
19. During this time, the plaintiff repeatedly ijecalled the presence of the 
pistol under the sofa cushion below him and prepared himseltto use it if 
Thomason made any physical assault. 
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20. The plaintiff spoke to Thomason softly in efforts to calm him down. 
21. When Thomason finished, the plaintiff asked him to leave, 
22. Thomason refused, again expressing rage that the plaintiff would say 
negative things about him instead af only positive things in the BYU letter of 
recommendation. 
23. The plaintiff listened quietly, then carefully and kindly apologiVpd for 
writing the negative comments in the BYU letter of recommendation, which 
placated Thomason. 
24. The plaintiff then told Thomason he would do anything possible to help 
Thomason get into a master's degree program except lie. Thomason became 
emotionally aggravated again, saying again that his expectation had been that 
the plaintiff would emphasize only the positive aspects about him. 
25. The plaintiff again spoke softly to Thomason^ this time about the 
possibility of Thomason's future success. 
26. Thomason became less irritated, and the plaintiff was able taget him to 
leave the plaintiffs home. 
27. After the heated conversation in the plaintiffs library, the plaintiff 
phoned the BYU Marriott School of Management and asked to speak to 
someone in charge of graduate program applications and letters of 
recommendation. A receptionist said the person in charge had already left the 
office for the day. 
28. The plaintiff recounted to the receptionist the brief phone call and visit 
from Thomason. 
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29. The receptionist took the message and promised that someone would 
return the plaintiffs phone call the following business day. 
30. On or about April 24, 1995, Kathy Carter, the admissions manager for 
the BYU accounting master's degree program phoned the plaintiff and said that 
the circumstances of the release of the plaintiffs letter of recommendation to 
Thomason had "snowballed.n 
31. Kathy Carter said Thomason had delivered his application and sealed 
envelopes containing letters of recommendation in his behalf to her 
department at BYU. 
32. Kathy Carter also said that Thomason later returned to her department 
and requested copies of the sealed letters of recommendation to deliver to the 
BYU law school in conjunction with his application there and to the 
Department of Organizational Behavior in conjunction with his application 
there. 
33. Kathy Carter also said that she instructed a "new secretary" in her BYU 
department named Shalene to make copies of the plaintiffs letter of 
recommendation for Thomason and to give them to Thomason to deliver to the 
law school and Organizational Behavior department. 
34. Kathy Carter also said that Thomason did not deliver letters of 
recommendation to the Organizational Behavior department, but had kept 
them. 
35. The plaintiff expressed distress that Thomason had the letter of 
recommendation the plaintiff had written, and asked to speak with the person 
5 
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ultimately in charge of the confidentiality of the plaintiffs letter of 
recommendation. 
36. Kathy Carter gave the plaintiff the name and phone number of the 
director of the BYU Department of Accountancy and Information Systems, Dr. 
Steve Albrecht, and the name and phone number of the dean of the BYU 
Marriott School of Management, Dr. Fred Skousen. 
37. The plaintiff phoned Albrecht, who was not in his office, and so the 
plaintiff left a message requesting that Albrecht return the phone call, The 
plaintiff then phoned Fred Skousen. 
38. After the plaintiff recounted to Skousen the release of the plaintiffs BYU 
letter of recommendation in behalf of Thomason to Thomason and Thomason's 
phone call and visit and conversation at the plaintiffs home, Skousen 
apologized to the plaintiff for the breach of privacy and confidentiality and said 
Albrecht would phone the plaintiff. 
39. Albrecht phoned the plaintiff at or about 2:30 p.m., April 24, 1995, and 
confirmed that one of the secretaries in his department had given the plaintiffs 
BYU letter of recommendation in behalf of Thomason to Thomason after BYU 
had obtained custody of the letters. 
40. Albrecht also apologized to the plaintiff for his department's release of 
the letter to Thomason. 
41. The plaintiff asked Albrecht to mail a copy of the plaintiffs letter of 
recommendation in behalf of Thomason to the plaintiff through BYU campus 
mail so the plaintiff could review the letter. Albrecht agreed to do so. 
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42. On April 24, 1995, "Michelle Berge" of the BYU "School of Accountancy & 
Information Systems" at "560 TNRB {BYU's Tanner building]" mailed a "Memo 
... To: Tom Lowery, 783 SWKT [BYU's Spencer W. Kimball Towe4 ,^re: Letter 
of Recommendation for Allen Thomason." 
43. The memo said: "Enclosed please find a copy of the Letter of 
Recommendation you wrote for Allen, Thomason, which you requested from Dr. 
Steve Albrecht" (attached, witlrenvelope). 
44. During May 1995, Thomason revealed to the plaintiffs neighbor, Mark 
Poulsen, that the plaintiff had written negative comments in his letter of 
recommendation for Thomason. Poulsen visited the plaintiff and discussed 
with the plaintiff Thomasoa's singer at the plaintiff. 
45. The plaintiffs fears of harm from Thomason increased in intensity and 
quantity. 
46. Because of his increases of intensity and fear, the plaintiff phoned Steve 
Albrecht again on or about June 2, 1995, and expressed to Albrecht the 
plaintiffs fear of damage to his reputation stemming from Thomason's 
possession of the plaintiffs negative letter of recommendation in behalf of 
Thomason, which Thomason might copy and distribute to others. 
47. The plaintiff asked Albrecht to retrieve the letter from Thomason. 
48. Albrecht told the plaintiff to contact BYU University Counsel Eugene 
Bramhall (hereafter "Bramhair) and to ask Bramhall to retrieve the letter. 
49. On or about June 5, 1995, the plaintiff reached Bramhall via phone, 
described to Bramhall the aforementioned events and circumstances 
surrounding his BYU confidential letter of recommendation in behalf of 
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Thomason and it's release by BYU to Thomason* and asked Bramhall to 
retrieve the letter from Thomason. 
50. Bramhall told the plaintiff that there were no legal problems for the 
plaintiff or for BYU because of Thomason's access to and possession of the 
letter, that only Thomason had violated the law. 
51. The plaintiff told Bramhall that BYU personnel had given Thomason a 
copy of the plaintiffs letter of recommendation in behalf of Thomason and that 
BYU should retrieve the letter. 
52. Bramhall told the plaintiff to retrieve the letter himself. The plaintiff told 
Bramhall he feared Thomason's reaction to any request the plaintiff might 
make to get the letter back. 
53. Bramhall then told the plaintiff to retrieve the letter through 
Thomason's mental health therapist, Hie plaintiff told Bramhall that he didn't 
know the name of Thomason's therapist. 
54. Bramhall told the plaintiff to visit the plaintiffs and Thomason's 
common church bishop, Lynn Bullock, and ask Bullock to find out who 
Thomason's therapist was and to tell the plaintiff the therapist's name. 
Bramhall also told the plaintiff to then tell BramhalL the therapist's name, 
that Bramhall would retrieve the letter and notify the plaintiff of its retrieval. 
55. Because the plaintiff felt subordinate to Bramhall's exercise of BYU 
administrative authority over the employee plaintiff, and because of Bramhall's 
commanding exercise of authority upon him, the plaintiff followed Bramhall's 
instructions. 
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56. During June 1995, the plaintiff phoned and visited Bishop Bullock 
numerous times in attempts to get the name of Thomason's therapist for 
Bramhall. In early July 199&, Bullock told the plaintiff that Thomason was 
seeing a therapist at the Alpine Center for Mental Health. 
57. In early July, the plaintiff phoned Bramhall to tell him the name of 
Thomason's medical clinic. Bramhall could not take the call, so the plaintiff 
left a message. 
58. On or about July 7, 1995, Bramhall returned the plaintiffs phone call; 
the plaintiff told Bramhall the name of Thomason's medical clinic, the Alpine 
Center for Mental Health. 
59. Bramhall never notified the plaintiff that the letter had or had not been 
retrieved. The plaintiff phoned Bramhall numerous times to discover the 
retrieved of his BYU letter of recommendation from Thomason, but Bramhall 
never returned the plaintiffs phone calls. 
60. On or about May 20, 1997, Plaintiff suffered a psychotic breakdown 
during his employment hours at BYU during a conversation with BYU Political 
Science Department Chairmacu David B. Magleby. 
61. On or about November 21, 1998, Plaintiff discovered that Defendants 
employees' actions were direct and proximate causes of Plaintiffs major 
psychotic breakdown that took place on May 20, 1997. 
COUNT 1—NEGLIGENCE 
THOMAS J. LOWERY v. BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
62. Paragraphs 1 through 61 of this complaint are incorporated herein by 
reference as though fully set forth iterein at length. 
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63. Between March 10, 1995 and March 15, 1995, Defendants employees 
created a duty to Plaintiff by providing to Plaintiff an official BYU 
"CONFIDENTIAL LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FOR THE MARRIOTT 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT GRADUATE PROGRAMS" form requesting a 
"frank and confidential evaluation of his or her [Thomason's] abilities and 
attitudes ...." Plaintiff then wrote, signed, and delivered the BYU confidential 
letter to BYU, according to BYU instructions on the letter, (see attached letter 
of recommendation, 2 pages, with envelope). 
64. Between March 15, 1995 and April 2L, 1995, Defendant's employees 
breached Defendant's duty to Plaintiff by delivering the letter to Thomason 
after having taken the letter into Defendant's custody. 
65. Defendant's employees' breach of duty directly and proximately caused 
Allen F. Thomason to visit Plaintiff and repeatedly cause Plaintiff to experience 
severe symptoms of Plaintiffs mental illness. 
66. Defendant's employees' conduct was the general kind of conduct 
Defendant's employees were employed to perform. 
67. Defendant's employees conduct occurred during normad working hours in 
the normal spatial bounderiea of their employment. 
68. Defendant's employees were motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of 
serving their employer's interest. 
69. Defendant's employees' conduct was clearly inside the scope of their 
employment. 
70. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful acts by 
Defendant's employees, Plaintiff Thomas J . Lowery has suffered severe 
10 
Appellant Addendum — 151 
physical, mental, emotional, and psychological trauma, bewilderment, 
turmoil, distress, pain, discomfort, and loss of enjoyment of life, 
including numerous depressive and manic and mixed depressive-manic 
episodes in his brain, a psychotic breakdown resulting in severe damage 
to his brain chemistry, and a severe biochemical mental disability. 
71. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful 
acts by Defendant's employees, Plaintiff Thomas J.Jxsvery h a s sustained 
a loss of income and benefits which would have accrued to him. 
72. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful 
acts by Defendant's employees, Thomas J . Lowery has had to incur 
medical and medical related expenses to his and/or his collateral source 
provider's special damage in sums not yet fully ascertainable. 
73. As a further consequence of the aforesaid wrongful acts by 
Defendant's employees, Thomas J . Lowery has sustained a loss of future 
earnings and loss of earning capacity in sums not yet ascertainable 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J , Lowery hereby demands judgment in his 
favor against defendant together with such other relief as this Honorable Court 
deems just and proper. 
COUNT 2—INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
THOMAS J. LOWERY V. BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
74. Paragraphs 1-61 and 63-65 of this complaint are incorporated herein, by 
reference as though fully set forth herein at length. 
75. Defendant's employees intentionally engaged in conduct toward Plaintiff 
with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress^ or where any reasonable 
person would have-known, that emotional distress would result. 
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76. Defendant's employees' actions toward Plaintiff were of such a nature as 
to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality. 
77. Defendant's employees' conduct was the general kind of conduct 
Defendant's employees were employed to perform. 
78. Defendant's employees conduct occurred during normal working hours in 
the normal spatial bounderies- of their employment. 
79. Defendant's employees were motivatedL at least in part, hy the purpose of 
serving their employer's interest. 
80. Defendant's employees' conduct was clearly inside the scope of their 
employment. 
81. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful acts by 
Defendant's employees, Plaintiff Thomas JL Lowery has suffered severe 
physical, mental, emotional, and psychological trauma, bewilderment, 
turmoil, distress, pain, discomfort, and loss of enjoyment of life, 
including numerous depressive and manic and mixed depressive-manic 
episodes in his brain, a psychotic breakdown resulting in severe damage 
to his brain chemistry, and a severe biochemical mental disability. 
82. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful 
acts by Defendant's employees, Plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery has sustained 
a loss of income and benefits which would have accrued to him. 
83. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful 
acts by Defendant's employees, Thomas J. Lowery has had to incur 
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medical and medical related expenses to his and/or his collateral source 
provider's special damage in sums not yet fully ascertainable. 
84. As a further consequence of the aforesaid wrongful acts by 
Defendant's employees, Thomas J . Lowery has sustained a loss of future 
earnings and loss of earning capacity in sums not yet ascertainable. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J . Lowery hereby demands judgment in his 
favor against defendant together with such other relief as this Honorable Court 
deems just and proper. 
COUNT 3—BREACH OF DUTY OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
THOMAS J. LOWERY V. BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
85. Paragraphs 1-61 and 63-65 of this complaint are incorporated herein by 
reference as though fully set forth herein at length. 
86. Defendant's employees^ held a-position of superiority over Plaintiff. 
87. Defendant's employees also gained the trust and confidence of Plaintiff. 
88. Defendant's employees exercised extraordinary influence over Plaintiff. 
89. Defendant's employees had ^corresponding duty, either legal or moral, 
to observe the confidence held by Plaintiff. 
90. Defendant's employees had a superior influence over Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff was dependent on Defendant's employees. 
91. Defendant's employees benefitted from violating confidence of Plaintiff 
through unfairness, which resulted from Defendant's employees' undue 
influence and fraud. 
92. Defendant's employees breached their duty of a confidential relationship 
with Plaintiff, which caused foreseeable, severe damage to Plaintiff. 
13 
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93. Defendant's employees' conduct was the general kind of conduct 
Defendant's employees were employed to perform. 
94. Defendant's employees conduct occurred during normal working hours in 
the normal spatial bounderies of their employment. 
95. Defendant's employees were motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of 
serving their employer's interest. 
96. Defendant's employees' conduct was clearly inside the scope of their 
employment. 
97. As a direct and proximate result erf the aforesaid wrongful acts by 
Defendant's employees, Plaintiff Thomas J, Lowery has suffered severe 
physical, mental, emotionaL and psychological trauma, bewilderment, 
turmoil, distress, pain, discomfort, and loss of enjoyment of life, 
including numerous depressive and manic and mixed depressive-manic 
episodes in his brain, a psychotic breakdown resulting in severe damage 
to his brain chemistry, and a severe biochemical mental disability. 
98. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful 
acts by Defendant's employees, Plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery has sustained 
a loss of income and benefits which would have accrued to him. 
99. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful 
acts by Defendant's employees, Thomas J. Lowery has had to incur 
medical and medical related expenses to his and/or his collateral source 
provider's special damage in sums not yet fully ascertainable. 
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100. As a further consequence of the aforesaid wrongful acts by 
Defendant's employees, Thomas J. Lowery has sustained a loss of future 
earnings and loss of earning capacity in sums not yet ascertainable. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J . Lowery hereby demands judgment in his 
favor against defendant together with such other relief as this Honorable Court 
deems just and proper. 
COUNT 4—NEGLIGENT TRAINING, MONITORING, EVALUATION, 
AND SUPERVISION ON A SYSTEMATIC OR PERIODIC BASIS 
THOMAS J. LOWERY v . BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
101. Paragraphs 1 through 100 of this complaint are incorporated herein by 
reference as though fully set forth herein at length. 
102. Defendant BYU failed to see that its employees Kathy Carter, 
Shalene, Dr. Steve Albrecht, Dr. Fred Skousen, and Eugene 
Bramhall were sufficiently trained on, a systematic or periodic 
basis. 
103. Defendant BYU failed to see that its employees Kathy Carter, 
Shalene, Dr. Steve Albrecht, Dr. Fred Skousen, and Eugene 
Bramhall were sufficiently monitored, evaluated, and supervised on 
a systematic or periodic basis. 
104. Defendant BYU owed Plaintiff a duty to protect Plaintiff against 
tort damages by BYU employees. 
105. Defendant BYU breached that duty. 
106. Defendant BYU's breach of duty was the direct and proximate 
cause of Plaintiffs injuries. 
15 
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107. Defendants could reasonably be expected, consistent with the 
practical realities of an employer-employee relationship, to appreciate the 
threat to Plaintiff of its employees actions and to act to minimize or 
protect against that threat. 
108. Defendant's employees' conduct was the general kind of conduct 
Defendant's employees were employed to perform. 
109. Defendant's employees conduct occurred during normal working hours in 
the normal spatial bounderies of their employment. 
110. Defendant's employees were motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of 
serving their employer's interest. 
111. Defendant's employees' conduct was clearly inside the scope of their 
employment. 
112. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful acts by 
Defendants, Plaintiff Thomas J. Loweiy has suffered severe physical, 
mental, emotional, and psychological trauma, bewilderment, turmoil, 
distress, pain, discomfort, and loss of enjoyment of life, including 
numerous depressive and manic and mixed depressive-manic episodes in 
his brain, a psychotic breakdown resulting in severe damage to his brain 
chemistry, and a severe biochemical mental disability. 
113. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful 
acts by Defendants, Plaintiff Thomas J. Lowery has sustained a loss of 
income and benefits which would have accrued to him. 
114. As a further direct and proximate result of the aforesaid wrongful 
acts by Defendants, Thomas J. Loweiy has had to incur medical and 
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medical related expenses to his and/or his collateral source provider's 
special damage in sums not yet fully ascertainable. 
115. As a further consequence of the aforesaid wrong acts by 
Defendants, Thomas J . Loweiy has sustained a loss of future earnings 
and loss of earning capacity in sums not yet ascertainable. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Thomas J . Loweiy hereby demands judgment in his 
favor against defendant together with such other relief as this Honorable Court 
deems just and proper. 
Dated this 18th Day of October, 2002 
Thomas J. Loweiy 
Thomas J . Loweiy 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801/262-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REPLY TaDEFENDANI'S-BELATED 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
AND MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 020902112 
Judge Leon Dever 
Plaintiffs reply to defendant's reponse of October 18, 2002 to plaintiffs Motion 
for Leave-to Amend the Complaint and Motion to Amend Complaint and 
Memoradum is based on the courts grant of plaintiffs Motion for Reasonable 
Modification of Rules and Memorandum, which gjant was based on, plaintiffs 
mental illness and mental disability recognized by the caurt and the protections of 
the Amercians with Disabilities Act. 
MEMORANDUM 
RELEVANT CASE HISTORY 
On June 7, 2002, the court recognized plaintiffs severe and persistent mental 
illness and mental disability by granting plaintiffs Motion for Reasonable 
Modification of Rules under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
On-September 9, 2002, the court granted defendant's defendants Motion to 
Dismiss without hearing oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss, which had been 
Thomas J. Lowery, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Brigham Young University 
Defendant 
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requested by plaintiff. The court's written order included a directive for defendant to 
prepare an order of dismissal for the court to sign-
On or about September 12, 2002^ the court vacated its dismissal of this case and 
scheduled a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss for October 18, 2002. 
At the beginning of the October 18, hearing, plaintiff submitted a Motion, for 
Leave to Amend Complaint and Motion to Amend Complaint and Memorandum 
The court scanned the motion and invited opposition by defendant. 
In his response, defendant confused and obfuscated the issues in the Motion 
to Amend. 
The court-invited a response from plaintiff, who explained in detail the 
motion's effect on the case, particularly the statute of limitations tolling under the 
discovery rule. 
The court then denied plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend —7 based on 
defendant's argument. 
Plaintiff again, attempted to get the court to understand the impact o£ the 
motion en the case. 
Defendant then obfuscated the issues. 
The court then dismissed the entire case at bar, again before any argument by 
plaintiff on the Motion to Dismiss. 
The-courfs dismissal of the case without giving plaintiff an opportunity to 
make oral argument on the motion to dismiss caused plaintiff to enter a severe 
major episode of depressive mania. 
Plaintiff asked the court if the court would not allow plaintitt to make oral 
argument on the motion to dismiss. 
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The court asked plaintiff what he had to say. 
Plaintiff asked the court if he, plaintiff should.just say it. 
The court told plaintiff to go ahead. 
Plaintiff made argument about his mental illness,, incompetency, mental 
disability,, and the confusion of the court caused by defendant in his pleadings and 
oral response. 
Plaintiff quoted Third District Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
describing plaintiffs severe and persistent mental illness since early life and 
plaintiff's mental disability. 
The court stated bluntly that plaintiff was not incompetent in 1995. 
Plaintiff fell into deep suicidal depression and ended his argument. 
The court asked defendant's counsel to respond; defendant's counsel relied 
only on his previous obfuscation. 
Plaintiff cycled into mania and further responded by repeatedly pleading with 
the court to read his memoranda on the motions before making a decision. He also 
thanked the court for allowing him to get his the facts and arguments into the 
record for the Court of Appeals. 
The court then vacated its grant of plaintiff's Motion for Leave-ta Amend the 
Complaint _ and its grant of defendant's Motion to Dismiss, took the motions 
under advisement, and promised to read the cases cited in the pleadings before 
deciding the motions. The court referred the pleadings to its law clerk. 
Plaintiff suffered severe and debilitating depressive and manic and mixed 
depressive-manic episodes for weeks following the court's hearing, including, 
nightmares of being killed repeatedly. 
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ARGUMENT 
The court should entertain plaintiffs Reply herein given the court's grant of 
reasonable modifications of rules due to plaintiffs mental disability and, in 
addition^ plaintiff s debilitating mental health since the October 18, 2002, hearing. 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Judicial Administration are often subject to 
modification at the discretion of litigating parties, at the discretion of the court, and 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
As stated in plaintiffs Motion, for Leave to Amend _ , it is weU-esiablish£d 
that Rule 15 is to be interpreted, liberally in-the case of ALL litigants- {Nunez u^ Alho, 
2002 UT App 247 (2002). 
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires reasonable modifications of 
court rules where necessary to provide access ta d u e process for mentally disahled 
litigants whose disabilities impede access to d u e process. 
The court should allow yet more liberality for mentally disabled pro se 
plaintiffs, or a t least read and consider carefully the pleadings of menially disabled 
p r a se plaintiffs before denying or granting motions. 
The court impeded plaintiffs access to d u e process in its October 18r 2002 
hearing by dismissing plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend ..., and for granting 
defendants Motion to Dismiss before having, carefully read the memoranda aad 
cases in die pleadings, which the court finally promised toj-ead after the-hearing. 
The court therefore should consider this Reply t a defendants response to 
plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend .... and to defendant's arguments for the 
Motion to Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
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The complaint is this case — including^ those facts contained in the cited case 
of Lowery v. Lowery, Civil No. 004904704^ before Judge William Bohling in the Utah 
Third District Quirt, Oct. 30 and 31r Nov. 1 and 7, and Dec 14, 2001 (Complain^ f 3 ) 
— avers that plaintiff has been mentally ill since early life, and that defendant 
repeatedly caused paranoia and severe biochemical distress to plaintiff in 1995 
(Comlaint, <H 12-13,16,18-19, 27, 44-46, 52, 63, 68, 73, 78, 83, 88, 91, and 95. 
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is to take all facts of the complaint 
as true. 
Given plaintiffs mental illness and disability, including the~symptoms_af 
bipolar disorder^ dilusional disorder, and paranoid personality disorder (see DSMIV 
on each) contained in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Third District 
Court in the above cited case, plaintiff forgot to include in the facts of the complaint 
in the case at bar his psychotic breakdown of May 20, 1997, .as a direct andproximatp 
result of defendant's actions in this case, as well as the subsequent-discovery that the 
actions of defendants in this case were a direct and proximate cause of plaintiffs 
major psychotic breakdown that took place on May 20, 1997. 
The additional materiaL facts in the proposed amended complaint ( f l 60-61) 
establish causation of damages to plaintiff by defendants, damges that became 
evident two years after the facts of defendant's actions in this case. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to AmendL, is a legal, justifiable, remedy to 
plaintiff's error of not initially including paragraphs 60 and 61 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
The_ Utah-Supreme Court in~Anrom Credit Services v. Liberty West 
Development, Utah Supreme CaurVNo. 970154 (1S98) andTimm ZL Dewsnup 851 
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P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993), and the Utah Court of Appeals in Hunez/, Sulzm v. 
VVz7Zioi^r1999UTApp76r977P.2d497>axwiNTieis^x v^ Hefferon, 1999 UT Apft317 
(Utah App 1999) make clear that leave to amend a complaint shall be-freely given 
when justice so requires it {Aumra, ^L36). The Court iv^Aurora wrote that "the 
discretion given atrial judge is not unlimited. In applying the federal counterparts 
Utahis Rule 15(a),, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
"Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within 
the discretion of the District Courts but outright refusal to grant the leave [to 
amend complaint] without any justifymgjreason appearing for the denial is 
notan^excerciseof discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and 
inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." (ff 36-37) 
The court should grant Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to Amend™ so plaintiff 
can avail himself of the^established rules of lawr including the discovery rule 
applicable to tolling of the statute of limitations. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established the bases for applying the discovery 
rule: 
The discovery rule applies [i\ when mandated by statute, [2] when a 
defendant has concealed 2Lplaintiff s cause of acitonr or [3] when exceptional 
[or "special"] circumstances exist Under the discovery rule^ "'the 
limitations period does not begin to run until the~discovery of facts- forming 
the basis of the cause of action/" {Berenda IK Longford, 914 P^d 45 (Utah 19961 
51). 
In the case at bar, exceptional or special circumstances exist ("[3]" above). The 
plaintifl has been mentally ill for at least 2Q years and likely since very early life, 
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which illness resulted in a psychotic breakdown and mental disability. The 
symptoms of plaintiffs illness and disability caused him to forget, a t the time of the 
filing of the complaint (during a protracted two-year divorce case), his discovery in 
1998 that defendants actions in this case were a direct and proximate cause of 
plaintiffs psychotic breakdown on May 20, 1997. 
Plaintiffs arguments for invoking "[2]" basis for the discovery rule (above) are 
included in his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Envirotech v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (1994), 
citing Warren v. Provo City Corp, 838 P.2d 1125,1129 (Utah 1992) states: 
If the plaintiff can prove due diligence ["that he or she acted 
reasonably in not bringing the action during the limitations period" (493)], 
the court then determines the application of the discovery rule based on a 
balancing test: whether "the hardship the statute af limitations would impose 
on the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case outweighs any prejudice to 
the defendant. (Id, footnote 4) 
In Envirotech, the court recognized tolling based on both the concealment theory 
and the exceptional, or special, circumstances theory. 
In the case at bar, plaintiff acted as reasonably as was possible for him to so act: it 
was impossible for the plaintiff to know in 1995 that the actions of defendants in this 
case were a direct and proximate cause of the psychotic breakdown that took place on 
May 20,1997. 
It w a s likewise impossible for plaintiff to know the same before h e was diagnosed 
and began receiving psydiotherapy for the debilitating effects of the breakdown, which 
began on November 21, 1998. 
7 
Appellant Addendum— 165 
Sinclair v. Brill, 857 F.Supp 132, recognizes tolling for the statute of limitations 
where a plaintiff becomes aware of damages caused_by defendants long after the causal 
actions of those defendants: 
The fact that the plaintiff knew she suffered any injury [prevents tolling] 
ONLY IF she was also aware of the causal relationship between her injuries and 
the defendant's conduct™ Nowhere in any of the testimony cited by the 
defendants does the plaintiff assert or infer that she knew [at date of injury] or 
any other time before [damages became evident] that the defendants' actions 
caused her blindness or her seizures. (IcU 136-137r emphasis added) 
The fact that plaintiff in the case at bar knew of the facts concerning defendant's 
actions against plaintiff would prevent tolling in this case ONLY IF plaintiff was also 
aware of the causal relationship between his later psychotic breakdown and the 
defendant's conduct. 
Nowhere in his initial or amended complaint does plaintiff assert that he knew 
before November 21, 1998,. that the defendants actions directly and proximately caused 
his psychotic breakdown on May 20, 1997. 
The court in this case never applied a discovery balancing test before it denied 
plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend ~ or before it dismissed the case twicer and has 
yet to apply such a test. 
The court in this case should grant the plaintiff's Motion For Leave t a Amend 
the Complaint and Motion to Amend the Complaint and deny the defendant's motion 
to dismiss. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2Q02. 
-2. 
Thomas J, Lowery 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of November, 2002,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Leave to Amend the Complaint and Motion to Amend the Complaint and 
Memorandum to be Mailed to the following: 
Mr. David B. Thomas 
A-350 ASB 
P.O.Box2L333 
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Thomas J. Lowery 
4143 S. 635 East 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84107 
801/262-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Thomas J. Lowery, 
Plaintiff-, 
vs. 
Brigham Young University 
Defendant 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S BELATED 
WRITTEN RESPONSE TO MOTION 
FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
AND MOTION TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT AND MEMORANHUM 
CwilNa Q2J0902112 
Judge-Leon Dever 
Defendant's belated written response to plaintiffs October 18, 2002, Motion for Leave to 
Amend the Complaint and Motion to Amend Complaint and Memorandum comes 40 days after 
plaintiffs Motion was filed with the Court and delivered to defendant. 
The_court should treat defendant's belated responses it did defendant's lack of response to 
plaintiffs Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules, which the court granted without hearing 
or oral argument. 
The court should grant plaintiffs Motion far. Leave, to Amend and MotioiUoAmend 
Complaint and Memorandum. 




Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration require that parties respond in 
writing to written motions withiiulO business days. The defendant— who is-represented by a law 
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school graduate, member of the Utah. Bar, and a presumably licensed, seasoned attorney — took 
40 days to respond in writing to plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Motion to 
Amend Complaint and Memorandum. — more time than the court has allotted the mentally ill and 
disabled plaintiff to respond to pleadings. 
The court should ignore the defendant's belated response, as it clearly violates court rules 
and, in addition, enlarges the pile of specious and deceptive arguments already dumped on the 
court in defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Defendant's belated memorandum again attempts to confuse the courLthrough obfuscation, 
stating: 
The thrust of plaintiff s claim is that a psychotic breakdown on May 20^ 1997 was a direct 
and proximate cause of the University's release of a letter of recommendation in March of 
1995. (defendants belated memorandum^ p. L-X emphasis added) 
Again, defendant makes absurd argument to confuse the court. May 20, 1997 came more 
than two years after March L995, which makes defendant's argument impossible. 
Plaintiff asserted the opposite: that the May 20, 1997 breakdown was a direct and 
proximate result of defendant's release of a letter of recommendation in March. 1995. 
Defendant then bases his argument on specious vagaries, such as "The allegations 
concerning the psychotic episodean May 1997, if truly causally related to the events of two years 
prior, are at best additional damages or aggravation of damages relating to the original claims"; 
"appears to claim that the new episode created new damages whick would extend the value of his 
claim, if any"; "because the additional paragraphs deal only with additional damages, but not the 
accrual of the case of action"; "facts which presumably support his various causes of action, all of 
which were known at the time the original wrong was done in 1995" (emphases added). 
2 
Appellant Addendum — 169 
This final clause argued by the defendant may be the most absurd, as knowledge of the 
May 20, 1997 breakdown and its discovery by plaintiff was impossible "at the time the original 
wrong wa&done in 1995." 
Nothing in the original complaint or the proposed amended complaint — which are to be 
taken by the court as true — contains any support for defendant's ridiculous argument. Nothing in 
either complaint suggests that the May 20, 1997 breakdown, wasa cause of defendant's actions in 
1995. 
Nor does either of the complaints contain any ^ support for-an apparent claim-by plaintiff of a 
new episode or new damages or additional damages. 
Defendant's specious speculation is groundless. 
Plaintiffs amended complaint eliminated six defendants from the original complaint 
according to the court's direction. It also includes- the previously forgotten facts of the case 
concerning plaintiff's discovery that his psychotic breakdown was directly and proximately caused 
by the actions of the defendants_utthe complaint, and which resulted in severe and permanent 
damage to plaintiff, including a mental disability. The amended complaint also articulates the 
description-of damages in the statements of claim. 
Plaintiff's motion to amend makes clear that the mentally ill plaintiff forgot to include in his 
original complaint the discovery that the actions of defendants in March 1995 were a direct and 
proximate cause of damages to plaintiff on and after May 20, 1997. 
Memory disfunction and confusion are among the debilitating symptoms of plaintiff's life-
long "serious and persistent" mental illness and disability, which the court has been fully aware of 
since April 9, 2002. 
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In fact, early pleadings in this case make clear that plaintiff intended to include in his 
complaint the discovery of his psychotic breakdown of May 20, 1997 as a causal result of the 
defendants actions in this case. 
In Plaintiffs April 9, 2002 affidavit in support of his Motion for Expedited Disposition of 
Plaintiffs Notice to Submit for Decision on Motion for Reasonable Modification of Rules, and 
Defendant's Objection to the Same, and Memorandum, plaintiff stated: 
"13. The dangerous mental health condition I suffer from now7 is at least in part 
a consequence of the incidents described in-my complaint (Civil No. 020902112)." 
(Affidavit, 5 13; cf. 59 14-20 and 6-12; cf. plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss All Claims^ p. 17)) 
The court recognized, at the outset of this case, the symptoms of plaintiffs illness and 
disability in its grant of plaintiffs motion for reasonable modification of rules, which was based on 
plaintiffs mental illness and disability and on the Americans with Disabilities Act (see DSM IV, 
Dilusional Disorder, Bi-Polar Disorder, Paranoid Personality Disorder, and references, therein). 
Defendant cites Becton, Dixon & Company v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983); 
Brigham Young University v. Baulsen Construction Co^ 1AA P.2d 1370 (UtalU-987); and 
Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992), in support of his specious 
arguments. 
But all three cases support plaintiffs motion to amend. 
Becton states that "the general rule has been that a cause of action accrues upon the 
happening-of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action," howevery "There are several 
exceptions to the general rule in Utah," including "where there are exceptional circumstances that 
would make application of the general rule irrational or unjust, this Court has adopted the 
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discovery rule by judical action (Id., a t 1257. including footnote 11, which cites Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 R2d 84 (Utah 1981), footnote 6). 
Becton supports plaintiffs motion to amend the com plainly as well as plaintiffs 
memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. 
RYU v. Paulsen, at 1374^ also holds that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations in 
exceptional circumstances, relying on Becton, at 1257, and Myers, at 87 (BYU v. Paulsen, at 
1374), again, supporting plaintiffs motion to amend and his memorandum in opposition to 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Atwtftfdalsasupports plaintiffs motion to amend and memorandum in. opposition to 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Atwood was denied the discovery rule because "the discovery rule 
does not apply to a plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or damages and a possibly cause of 
action before the statute of limitations expires," and because Atwood recognized a cause for action 
during the statute period but did "not suggest any reason why7 the^action couldnot have-been filed 
between" the time he discovered the cause of action and the expiration of the statute. 
In the case at bar, the accrual of the cause of action began at the time of plaintiffs 
discovery, on about about November 21, 1998, that the actions of the defendants in March 1995 
were directand proximate causes of plaintiff s. psychotic breakdown on May 2071997. And 
further accrual occurred in a multitude of subsequent depressive and manic and mixed despressive-
manic episodes, including suicidal and homocidal episodes through the present. The November 5, 
1999 diagnosis that plaintiff was mentally disabled was a further accrual, as was the final 
declaration^ the Third District Court on December 1.4, 2QQL, that plaintiff is mentally disabled. 
And the possible death of the plaintiff before this case ends (Myers , Id.), upon which plaintiffs 
estate wouldbase an additional joined wrongful-death statement of claim in an amended complaint, 
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is yet possible ~ all of w hich facts are-part of the Third District Court record in Lowery v. 
Lowery, Civil No. 004904704, Third District Court of Utah, cited in both Complaints, 5 3). 
Plaintiffs two restored paragraphs of facts and the related statements-of-claim-ahout 
damages relevant to those two restored paragraphs do not describe new actions or additional 
damages, but describe plaintiffs breakdown and the discovery of the damages necessary to the 
accrual of the cause of action. 
While plaintiff s discovery, on or about November 2U 1998, of damages resulting on May 
20, 1997 was within the statute of limitations, plaintiff was senouslv and persistently mentally oil, 
mental!} disabled, and unable to manage his business affairs. 
Plaintiff was unable to manage his business affairs at the time of defendant's actions in this 
case, was much less-able to manage his business affairs fronrthe moment of his psychotic break 
on May 20, 1997 to the time he discovered that defendant's actions were a direct and proximate 
cause of the breakdown and to the present (see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law in Lowery 
v. Lowery, Civil No. 004904704, Third District Court of Utah, Complaints, 5 3). 
Most recently, the Utah. Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have declared that 
statute of 
Limitation periods begin to run when a cause of action has accrued, which 'occurs 
upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action'. {Bank One 
UtaKNA. v. West Jordan City, No. 2QQQ078SCA (2002 UT App 221\ at 23; Amgon v. 
Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), at 252, quoting Becton. 
Dixon & Co., at 1257, emphasis added; Maoris v. Sculptured Software, hxc^ 24 P3d~984 
(Utah 2001)) 
Plaintiff s major psychotic breaLon May 20, 1997 is clearly an event necessary to the 
accrual of the cause of action in this case, as is made clear by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
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of law in Lowery v. Lowery, Civil No. 004904704^ Third District Court of Utah, upon which the 
court based its decision on plaintiffs motion for reasonable modification of rules, which the court 
has been fully aware of since the beginning of this case. 
Plaintiffs discovery of the causal connection between the actions of the defendants and the 
damages to plaintiff in this case is also without question an event necessary to the accnial of the 
cause of action in this case, as is made clear by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law in 
Lowery v. Lowery, Civil No. QQ49Q47Q4y Third District Court of Utah, upon which the court 
based its decision on plaintiffs motion for reasonable modification of rules. 
As repeatedly madaclear in pleadings-on this issue, in this case, after plaintiff had begun 
daily psychotropic drug treatment and long-term psychotherapy, w7hich began on November 21, 
1998 (now going on 4.5 years^ plaintiff discovered that the actions of defendants in this case 
caused the psychotic breakdown. 
The-issues in the cases cited are the application of the discovery rule and the accnial of a 
cause of action. 
ThcJdacris court upheld the long-time standard for invoking the discovery rule: 
(1) when the discovery7 rule is mandated by statute; (2) when a plaintiff does not become 
aware of the cause of action because of the defendant" s concealment or misleading conduct; 
and (3) when the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the statute 
of limitation would be irrational or unjust regardless of any showing that the defendant has 
prevented the discovery7 of the cause of action. (Id. 989; also see Williams v. Howard^ 970 
P2d_ 1282 (Utah 1998) (directly applying the discovery rule to UCA 7&-1236)T as well as 
Envirotech Corp v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994) (same), Olsen v. Hooley, 
865 P2d. 1345 (Utah, 1993), Meyers-v, McDonald,-635 P2d. (Utah 1981)). 
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In the case of plaintiffs motion to amend, at least"(3)y" for exceptional circumstances, 
clearly applies; and the court must apply the Maoris court's "balancing test" {Maoris, at 989): 
However, before a court reaches this test, aa initial showing must be made that 
the plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have known of the existence of the 
casaof action in time to file a claim within the limitation period. (Macris, 989) 
Plaintiffs life-long illness and disability, the timing between the March 1995 actions of 
defendant and plaintiffs May 20, 1997 breakdown, and the beginning of plaintiff s treatment with 
psychotropic medications and psychotherapy — which facts are contained in the complaint and 
knowa to the court by its review and grant of plaintiffs motion for reasonable modification of 
rules and its review7 of plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss 
clearly constitutes an initial showing that plaintiff could not have known of and couldnot 
reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim within the 
limitation period. 
Plaintiff s reasoning has been impaired since early life, and was much more impaired since 
the psychotic breakdown. 
Plaintiffs breakdown, caused directly and proximately by defendant's actions^ could not 
have been reasonably known by anyone prior to its occurrence on May 20, 1997, and plaintiff was 
unable ta conduct his business affairs reasonably from early life and even less^capable^of 
reasonable knowledge after May 20, 1997, as his rational faculty was seriously and persistently 
impaired by his illness and disability since early life and even more impaired since May 20, 1997. 
A balancing test conducted by the court, required by law, before its decision on the motions 
to amend and to dismiss will show that "there are exceptional-circumstances making [the statute of] 
limitation irrational or unjust" in this case (Macris, at 989). 
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To apply the statute of limitation in this case would be irrational and unjust due to the 
impossibility of plaintiffs knowledge of the accrual of the cause of action before his breakdown on 
May 20, 1997 and thereafter until he was treated for his life-long mental illness and disability by 
his doctors. 
Thexourt should grant plaintiff s motion to amend and deny the defendant's motion to 
dismiss. 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2002. 
s 
Thomas J. Lowery 
9 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 4rd day of December, 2002,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Reply to Defedant's Belated Response to Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Motion 
to Amend Complaint and Memorandum to be Mailed to the following: 
Mr. David B. Thomas 
A-350 ASB 
P.O. Box 21333 
Provo, Utah 84602-1333 
Thomas J. Lowerv 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 2 2002 
<tij SALT LAKE COUNTY 
B y J L - — — — 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS J- LOWERY : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 020902112 
vs. : 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, et al.,: 
Defendant. : 
Before the Court is defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to 
Rule 4-501. Following oral argument on October 18, 2002, the Court 
took the matter under advisement. Having considered the Motion, the 
Memoranda and the arguments submitted in behalf of the parties, the 
Court enters the following decision: 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
This Motion was filed under Rule 12 (b) (6) , but during the 
course of briefing outside materials were submitted in support of 
the parties' positions. While the Court may choose to consider 
these materials, and treat the motion as one made under Rule 56, in 
this case, the Court elects to exclude these documents and examine 
the complaint on its own merits in light of Rule 12(b)(6). The 
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Court will grant this motion only if, as a matter of law, the 
plaintiff cannot recover under the facts alleged. 
The defendants seek dismissal of the complaint because they 
claim is was not timely filed. A statute of limitations, which is 
an affirmative defense, may be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) 
standard when the facts necessary to the defense have been pled in 
the complaint. See Tucker v. State Farm Mutual, 2 002 UT 54; 53 
P. 3d 947. Here, plaintiff has not only pled the date of the 
accrual of the cause of action, thus bringing the statute of 
limitations defense within the scope of Rule 12(b)(6), but in 
apparent anticipation of the present challenge, asserted that "at 
relevant times hereto, Thomas J. Lowery was a mentally ill man, 
which tolls the statute of limitations for this action.1' Complaint 
at ^ 3. Because both the statute of limitations and the 
incompetency defense thereto have been raised in the complaint, the 
only question the court need determine is whether the claim that 
the statute of limitations is tolled because of his alleged 
incompetency is sufficient to defeat the defense and allow this 
matter to go forward. 
This exercise requires that the Court accept the facts as 
stated in the complaint, and indulge all reasonable inferences from 
the facts in plaintiff's favor. However, "the sufficiency of 
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[plaintiff's] pleadings mast be determined by the facts pleaded 
rather than the conclusions stated." Franco v. Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, H 26, 21 P.3d 198. 
The Court accepts as true for purposes of this motion that 
plaintiff is mentally ill. However, plaintiff's conclusion that 
because of this mental illness the statute of limitations was 
tolled is a conclusory statement which the Court is not required to 
accept. Further, it misstates the law. In Utah, the statute of 
limitations is tolled for incompetency. While incompetency may 
result from mental illness, mental illness does not by its mere 
presence require the conclusion that the afflicted individual is 
incompetent. Rather, a person is incompetent for purposes of 
tolling a statute of limitations when he is "unable to protect 
[his] legal rights because of an overall inability to function in 
society;" or in other words, "when the disability is of such a 
nature to show him . . . unable to manage his . . . business 
affairs or estate, or to comprehend his . . . legal rights or 
liabilities"; or is unable to "care for his . . . personal safety 
and provide basic human needs such as food, shelter, and clothing." 
O'Neal v. Division of Family Svc. , 821 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 1991). 
The only allegations in the complaint which describe plaintiff's 
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condition discuss his injuries as a result of the defendants1 
actions: 
plaintiff suffered . . . severe biochemical 
distress and fear of physical harm to himself 
and his family; anxiety; nervousness; 
sleeplessness adversely affecting plaintiff's 
ability to function and interact normally in 
the workplace and socially; humiliation; 
embarrassment; inability to concentrate and 
focus; intense pain m his head, neck, 
shoulders and back; frequent nightmares 
causing perspiration and disrupted patterns of 
sleep adversely affecting plaintiff's ability 
to function and interact normally in the 
workplace and socially; fatigue; overreaction 
or inordinate reaction to ordinary events and 
occurrences. 
Complaint at If 63, 68,73, 78, 83, 88, and 95. While these 
symptoms are not alleged in his complaint for the purpose of 
tolling the statute of limitations, they do discuss plaintiff's 
condition which nonetneless does not demonstrate that at any time 
within the intervening period between the accrual of the cause of 
action and the filing of the complaint plaintiff was unable to 
protect his legal rights. 
Even if the Court were to consider the documents provided both 
in support and in defense of the motion to dismiss under the Rule 
56 standard, the outcome would be the same. Certainly plaintiff 
provides ample evidence of his mental illness, including a judicial 
finding and an award of alimony because he is mentally ill. On the 
Appellant Addendum — 181 
LOWERY V. PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
other hand, plaintiff also provides an affidavit which, while 
demonstrating the difficulties his condition imposes upon him, 
reveals that plaintiff is presently under the same condition he 
suffered from during the years between his injury and the filing of 
the cause of action. Because plaintiff's present pleadings 
evidence a better understanding of his legal rights than is 
typically demonstrated by a pro-se party, this Court cannot 
conclude that the plaintiff was at any time incompetent for 
purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. 
Accordingly, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. 
This constitutes the final order of the Court on the matters 
referenced herein. No further order is required. 
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